IRLF 


SB    MS    Qlfl 


EXCHANGE 


CORNELL  STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY 
No.  ii 


JOHN  DEWEY'S  LO.GICAL  THEORY 


BY 


DELTON  THOMAS  HOWARD,  A.M 

FORMERLY  FELLOW  IN  THE  SAGE  SCHOOL  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE   FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE 

REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR 

OF  PHILOSOPHY 


NEW   YORK 

LONGMANS,  GREEN,  &  CO. 
1919 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY 
LANCASTER.  PA. 


PREFACE 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  offer  an  apology  for  an  historical 
treatment  of  Professor  Dewey's  logical  theories,  since  function- 
alism  glories  in  the  genetic  method.  To  be  sure,  certain  more  \ 
extreme  radicals  are  opposed  to  a  genetic  interpretation  of  the  \ 
history  of  human  thought,  but  this  is  inconsistent.  At  any  rate, 
the  historical  method  employed  in  the  following  study  may 
escape  censure  by  reason  of  its  simple  character,  for  it  is  little 
more  than  a  critical  review  of  Professor  Dewey's  writings  in  their 
historical  order,  with  no  discussion  of  influences  and  connections, 
and  with  little  insistence  upon  rigid  lines  of  development.  It  is 
proposed  to  "follow  the  lead  of  the  subject-matter"  as  far  as 
possible;  to  discover  what  topics  interested  Professor  Dewey,  how 
he  dealt  with  them,  and  what  conclusions  he  arrived  at.  This 
plan  has  an  especial  advantage  when  applied  to  a  body  of  doc- 
trine which,  like  Professor  Dewey's,  does  not  possess  a  syste- 
matic form  of  its  own,  since  it  avoids  the  distortion  which  a 
more  rigid  method  would  be  apt  to  produce. 

It  has  not  been  possible,  within  the  limits  of  the  present  study,  to 
take  note  of  all  of  Professor  Dewey's-wri  tings,  and  no  reference  has 
been  made  to  some  which  are  of  undoubted  interest  and  impor- 
tance. Among  these  may  be  mentioned  especially  his  books  and 
papers  on  educational  topics  and  a  number  of  his  ethical  writings. 
Attention  has  been  devoted  almost  exclusively  to  those  writings 
which  have  some  important  bearing  upon  his  logical  theory. 
The  division  into  chapters  is  partly  arbitrary,  although  the 
periods  indicated  are  quite  clearly  marked  by  the  different  direc- 
tions which  Professor  Dewey's  interests  took  from  time  to  time. 
It  will  be  seen  that  there  is  considerable  chance  for  error  in  distin- 
guishing between  the  important  and  the  unimportant,  and  in 
selecting  the  essays  which  lie  in  the  natural  line  of  the  author's 
development.  But,  valeat  quantum,  as  William  James  would  say. 

The  criticisms  and  comments  which  have  been  made  from  time 
to  time,  as  seemed  appropriate,  may  be  considered  pertinent  or 
irrelevant  according  to  the  views  of  the  reader.  It  is  hoped  that 

HI 
438119 


IV  PREFACE. 

they  are  not  entirely  aside  from  the  mark,  and  that  they  do  not 
interfere  with  a  fair  presentation  of  the  author's  views.  The 
last  chapter  is  devoted  to  a  direct  criticism  of  Professor  Dewey's 
functionalism,  with  some  comments  on  the  general  nature  of 
philosophical  method. 

Since  this  thesis  was  written,  Professor  Dewey  has  published 
two  or  three  books  and  numerous  articles,  which  are  perhaps  more 
important  than  any  of  his  previous  writings.  The  volume  of 
Essays  in  Experimental  Logic  (1916)  is  a  distinct  advance  upon 
The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy  and  Other  Essays,  pub- 
lished six  years  earlier.  Most  of  these  essays,  however,  are 
considered  here  in  their  original  form,  and  the  new  material, 
while  interesting,  presents  no  vital  change  of  standpoint.  It 
might  be  well  to  call  attention  to  the  excellent  introductory  essay 
which  Professor  Dewey  has  provided  for  this  new  volume.  Some 
mention  might  also  be  made  of  the  volume  of  essays  by  eight  rep- 
resentative pragmatists,  which  appeared  last  year  (1917)  under 
the  title,  Creative  Intelligence.  My  comments  on  Professor  Dewey's 
contribution  to  the  volume  have  been  printed  elsewhere.1  It  has 
not  seemed  necessary,  in  the  absence  of  significant  developments, 
to  extend  the  thesis  beyond  its  original  limits,  and  it  goes  to 
press,  therefore,  substantially  as  written  two  years  ago. 

I  wish  to  express  my  gratitude  to  the  members  of  the  faculty 
of  the  Sage  School  of  Philosophy  for  many  valuable  suggestions 
and  kindly  encouragement  in  the  course  of  my  work.  I  am  most 
deeply  indebted  to  Professor  Ernest  Albee  for  his  patient  guidance 
and  helpful  criticism.  Many  of  his  suggestions,  both  as  to  plan 
and  detail,  have  been  adopted  and  embodied  in  the  thesis,  and 
these  have  contributed  materially  to  such  logical  coherence  and 
technical  accuracy  as  it  may  possess.  The  particular  views 
expressed  are,  of  course,  my  own.  I  wish  also  to  thank  Professor 
J.  E.  Creighton  especially  for  his  friendly  interest  and  for  many 
suggestions  which  assisted  the  progress  of  my  work,  as  well  as 
for  his  kindness  in  looking  over  the  proofs. 

D.  T.  HOWARD. 

EVANSTON,  ILLINOIS, 

June,  1918. 

1  "The  Pragmatic  Method,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific 
Methods,  1918,  Vol.  XV,  pp.  149-156. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  "Psychology  as  Philosophic  Method" I 

II.  The  Development  of  the  Psychological  Standpoint  . .  15 

III.  "Moral  Theory  and  Practice" 33 

IV.  Functional  Psychology 47 

V.  The  Evolutionary  Standpoint 59 

^*tl.  "Studies  in  Logical  Theory" 72 

VII.  The  Polemical  Period 88 

VIII.  Later  Developments 105 

IX.  Conclusions 119 


CHAPTER   I 

"PSYCHOLOGY  AS   PHILOSOPHIC   METHOD" 

DEWEY'S  earliest  standpoint  in  philosophy  is  presented  in  two 
articles  published  in  Mind  in  1886:  "The  Psychological  Stand- 
point," and  "Psychology  as  Philosophic  Method."1  These 
articles  appear  to  have  been  written  in  connection  with  his 
Psychology,  which  was  published  in  the  same  year,  and  which 
represents  the  same  general  point  of  view  as  applied  to  the  study 
of  mental  phenomena.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present  study 
attention  may  be  confined  to  the  two  articles  in  Mind. 

Dewey  begins  his  argument,  in  "The  Psychological  Stand- 
point," with  a  reference  to  Professor  Green's  remark  that  the 
psychological  standpoint  is  what  marks  the  difference  between 
transcendentalism  and  British  empiricism.  Dewey  takes  excep- 
tion to  this  view,  and  asserts  that  the  two  schools  hold  this 
standpoint  in  common,  and,  furthermore,  that  the  psychological 
standpoint  has  been  the  strength  of  British  empiricism  and  deser- 
tion of  that  standpoint  its  weakness.  Shadworth  Hodgson's 
comment  on  this  proposal  testifies  to  its  audacity.  In  a  review 
of  Dewey's  article,  he  says:  "If  for  instance  we  are  told  by  a 
competent  writer,  that  Absolute  Idealism  is  not  only  a  truth  of 
experience  but  one  attained  directly  by  the  method  of  experien- 
tial psychology,  we  should  not  allow  our  astonishment  to  prevent 
our  examining  the  arguments,  by  virtue  of  which  English  psy- 
chology attains  the  results  of  German  transcendentalism  without 
quitting  the  ground  of  experience."2 

Dewey  defines  his  psychological  standpoint  as  follows:  "We 
are  not  to  determine  the  nature  of  reality  or  of  any  object  of 
philosophical  inquiry  by  examining  it  as  it  is  in  itself,  but  only 
as  it  is  an  element  in  our  knowledge,  in  our  experience,  only  as 
it  is  related  to  our  mind,  or  is  an  'idea*.  \  .  .  Or,  in  the  ordinary 

1  Vol.  xi,  pp.  1-19;  pp.  153-173. 

2  "Illusory  Psychology,"  Mind,  Vol.  XI,  1886,  p.  478. 

I 


2  JOHNi:DEW£r.S.*LOGICAL   THEORY. 

way  of  putting  it,  the  nature  of  all  objects  of  philosophical 
inquiry  is  to  be  fixed  by  finding  out  what  experience  says  about  • 
them."1     The  implications  of  this  definition  do  not  appear  at 
first  sight,  but  they  become  clearer  as  the  discussion  proceeds. 

Locke,  Dewey  continues,  deserted  the  psychological  stand- 
point because  he  did  not,  as  he  proposed,  explain  the  nature  of 
such  things  as  matter  and  mind  by  reference  to  experience.  On 
the  contrary,  he  explained  experience  through  the  assumption  of 
the  two  unknowable  substances,  matter  and  mind.  Berkeley 
also  deserted  the  psychological  standpoint,  in  effect,  by  having 
recourse  to  a  purely  transcendent  Spirit.  Even  Hume  deserted 
it  by  assuming  as  the  only  reals  certain  unrelated  sensations,  and  ^ 
by  trying  to  explain  the  origin  of  experience  and  knowledge  by 
their  combination.  These  reals  were  supposed  to  exist  in  inde- 
pendence of  an  organized  experience,  and  to  constitute  it  by 
their  association.  It  might  be  argued  that  Hume's  sensations 
are  found  in  experience  by  analysis,  and  this  would  probably  be 
true.  But  the  sensations  are  nothing  apart  from  the  conscious- 
ness in  which  they  are  found.  "Such  a  sensation,"  Dewey  says, 
"a  sensation  which  exists  only  within  and  for  experience,  is  not 
one  which  can  be  used  to  account  for  experience.  It  is  but  one 
element  in  an  organic  whole,  and  can  no  more  account  for  the 
whole,  than  a  given  digestive  act  can  account  for  the  existence 
of  a  living  body."2 

So  far.Dewey  is  merely  restating  the  criticism  of  English  em- 
piricism that  had  been  made  by  Green  and  his  followers.  Reality, 
as  experienced,  is  a  whole  of  organically  related  parts,  not  a 
mechanical  compound  of  elements.  Whatever  is  to  be  explained 
must  be  taken  as  a  fact  of  experience,  and  its  meaning  will  be 
revealed  in  terms  of  its  position  and  function  within  the  whole. 
But  while  Dewey  employs  the  language  of  idealism,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  he  has  grasped  the  full  significance  of  the  "concrete 
universal"  of  the  Hegelian  school.  The  following  passage 
illustrates  the  difficulty:  "The  psychological  standpoint  as  it 
has  developed  itself  is  this:  all  that  is,  is  for  consciousness  or 
knowledge.  The  business  of  the  psychologist  is  to  give  a  genetic 

1  "The  Psychological  Standpoint,"  Mind,  1886,  vol.  XI,  p.  2. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  7. 


11  PSYCHOLOGY  AS  PHILOSOPHIC  METHOD.11  3 

account  of  the  various  elements  within  this  consciousness,  and 
thereby  fix  their  place,  determine  their  validity,  and  at  the  same 
time  show  definitely  what  the  real  and  eternal  nature  of  this 
consciousness  is."1 

Consciousness  (used  here  as  identical  with  'experience')  is 
apparently  interpreted  as  a  structure  made  up  of  elements  related 
in  a  determinable  order,  and  having,  consequently,  a  'real  and 
eternal  nature.'  The  result  is  a  'structural'  view  of  reality,  and 
the  type  of  idealism  for  which  Dewey  stands  may  fittingly  be 
called  'structural'  idealism.  This  type  of  idealism  does,  in  fact, 
hold  a  position  intermediate  between  English  empiricism  and 
German  transcendentalism.  But  it  would  not  commonly  be 
considered  a  synthesis  of  the  best  characteristics  of  the  two 
schools.  'Structural'  idealism  is,  historically  considered,  a 
reversion  to  Kant  which  retains  the  mechanical  elements  of  the 
Critique,  but  fails  to  reckon  with  the  truly  organic  mode  of  inter- 
pretation in  which  it  culminates.  As  experience,  from  Kant's 
undeveloped  position,  is  a  structure  of  sensations  and  forms,  so 
Dewey 's  'consciousness'  is  a  compound  of  separate  elements  or 
existences  related  in  a  '  real  and  eternal'  order. 

Dewey  illustrates  his  method,  in  the  discussion  which  follows, 
by  employing  it,  or  showing  how  it  should  be  employed,  in  the 
definition  of  certain  typical  objects  of  philosophical  inquiry. 
The  first  to  be  considered  are  subject  and  object.  In  dealing 
with  the  relation  of  subject  to  object,  the  psychological  method 
will  attempt  to  show  how  consciousness  differentiates  itself,  or 
'specifies'  itself,  into  subject  and  object.  These  terms  will  be 
viewed  as  related  terms  within  the  whole  of  'consciousness,'  rather 
than  as  elements  existing  prior  to  or  in  independence  of  the  whole 
in  which  they  are  found. 

There  is  a  type  of  realism  which  illustrates  the  opposite  or 
ontological  method.  It  is  led,  through  a  study  of  the  dependence 
of  the  mind  upon  the  organism,  to  a  position  in  which  subject  and 
object  fall  apart,  out  of  relation  to  each  other.  The  separation 
of  the  two  leads  to  the  positing  of  a  third  term,  an  unknown  x, 
which  is  supposed  to  unite  them.  The  psychological  method 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  8  f. 


4  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

would  hold  that  the  two  objects  have  their  union,  not  in  an  un- 
known 'real/  but  in  the  'consciousness'  in  which  they  appear. 
The  individual  consciousness  as  subject,  and  the  objects  over 
against  it,  are  elements  at  once  distinguished  and  related  within 
the  whole.  All  the  terms  are  facts  of  experience,  and  none  are 
to  be  assumed  as  ontological  reals. 

Subje^tiveidealisjn,  Dewey  continues,  makes  a  similar  error 
in  Talfing  to  discriminate  between  the  ego,  or  individual  conscious- 
ness, and  the  Absolute  Consciousness  within  which  ego  and  object 
are  differentiated  elements.  It  fails  to  see  that  subject  and 
object  are  complements,  and  inexplicable  except  as  related  ele- 
ments in  a  larger  whole.  The  individual  consciousness,  again, 
and  the  universal  'Consciousness,'  are  to  be  defined  by  reference 
to  experience.  It  is  not  to  be  assumed  at  the  start,  as  the  sub- 
jective idealists  assume,  that  the  nature  of  the  individual  con- 
sciousness is  known.  The  ego  is  to  be  defined,  not  assumed, 
and  this  is  the  essence  of  the  psychological  method. 

So  far,  two  factors  in  Dewey's  standpoint  are  clearly  discern- 
ible. In  the  first  place,  all  noumena  and  transcendent  reals 
are  to  be  rejected  as  means  of  explanation,  and  definition  is  to 
be  wholly  in  terms  of  experienced  elements,  as  experienced.  In 
the  second  place,  experience  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  rational  system 
of  related  elements,  while  explanation  is  to  consist  in  tracing 
out  the  relations  which  any  element  bears  to  the  whole\  The 
universal  'Consciousness'  is  the  whole,  and  the  individual  mind, 
again,  is  an  element  within  the  whole,  to  be  explained  by  tracing 
out  the  relations  which  it  bears  to  other  elements  and  to  the 
whole  system.  It  is  not  easy  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  Dewey 
conceives  of  *  consciousness '  as  a  construct  of  existentially 
distinct  terms. 

/Dewey  does  not  actually  treat  subject  and  object,  individual 
and  universal  consciousness,  in  the  empirical  manner  for  which 
he  contends.  He  merely  outlines  a  method ;  and,  while  this  has  a 
negative  bearing  as  against  transcendent  modes  of  explanation, 
it  has  little  content  of  its  own.  But  in  spite  of  Dewey's  lack  of 
explicitness,  it  is  evident  that  he  tends  to  view  his  'objects  of 
philosophical  inquiry'  as  so  many  concrete  particular  existences 


"PYSCHOLOGY  AS  PHILOSOPHIC  METHOD.''  5 

or  things.  The  idea  that  they  can  be  empirically  marked  out 
and  investigated  seems  to  imply  this.  But  subject,  object, 
individual,  and  universal  are  certainly  not  reducible  to  particular 
sensations,  even  though  it  must  be  admitted  that  they  have  a 
reference  to  particulars.  These  abstract  concepts  had  been  a 
source  of  difficulty  to  the  empiricists,  because  they  had  not  been 
able  to  reduce  them  to  particular  impressions,  and  Dewey's  pro- 
posed method  appears  to  involve  the  same  difficulty. 

In  his  second  article,  on  "Psychology  as  Philosophic  Method," 
Dewey  proposes  to  show  that  his  standpoint  is  practically  iden- 
tical with  that  of  transcendental  idealism.  This  is  made  possible, 
he  believes,  through  the  fact  that,  since  experience  or  conscious- 
ness is  the  only  reality,  psychology,  as  the  scientific  account  of 
this  reality,  becomes  identical  with  philosophy. 

In  maintaining  his  position,  Dewey  finds  it  necessary  to  criticise 
the  tendency,  found  in  certain  idealists,  to  treat  psychology 
merely  as  a  special  science.  This  view  of  psychology  is  attained, 
Dewey  observes,  by  regarding  man  under  two  arbitrarily  deter- 
mined aspects.  Taken  as  a  finite  being  acting  amid  finite  things, 
a  knowing,  willing,  feeling  phenomenon,  man  is  said  to  be  the 
object  of  a  special  science,  psychology.  But  in  another  aspect 
man  is  infinite,  the  universal  self-consciousness,  and  as  such  is 
the  object  of  philosophy.  This  distinction  between  the  two 
aspects  of  man's  nature,  Dewey  believes,  cannot  be  maintained. 
As  a  distinction,  it  must  arise  within  consciousness,  and  it  must 
therefore  be  a  psychological  distinction.  Psychology  cannot 
limit  itself  to  anything  less  than  the  whole  of  experience,  and 
cannot,  therefore,  be  a  special  science  dependent,  like  others, 
upon  philosophy  for  its  working  concepts.  On  the  contrary,  the 
method  of  psychology  must  be  the  method  of  philosophy. 

Dewey  reaches  this  result  quite  easily,  because  he  makes  psy- 
chology the  science  of  reality  to  begin  with. /"The  universe," 
he  says,  "except  as  realized  in  an  individual,  has  no  existence. 
.  .  .  Self-consciousness  means  simply  an  individualized  universe ; 
and  if  this  universe  has  not  been  realized  in  man,  if  man  be  not 
self-conscious,  then  no  philosophy  whatever  is  possible.  If  it 
has  been  realized,  it  is  in  and  through  psychological  experience 


6  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

that  this  realization  has  occurred.  Psychology  is  the  scientific 
account  of  this  realization,  of  this  individualized  universe,  of 
this  self-consciousness."1 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  exactly  what  these  expressions 
meant  for  Dewey.  Granting  that  the  human  mind  is  both 
individual  and  universal,  what  objection  could  be  raised  against 
the  study  of  its  individual  or  finite  aspects  as  the  special  subject- 
matter  of  a  particular  science?  All  the  sciences,  as  Dewey  was 
aware,  are  abstract  in  method.  Dewey 's  position  appears  to  be 
that  the  universal  and  individual  aspects  of  consciousness  are 
nothing  apart  from  each  other,  and  must  be  studied  together- 
But  'consciousness'  in  Dewey's  view  is,  in  fact,  two  conscious- 
nesses. Reality  as  a  whole  is  a  Consciousness,  and  the  individual 
mind  is  another  consciousness.  A  problem  arises,  therefore,  as 
to  their  connection.  Dewey  affirms  that,  unless  they  are  united, 
unless  the  universal  is  given  in  the  individual  consciousness, 
there  can  be  no  science  of  the  whole,  and  therefore  no  philosophy. 
The  epistemological  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  reality 
becomes,  accordingly,  the  raison  d'etre  of  his  method.  The 
problem  was  an  inheritance  from  subjective  idealism.  It  may 
be  pointed  out  that  there  is  some  similarity  between  Dewey's 
standpoint  and  Berkeley's.  Both  conceive  of  consciousness 
as  a  construct  of  elements,  and  Dewey's  'Consciousness  in 
general '  holds  much  the  same  relation  to  the  finite  consciousness 
that  the  Divine  Mind  holds  to  the  individual  consciousness  in 
Berkeley's  system.  The  similarity  between  the  two  standpoints 
must  not  be  overemphasized,  but  it  is  none  the  less  suggestive 
and  interesting. 

In  attempting  to  determine  the  proper  status  of  psychology 
as  a  science,  Dewey  is  led  into  a  more  detailed  exposition  of  his 
standpoint.  His  position  in  general  is  well  indicated  in  the  fol- 
lowing passage:  /' In  short,  the  real  esse  of  things  is  neither  their 
percipi,  nor  their  intelligi  alone ;  it  is  their  experiri."*  The  science 
of  the  intelligi  is  logic,  and  of  the  percipi,  philosophy  of  nature. 
But  these  are  abstractions  from  the  experiri,  the  science  of  which 
is  psychology.  'It  it  be  denied  that  the  experiri,  self-conscious  - 

1  "Psychology  as  Philosophic  Method,"  Mind,  1886,  Vol.  XI,  p.  15?- 

2  Ibid.,  p.  160.     (Observe  that  this  is  a  direct  reference  to  Berkeley.) 


"PSYCHOLOGY  AS  PHILOSOPHIC  METHOD."  7 

ness  in  its  wholeness,  can  be  the  subject-matter  of  psychology, 
then  the  possibility  of  philosophy  is  also  denied.  "If  man,  as 
matter  of  fact,  does  not  realise  the  nature  of  the  eternal  and  the 
universal  within  himself,  as  the  essence  of  his  own  being;  if  he 
does  not  at  one  stage  of  his  experience  consciously,  and  in  all 
stages  implicitly,  lay  hold  of  this  universal  and  eternal,  then  it  is 
mere  matter  of  words  to  say  that  he  can  give  no  account  of  things 
as  they  universally  and  eternally  are.\  To  deny,  therefore,  that 
self-consciousness  is  a  matter  of  psychological  experience  is  to 
deny  the  possibility  of  any  philosophy."1  Dewey  assures  us 
again  that  his  method  alone  will  solve  the  epistemological  prob- 
lem. 

Self-consciousness,  as  that  within  which  things  exist  sub 
specie  (Bternitatis  and  in  or  dine  ad  universum,  must  be  the  object 
of  psychology.  The  refusal  to  take  self-consciousness  as  an 
experienced  fact,  Dewey  says,  results  in  such  failures  as  are  seen 
in  Kant,  Hegel,  and  even  Green  and  Caird,  to  give  any  adequate 
account  of  the  nature  of  the  Absolute.  Kant,  for  purely  logical 
reasons,  denied  that  self-consciousness  could  be  an  object  of 
experience,  although  he  admitted  conceptions  and  perceptions 
as  matters  of  experience.  As  a  result  of  his  attitude,  conception 
and  perception  were  never  brought  into  organic  connection;  the 
self-conscious,  eternal  order  of  the  world  was  referred  to  some- 
thing back  of  experience.  Dewey  attributes  Kant's  failure  to 
his  logical  method,  which  led  him  away  from  the  psychological 
standpoint  in  which  he  would  have  found  self-consciousness  as 
a  directly  presented  fact. 

This  criticism  of  Kant's  '  logical  method '  fails  to  take  account 
of  the  transitional  nature  of  Kant's  standpoint.  Looking  back- 
ward, it  is  easy  enough  to  ask  why  Kant  did  not  begin  with  the 
organic  view  of  experience  at  which  he  finally  arrived.  But  the 
answer  must  be  that  the  organic  standpoint  did  not  exist  until 
Kant,  by  his  'logical  method,'  had  brought  it  to  light.  The 
Kantian  interpretation  of  experience,  in  which,  as  Dewey  asserts, 
conception  and  perception  were  never  brought  into  organic 
relation,  is  a  half-way  stage  between  mechanism  and  organism. 

1  op.  dt. 


8  JOHN  DEWEY1  S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

But  how  does  Dewey  propose  to  improve  upon  Kant's  position? 
He  will  first  of  all  put  Kant's  noumenal  self  back  into  experience, 
as  a  fact  in  consciousness.  But  how  will  this  help  to  bring  per- 
ception and  conception  into  closer  union?  There  seems  to  be  no 
answer.  Dewey 's  view  appears  to  be  that  organic  relations  are 
achieved  whenever  an  object  is  made  a  part  of  experience 
and  so  brought  into  connection  with  other  experienced  facts. 
'Organic  relation'  is  interpreted  as  equivalent  to  'mental  rela- 
tion.' But  mental  relations  are  not  organic  because  they  are 
mental.  It  would  be  as  easy  to  assert  that  they  are  mechanical. 
The  test  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  relations  which  are  actually 
found  in  the  mental  sphere  and  the  fitness  of  the  organic  cate- 
gories to  express  them.  Dewey 's  'consciousness,'  as  has  been 
said  before,  appears  to  be  a  structure,  not  an  organism.  Its 
parts  are  external  to  each  other,  however  closely  they  may  be 
related.  An  organic  view  of  experience  would  begin  with  a 
denial  of  the  actuality  of  bare  facts  or  sensations,  and  would  not 
waver  in  maintaining  that  standpoint  to  the  end. 

Hegel's  advance  upon  Kant,  Dewey  continues,  "consisted 
essentially  in  showing  that  Kant's  logical  standard  was  erroneous, 
and  that,  as  a  matter  of  logic,  the  only  true  criterion  or  standard 
was  the  organic  notion,  or  Begriff,  which  is  a  systematic  totality, 
and  accordingly  able  to  explain  both  itself  and  also  the  simpler 
processes  and  principles."1  The  logical  reformation  which 
Hegel  accomplished  was  most  important,  but  the  work  of  Kant 
still  needed  to  be  completed  by  "showing  self-consciousness  as  a 
fact  of  experience,  as  well  as  perception  through  organic  forms 
and  thinking  through  organic  principles."2  This  element  is 
latent  in  Hegel,  Dewey  believes,  but  needs  to  be  brought  out. 

T.  H.  Green  comes  under  the  same  criticism.  He  followed 
Kant's  logical  method,  and  as  a  consequence  arrived  at  the  same 
negative  results.  The  nature  of  self-consciousness  remains  un- 
known to  Green ;  he  can  affirm  its  existence,  but  cannot  describe 
its  nature.  Dewey  quotes  that  passage  from  the  Prolegomena 
to  Ethics  in  which  Green  says:3  "As  to  what  that  conscious- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  161. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Third  Edition,  p.  54. 


"PSYCHOLOGY  AS  PHILOSOPHIC  METHOD."  9 

ness  in  itself  or  in  its  completeness  is,  we  can  only  make  negative 
statements.  That  there  is  such  a  consciousness  is  implied  in  the 
existence  of  the  world ;  but  what  it  is  we  only  know  through 
its  so  far  acting  in  us  as  to  enable  us,  however  partially  and 
interruptedly,  to  have  knowledge  of  a  world  or  an  intelligent 
experience."  If,  Dewey  observes,  Green  had  begun  with  the 
latter  point  of  view,  and  had  taken  self-consciousness  as  at  least 
partially  realized  in  finite  minds,  he  would  have  been  able  to  make 
some  positive  statements  about  it.  Dewey,  however,  has  not 
given  the  most  adequate  interpretation  of  Green's  'Spiritual 
Principle  in  Nature.'  This  was  evidently,  for  Green,  a  symbol 
of  the  intelligibility  of  the  world  as  organically  conceived,  an 
order  which  could  not  be  comprehended  by  the  mechanical 
categories,  but  which  was  nevertheless  real.  As  Green  tended 
to  hypostatize  the  organic  conception,  so  Dewey  would  make  it  a 
concrete  reality,  with  the  further  specification  that  it  must  be 
something  given  to  psychological  observation. 

'/The  chief  point  of  Dewey's  criticism,  of  the  idealists  is  that  they 
fail  to  establish  self-consciousness  as  an  experienced  fact;  and, 
Dewey  maintains,  it  must  be  so  established  if  it  is  to  be  anything 
real  and  genuine.  If  it  is  anything  that  can  be  discussed  at  all, 
it  must  be  an  element  in  experience ;  and  if  it  is  in  experience,  it 
must  be  the  subject-matter  of  psychology.  It  is  inevitable, 
from  Dewey's  standpoint,  that  transcendentalism  should  adopt 
his  psychological  method. 

In  the  further  development  of  his  standpoint,  Dewey  considers 
(i)  the  relations  of  psychology  to  the  special  sciences,  and  (2) 
the  relation  of  psychology  to  logic.  Dewey's  conception  of  the 
relation  of  psychology  to  the  special  sciences  is  well  illustrated 
in  the  following  passage: '" Mathematics,  physics,  biology  exist, 
because  conscious  experience  reveals  itself  to  be  of  such  a  nature, 
that  one  may  make  virtual  abstraction  from  the  whole,  and  con- 
sider a  part  by  itself,  without  damage,  so  long  as  the  treatment  is 
purely  scientific,  that  is,  so  long  as  the  implicit  connection  with 
the  whole  is  left  undisturbed,  and  the  attempt  is  not  made  to 
present  this  partial  science  as  metaphysic,  or  as  an  explanation  of 
the  whole,  as  is  the  usual  fashion  of  our  uncritical  so-called 


10  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL    THEORY. 

'scientific  philosophies.'  Nay  more,  this  abstraction  of  some 
one  sphere  is  itself  a  living  function  of  the  psychologic  experience. 
It  is  not  merely  something  which  it  allows:  it  is  something  which 
it  does.  It  is  the  analytic  aspect  of  its  own  activity,  whereby  it 
deepens  and  renders  explicit,  realizes  its  own  nature.  .  .  .  The 
analytic  movement  constitutes  the  special  sciences ;  the  synthetic 
constitutes  the  philosophy  of  nature ;  the  self-developing  activity 
itself,  as  psychology,  constitutes  philosophy."1 

The  special  sciences  are  regarded  as  abstractions  from  the 
central  or  psychological  point  of  view,  but  they  are  legitimate 
abstractions,  constituted  by  a  proper  analytic  movement  of  the 
total  self-consciousness,  which  specifies  itself  into  the  special 
branches  of  knowledge.  If  we  begin  with  any  special  science, 
and  drive  it  back  to  its  fundamentals,  it  reveals  its  abstractness, 
and  thought  is  led  forward  into  other  sciences,  and  finally  into 
philosophy,  as  the  science  of  the  whole.  But  philosophy,  first 
appearing  as  a  special  science,  turns  out  to  be  science;  it  is  pre- 
supposed in  all  the  special  sciences,  and  is  their  basis.  But 
where  does  psychology  stand  in  this  classification? 

At  first  sight  psychology  appears  to  be  a  special  science,  ab- 
stract like  the  others.  "As  to  systematic  observation,  experi- 
ment, conclusion  and  verification,  it  can  differ  in  no  essential 
way  from  any  one  of  them."2  But  psychology,  like  philosophy, 
turns  out  to  be  a  science  of  the  whole.  Each  special  science 
investigates  a  special  sphere  of  conscious  experience.  "From 
one  science  to  another  we  go,  asking  for  some  explanation  of 
conscious  experience,  until  we  come  to  psychology.  .  .  .  But 
the  very  process  that  has  made  necessary  this  new  science  reveals 
also  that  each  of  the  former  sciences  existed  only  in  abstraction 
from  it.  Each  dealt  with  some  one  phase  of  conscious  experience, 
and  for  that  very  reason  could  not  deal  with  the  totality  which 
gave  it  its  being,  consciousness."3  Philosophy  and  psychology 
therefore  mainly  coincide,  and  the  method  of  psychology, 
properly  developed,  becomes  the  method  of  philosophy. 

If  psychology  is  to  be  identified  with  philosophy  in  this  fashion, 

1  Mind,  Vol.  XI,  p.  166  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  166. 

3  Ibid. 


"PSYCHOLOGY  AS  PHILOSOPHIC  METHOD."  II 

the  mere  change  of  name  would  seem  to  be  superfluous.  There 
would  be  no  reason  for  maintaining  psychology  as  a  separate 
discipline.  Perhaps  Dewey  did  not  intend  that  it  should  be 
maintained  separately.  In  that  case,  the  total  effect  of  his 
argument  would  be  to  prescribe  certain  methods  for  philosophy. 
It  seems  necessary  to  suppose  that  Dewey  proposed  to  merge 
philosophy  in  psychology,  and  make  it  an  exact  science  while 
retaining  its  universality.  "Science,"  he  argued,  "is  the  syste- 
matic account,  or  reason  of  fact;  Psychology  is  the  completed 
systematic  account  of  the  ultimate  fact,  which,  as  fact,  reveals 
itself  as  reason.  .  .  ."*  Self-consciousness  in  its  ultimate 
nature  is  conceived  of  as  a  special  fact,  over  and  above  what  it 
includes  in  the  way  of  particulars.  Psychology,  as  the  science 
of  this  ultimate  fact,  must  at  the  same  time  be  philosophy.  The 
identification  of  the  two  disciplines  depends  upon  taking  the 
'wholeness'  of  reality  as  a  'fact,'  which  can  be  brought  under 
observation.  This  is  a  natural  conclusion  from  Dewey 's  struc- 
tural view  of  reality. 

In  taking  up  the  subject  of  the  relation  of  psychology  to  logic, 
Dewey  remarks  that  in  philosophy  matter  and  form  cannot  be 
separated.  "Self-consciousness  is  the  final  truth,  and  in  self- 
consciousness  the  form  as  organic  system  and  the  content  as 
organized  system  are  exactly  equal  to  each  other."2  Logic 
abstracts  from  the  whole,  gives  us  only  the  form,  or  intelligi  of 
reality,  and  is  therefore  only  one  moment  in  philosophy.  Since 
logic  is  an  abstraction  from  Nature,  we  cannot  get  from  logic 
back  to  Nature,  by  means  of  logic.  We  do,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
make  the  transition  in  philosophy,  because  the  facts  force  us 
back  to  Nature.  Just  as  in  Hegel's  logic,  the  category  of  quality, 
when  pressed,  reveals  itself  as  inadequate  to  express  the  facts, 
and  is  compelled  to  pass  into  the  category  of  quantity,  so  does 
logic  as  a  whole,  when  pressed,  reveal  its  inadequacy  to  express 
the  whole  of  reality.  The  transition  from  category  to  category 
in  the  Hegelian  logic  is  not  an  unfolding  of  the  forms  as  forms, 
but  results  from  a  compulsion  exerted  by  the  facts,  when  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  170. 

2  Ibid. 


12  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

categories  are  used  to  explain  them.  Logic  is,  and  must  remain, 
abstract  in  all  its  processes,  and  its  outcome  (with  Hegel,  Geist) 
may  assert  the  abstract  necessity  of  one  self-conscious  whole, 
but  cannot  give  the  reality.  "  Logic  cannot  reach,  however 
much  it  may  point  to,  an  actual  individual.  The  gathering  up 
of  the  universe  into  one  self-conscious  individuality  it  may  assert 
as  necessary,  it  cannot  give  it  as  reality."1  Taken  as  an  abstract 
method,  logic  is  apt  to  result  in  a  pantheism,  "where  the  only 
real  is  the  Idee,  and  where  all  its  factors  and  moments,  including 
spirit  and  nature,  are  real  only  at  different  stages  or  phases  of  the 
Idee,  but  vanish  as  imperfect  ways  of  looking  at  things  .  .  . 
when  we  reach  the  Idee."2 

Dewey  has  in  mind  logic  as  a  science  of  the  forms  of  reality 
taken  in  abstraction  from  their  content.  In  reality,  however, 
there  can  be  no  logic  of  concepts  apart  from  their  concrete 
application.  Hegel  certainly  never  believed  that  it  was  possible 
to  abstract  the  logical  forms  from  reality  and  study  them  in  their 
isolation.  As  against  a  purely  formal  logic,  if  such  a  thing  were 
possible,  Dewey's  criticism  would  be  valid,  but  the  transcen- 
dental logic  of  his  time  was  not  formal  in  this  sense.  The  psy- 
chological method  which  Dewey  offers  as  a  substitute  for  the 
logical  method  escapes,  he  believes,  the  difficulties  of  the  latter 
method.  At  the  same  time  it  preserves,  in  his  opinion,  the  essen- 
tial spirit  of  the  Hegelian  method.  Dewey's  comments  show 
that  he  conceives  his  method  to  be  a  restatement,  in  improved 
form,  of  the  doctrine  of  the  'concrete  universal.'  But  the 
'psychological  method'  and  the  method  of  idealism  are,  if  any- 
thing, antithetical.  An  excellent  summary  of  Dewey's  theory 
is  afforded  by  the  following  passage:  "Only  a  living  actual  Fact 
can  preserve  within  its  unity  that  organic  system  of  differences 
in  virtue  of  which  it  lives  and  moves  and  has  its  being.  It  is 
with  this  fact,  conscious  experience  in  its  entirety,  that  psychology 
as  method  begins.  It  thus  brings  to  clear  light  of  day  the  pre- 
supposition implicit  in  every  philosophy,  and  thereby  affords 
logic,  as  well  as  the  philosophy  of  nature,  its  basis,  ideal  and 
surety.  If  we  have  determined  the  nature  of  reality,  by  a 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  172. 

2  Ibid. 


"PSYCHOLOGY  AS  PHILOSOPHIC  METHOD."  13 

process  whose  content  equals  its  form,  we  can  show  the  meaning, 
worth  and  limits  of  any  one  moment  of  this  reality."1 

It  would  be  useless  to  speculate  upon  the  various  possible 
interpretations  that  might  be  given  of  Dewey's  psychological 
method.  The  most  critical  examination  of  the  text  will  not 
dispel  its  vagueness,  nor  afford  an  answer  to  the  many  questions 
that  arise.  It  does,  however,  throw  an  interesting  light  on 
certain  tendencies  in  Dewey's  own  thinking. 

Dewey's  attempt  to  show  that  English  empiricism  and  trans- 
cendentalism have  a  common  psychological  basis  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  failure.  That  the  nature  of  the  attempt  reveals 
a  misunderstanding,  or  fatal  lack  of  appreciation,  on  the  part 
of  Dewey,  of  the  critical  philosophy  and  the  later  development 
of  idealism  by  Hegel,  has  already  been  suggested.  He  does  not 
appear  to  have  grasped  the  significance  of  the  movement  from 
Kant  to  Hegel.  Kant,  of  course,  believed  that  the  a  priori 
forms  of  experience  could  be  determined  by  a  process  of  critical 
analysis,  which  would  reveal  them  in  their  purity.  The  con- 
stitutive relations  of  experience  were  supposed  by  him  to  be 
limited  to  the  pure  forms  of  sensibility,  space  and  time,  and  the 
twelve  categories  of  the  understanding,  which,  being  imposed 
upon  the  manifold  of  sensations,  as  organized  by  the  productive 
imagination,  determined  once  and  for  all  the  order  of  the  phe- 
nomenal world.  His  logic,  therefore,  as  an  account  of  the  forms 
of  experience,  would  represent  logic  of  the  type  which  Dewey 
criticized.  But  with  the  rejection  of  Kant's  noumenal  world, 
the  critical  method  assumed  a  different  import.  It  was  no  longer 
to  be  supposed  that  reality,  as  knowable,  was  organized  under 
the  forms  of  a  determinate  number  of  categories,  which  could 
be  separated  out  and  classified.  Kant's  idea  that  experience 
was  an  intelligible  system  was  retained,  but  its  intelligibility 
was  not  supposed  to  be  wholly  comprised  in  man's  methods  of 
knowing  it.  The  instrumental  character  of  the  categories  was 
recognized.  Criticism  was  directed  upon  the  categories,  with 
the  object  of  determining  their  validity,  spheres  of  relevance, 
and  proper  place  in  the  system  of  knowledge.  Such  a  criticism, 

1  Op.  cit. 


14  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

in  the  nature  of  things,  could  not  deal  with  the  forms  of  thought 
in  abstraction  from  their  application.  Direct  reference  to  ex- 
perience, therefore,  became  a  necessary  element  in  idealism. 
At  the  same  time,  philosophy  became  a  'criticism  of  categories.' 
The  method  is  empirical,  but  never  psychological. 

Dewey  recognized  the  need  of  an  empirical  method  in  philoso- 
phy, but  failed  to  show  specifically  how  psychology  could  deal 
with  philosophical  problems.  He  appears  to  have  conceived 
that  sensation  and  meaning,  facts  and  forms,  were  present  in 
experience  or  'Consciousness/  as  if  this  were  some  total  under- 
standing which  retained  the  elements  in  a  fixed  union  and  order. 
While,  according  to  his  method,  the  forms  of  this  universal 
consciousness  could  not  be  considered  apart  from  the  particulars 
in  which  they  inhered,  they  might  be  studied  by  a  survey  of  ex- 
perience, a  direct  appeal  to  consciousness,  in  which  'form  and 
content  are  equal.'  He  seems  to  have  held  that  truth  is  given 
in  immediate  experience.  A  study  of  reality  as  immediately 
given,  therefore,  to  psychological  observation,  would  provide  an 
account  of  the  eternal  nature  of  things,  as  they  stand  in  the 
universal  mind.  Dewey  did  not  attempt  a  criticism  of  the  cate- 
gories and  methods  which  psychology  must  employ  in  such  a 
task.  Had  he  done  so,  the  advantages  of  a  critical  method 
might  have  occurred  to  him. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE   DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   STANDPOINT 

THE  "psychological  method,"  as  so  far  presented,  is  an  outline 
which  must  be  developed  in  detail  before  its  philosophical  import 
is  revealed.  For  several  years  following  the  publication  of  his 
first  articles  in  Mind  Dewey  was  occupied  with  the  task  of  work- 
ing out  his  method  in  greater  detail,  and  giving  it  more  concrete 
form.  His  thought  during  this  period  follows  a  fairly  regular 
order  of  development,  which  is  to  be  sketched  in  the  present 
chapter. 

In  1887  Dewey  published  in  Mind  an  article  entitled  "Know- 
ledge as  Idealisation."1  This  article  is,  in  effect,  a  consideration 
of  one  of  the  special  problems  of  the  "psychological  method." 
If  reality  is  an  eternal  and  all-inclusive  consciousness,  in  which 
sensations  and  meanings  are  ordered  according  to  a  rational 
system,  what  must  be  the  nature  of  the  finite  thought-process 
which  apprehends  this  reality?  In  his  previous  articles  Dewey 
had  proposed  the  "psychological  method"  as  an  actual  mode  of 
investigation,  and  questions  concerning  the  nature  of  the  human 
thought-process  naturally  forced  themselves  upon  his  attention. 

The  thought-process  is,  to  begin  with,  a  relating  activity 
which  gives  meaning  to  experience.  Says  Dewey:  "When 
Psychology  recognizes  that  the  relating  activity  of  mind  is  one 
not  exercised  upon  sensations,  but  one  which  supplies  relations 
and  thereby  makes  meaning  (makes  experience,  as  Kant  said), 
Psychology  will  be  in  a  position  to  explain,  and  thus  to  become 
Philosophy."2  This  statement  raises  the  more  specific  question, 
what  is  meaning? 

Every  idea,  Dewey  remarks,  has  two  aspects:  existence  and 
meaning.  "Recognizing  that  every  psychical  fact  does  have 
these  two  aspects,  we  shall,  for  the  present,  confine  ourselves  to 

1  Vol.  XII,  pp.  382-396. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  394. 

15 


1 6  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

asking  the  nature,  function  and  origin  of  the  aspect  of  meaning 
or  significance — the  content  of  the  idea  as  opposed  to  its  exis- 
tence."1 The  meaning  aspect  of  the  idea  cannot  be  reduced  to 
the  centrally  excited  image  existences  which  form  a  part  of  the 
existence-aspect  of  the  idea.  "I  repeat,  as  existence,  we  have 
only  a  clustering  of  sensuous  feelings,  stronger  and  weaker."2 
But  the  thing  is  not  perceived  as  a  clustering  of  feelings;  the 
sensations  are  immediately  interpreted  as  a  significant  object. 
"Perceiving,  to  restate  a  psychological  commonplace,  is  inter- 
preting. The  content  of  the  perception  is  what  is  signified."3 
Dewey's  treatment  of  sensations,  at  this  point,  is  somewhat 
uncertain.  If  it  be  a  manifold  that  is  given  to  the  act  of  inter- 
pretation, Kant's  difficulty  is  again  presented.  The  bare  sen- 
sations taken  by  themselves  mean  nothing,  and  yet  everything 
does  mean  something  in  being  apprehended.  The  conclusion 
should  be  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  mere  existence.  Dewey's 
judgment  is  undecided  on  this  issue.  "It  is  true  enough,"  he 
says,  "that  without  the  idea  as  existence  there  would  be  no  ex- 
perience; the  sensuous  clustering  is  a  condition  sine  qua  non  of 
all,  even  the  highest  spiritual,  consciousness.  But  it  is  none  the 
less  true  that  if  we  could  strip  any  psychical  existence  of  all  its 
qualities  except  bare  existence,  there  would  be  nothing  left,  not 
even  existence,  for  our  intelligence.  ...  If  we  take  out  of  an 
experience  all  that  it  means,  as  distinguished  from  what  it  is — 
a  particular  occurrence  at  a  certain  time,  there  is  no  psychical 
experience.  The  barest  fragment  of  consciousness  that  can  be 
hit  upon  has  meaning  as  well  as  being."4  An  interpretation  of 
reality  as  truly  organic  would  treat  mechanical  sensation  as  a 
pure  fiction.  But  Dewey  clings  to  'existence'  as  a  necessary 
'aspect'  of  the  psychical  fact.  The  terms  and  relations  never 
entirely  fuse,  although  they  are  indispensable  to  each  other. 
There  is  danger  that  the  resulting  view  of  experience  will  be 
somewhat  angular  and  structural. 

At  one  point,  indeed,  Dewey  asserts  that  there  is  no  such  thing 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  383. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  384. 
*Ibid. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STANDPOINT.        17 

as  a  merely  immediate  psychical  fact,  at  least  for  our  experience. 
/''So  far  is  it  from  being  true  that  we  know  only  what  is  imme- 
diately present  in  consciousness,  that  it  should  rather  be  said  that 
what  is  immediately  present  is  never  known."1  But  in  the  next 
paragraph  Dewey  remarks:  "That  which  is  immediately  present 
is  the  sensuous  existence;  that  which  is  known  is  the  content 
conveyed  by  this  existence."2  The  sensation  is  not  known,  and 
therefore  probably  not  experienced.  In  this  case  Dewey  is 
departing  from  his  own  principles,  by  introducing  non-exper- 
ienced factors  into  his  interpretation  of  experience.  The 
language  is  ambiguous.  If  nothing  is  immediately  given,  then 
the  sensuous  content  is  not  so  given. 

The  'sensuous  existences'  assumed  by  Dewey  are  the  ghosts 
of  Kant's  'manifold  of  sensation.'  The  difficulty  comes  out 
clearly  in  the  following  passage :  "  It  is  indifferent  to  the  sensation 
whether  it  is  interpreted  as  a  cloud  or  as  a  mountain ;  a  danger 
signal,  or  a  signal  of  open  passage.  The  auditory  sensation 
remains  unchanged  whether  it  is  interpreted  as  an  evil  spirit 
urging  one  to  murder,  or  as  intra-organic,  due  to  disordered  blood- 
pressure.  .  .  .  It  is  not  the  sensation  in  and  of  itself  that  means 
this  or  that  object;  it  is  the  sensation  as  associated,  composed, 
identified,  or  discriminated  with  other  experiences;  the  sensation, 
in  short,  as  mediated.  The  whole  worth  of  the  sensation  for 
intelligence  is  the  meaning  it  has  by  virtue  of  its  relation  to  the 
rest  of  experience."3 

There  is  an  obvious  parallel  between  this  view  of  experience 
and  Kant's.  Kant,  indeed,  transcended  the  notion  that  ex- 
perience is  a  structure  of  sensations  set  in  a  frame-work  of  thought 
forms;  but  the  first  Critique  undoubtedly  leaves  the  average 
reader  with  such  a  conception  of  experience.  It  is  unjust  to 
Kant,  however,  to  take  the  mechanical  aspect  of  his  thought  as 
its  most  important  phase.  He  stands,  in  the  opinion  of  modern 
critics,  at  a  half-way  stage  between  the  mechanism  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  and  the  organic  logic  of  the  nineteenth,  and  his 
works  point  the  way  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  point  of  view. 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  385. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  388. 


18  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

This  was  recognized  by  Hegel  and  by  his  followers  in  England. 
How  does  it  happen,  then,  that  Dewey,  who  was  well-read  in  the 
philosophical  literature  of  the  day,  should  have  persisted  in  a 
view  of  experience  which  appears  to  assume  the  externally  or- 
ganized manifold  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason?  Or,  to  put  the 
question  more  explicitly,  why  did  he  retain  as  a  fundamental 
assumption  Kant's  '  manifold  of  sensations '  ? 

So  far,  Dewey  has  been  concerned  with  the  nature  of  meaning. 
He  now  turns  to  knowledge,  and  the  knowing  process  as  that 
which  gives  meaning  to  experience.  Knowledge,  or  science,  he 
says,  is  a  process  of  following  out  the  ideal  element  in  experience. 
"The  idealisation  of  science  is  simply  a  further  development  of 
this  ideal  element.  It  is,  in  short,  only  rendering  explicit  and 
definite  the  meaning,  the  idea,  already  contained  in  perception."1 
But  if  perception  is  already  organized  by  thought,  the  sensations 
must  have  been  related  in  a  'productive  imagination.'  Dewey, 
however,  does  not  recognize  such  a  necessity.  The  factor  of 
meaning  is  ideal,  he  continues,  because  it  is  not  present  as  so 
much  immediate  content,  but  is  present  as  symbolized  or  me- 
diated. /But  the  question  may  be  asked,  ."Whence  come  the 
ideal  elements  which  give  to  experience  its  meaning?"  No 
answer  can  be  given  except  by  psychology,  as  an  inquiry  into 
the  facts,  as  contrasted  with  the  logical  necessity  of  experience. 

Sensations  acquire  meaning  through  being  identified  with  and 
discriminated  from  other  sensations  to  which  they  are  related. 
But  it  is  not  as  mere  existences  that  they  are  compared  and  re- 
lated, but  as  already  ideas  or  meanings.  "The  identification 
is  of  the  meaning  of  the  present  sensation  with  some  meaning 
previously  experienced,  but  which,  although  previously  expe- 
rienced, still  exists  because  it  is  meaning,  and  not  occurrence."2 
The  existences  to  which  meanings  attach  come  and  go,  and  are 
new  for  every  new  appearance  of  the  idea  in  consciousness;  but 
the  meanings  remain.  "The  experience,  as  an  existence  at  a 
given  time,  has  forever  vanished.  Its  meaning,  as  an  ideal 
quality,  remains  as  long  as  the  mind  does.  Indeed,  its  remaining 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  390. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  392. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STANDPOINT.        19 

is  the  remaining  of  the  mind ;  the  conservation  of  the  ideal  quality 
of  experience  is  what  makes  the  mind  a  permanence."1 

It  is  not  possible,  Dewey  says,  to  imagine  a  primitive  state  in 
which  unmeaning  sensations  existed  alone.  Meaning  cannot 
arise  out  of  that  which  has  no  meaning.  "Sensations  cannot 
revive  each  other  except  as  members  of  one  whole  of  meaning; 
and  even  if  they  could,  we  should  have  no  beginning  of  significant 
experience.  Significance,  meaning,  must  be  already  there. 
Intelligence,  in  short,  is  the  one  indispensable  condition  of  intel- 
ligent experience."2 

Thinking  is  an  act  which  idealizes  experience  by  transforming 
sensations  into  an  intelligible  whole.  It  works  by  seizing  upon 
the  ideal  element  which  is  already  there,  conserving  it,  and  de- 
veloping it.  It  produces  knowledge  by  supplying  relations 
to  experience.  Dewey  realizes  that  his  act  of  intelligence  is 
similar  to  Kant's  ' apperceptive  unity.'  He  says:  "The  mention 
of  Kant's  name  suggests  that  both  his  strength  and  his  weakness 
lie  in  the  line  just  mentioned.  It  is  his  strength  that  he  recog- 
nizes that  an  apperceptive  unity  interpreting  sensations  through 
categories  which  constitute  the  synthetic  content  of  self-con- 
sciousness is  indispensable  to  experience.  It  is  his  weakness 
that  he  conceives  this  content  as  purely  logical,  and  hence  as 
formal."3  Kant's  error  was  to  treat  the  self  as  formal  and  held 
apart  from  its  material.  "The  self  does  not  work  with  a  priori 
forms  upon  an  a  posteriori  material,  but  intelligence  as  ideal  (or 
a  priori)  constitutes  experience  (or  the  a  posteriori)  as  having 
meaning."4  Dewey 's  standpoint  here  seems  to  be  similar  to 
that  of  Green.  But  as  Kant's  unity  of  apperception  became  for 
Green  merely  a  symbol  of  the  world's  inherent  intelligibility,  the 
latter  did  not  regard  it  as  an  actual  process  of  synthesis.  Dewey 
fails  to  make  a  distinction,  which  might  have  been  useful  to  him, 
between  Kant's  unity  of  apperception  and  his  productive  imagi- 
nation. It  is  the  latter  which  Dewey  retains,  and  he  tends  to 
identify  it  with  the  empirical  process  of  the  understanding. 

1  Op.  cit. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  393. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  394. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  395. 


20  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

Knowing,  psychologically  considered,  is  a  synthetic  process.! 
"And  this  is  to  say  that  experience  grows  as  intelligence  adds 
out  of  its  own  ideal  content  ideal  quality.  .  .  .  The  growth  of 
the  power  of  comparison  implies  not  a  formal  growth,  but  a 
synthetic  internal  growth."1  Dewey,  of  course,  views  under- 
standing as  an  integral  part  of  reality's  processes  rather  than  as  a 
process  apart,  but  it  is  for  him  a  very  special  activity,  which 
builds  up  the  meaning  of  experience.  "Knowledge  might  be 
indifferently  described,  therefore,  as  a  process  of  idealisation  of 
experience,  or  of  realisation  of  intelligence.  It  is  each  through 
the  other.  Ultimately  the  growth  of  experience  must  consist 
in  the  development  out  of  itself  by  intelligence  of  its  own  im- 
plicit ideal  content  upon  occasion  of  the  solicitation  of  sensation."2 

The  difficulties  of  Dewey's  original  position  are  numerous. 
The  relation  of  the  self,  as  a  synthetic  activity,  to  the  "Eternal 
Consciousness,"  in  which  meaning  already  exists  in  a  completed 
form,  is  especially  perplexing.  Does  the  self  merely  trace  out 
the  meaning  already  present  in  reality,  or  is  it  a  factor  in  the 
creation  of  meaning?  It  is  clear  that  if  the  thinking  process  is  a 
genuinely  synthetic  activity,  imposing  meaning  on  sensations, 
it  literally  'makes  the  world'  of  our  experience.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  meaning  is  given  to  thought,  as  a  part  of  its  data, 
the  self  merely  reproduces  in  a  subjective  experience  the  thought 
which  exists  objectively  in  the  eternal  mind.  The  dilemma  arises 
as  a  result  of  Dewey's  initial  conception  of  reality  as  a  structure 
of  sensations  and  meanings.  This  conception  of  reality  must  be 
given  up,  if  the  notion  of  thought  as  a  process  of  idealization  is 
to  be  retained. 

In  1888,  Dewey's  Leibniz's  New  Essays  Concerning  the  Human 
Understanding  appeared,  and  during  the  two  years  following  he 
appears  to  have  become  interested  in  ethical  theory,  the  results 
of  his  study  beginning  to  appear  in  1890.  Dewey's  ethical 
theories  have  so  important  a  bearing  upon  his  logical  theory  as 
to  demand  special  attention.  They  will  be  reserved,  therefore, 

1  Op.  cit. 

2 1 bid.,  p.  396.  (The  last  sentence  forecasts  Dewey's  later  contention  that 
knowing  is  a  specific  act  operating  upon  the  occasion  of  need.) 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STANDPOINT.       21 

for  a  separate  chapter,  and  attention  will  be  given  here  to  the 
more  strictly  logical  studies  of  the  period. 

The  three  years  which  intervened  between  the  publication  of 
the  essay  on  "Knowledge  as  Idealisation"  and  the  appearance 
of  an  article  "On  Some  Current  Conceptions  of  the  term  'Self,'" 
in  Mind  (1890), l  did  not  serve  to  divert  Dewey's  attention  from 
the  inquiries  in  which  he  had  previously  been  interested.  On  the 
contrary,  the  later  article  shows  how  persistently  his  mind  must 
have  dwelt  upon  the  problems  connected  with  the  notion  of  the 
self  as  a  synthetic  activity  in  experience. 

The  immediate  occasion  for  the  article  on  the  Self  was  the 
appearance  of  Professor  Andrew  Seth's  work,  Hegelianism  and 
Personality  (1889).  Dewey  appears  to  have  been  influenced  by 
Seth  at  an  even  earlier  period,2  and  he  now  found  the  lectures  on 
Hegel  stimulating  in  connection  with  his  own  problems  about 
thought  and  reality. 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  go  into  the  details  of  Dewey's 
criticism  of  the  three  ideas  of  the  self  presented  by  Seth.  Since 
it  is  Dewey's  own  position  that  is  in  question,  it  is  better  to  begin 
with  his  account  of  the  historical  origin  of  these  definitions, 
"chiefly  as  found  in  Kant,  incidentally  in  Hegel  as  related  to 
Kant."3  Dewey  turns  to  the  'Transcendental  Deduction,'  and 
follows  Kant's  description  of  the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception. 
"Its  gist,"  he  says,  "in  the  second  edition  of  the  K.d.r.V.,  is  the 
proof  that  the  identity  of  self-consciousness  involves  the  syn- 
thesis of  the  manifold  of  feelings  through  rules  or  principles  which 
render  this  manifold  objective,  and  that,  therefore,  the  analytic 
identity  of  self-consciousness  involves  an  objective  synthetic 
unity  of  consciousness."4  To  say  that  self-consciousness  is 
identical  is  a  merely  analytical  proposition,  and,  as  it  stands, 
unfruitful.  "But  if  we  ask  how  we  know  this  sameness  or  iden- 
tity of  consciousness,  the  barren  principle  becomes  wonderfully 
fruitful."5  In  order  to  know  reality  as  mine,  not  only  must  the 

1  Vol.  XV,  pp.  58-74- 

2  See  Mind,  Vol.  XI,  1886,  p.  170. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  63. 

4  Ibid. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  64. 


JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

consciousness  that  it  is  mine  accompany  each  particular  im- 
pression, but  each  must  be  known  as  an  element  in  one  conscious- 
ness. "The  sole  way  of  accounting  for  this  analytic  identity  of 
consciousness  is  through  the  activity  of  consciousness  in  con- 
necting or  'putting  together'  the  manifold  of  sense."1 

In  the  'Deduction'  of  the  first  Critique,  Dewey  continues, 
Kant  begins  with  the  consciousness  of  objects,  rather  than  with 
the  identity  of  self -consciousness.  Here  also  consciousness 
implies  a  unity,  which  is  not  merely  formal,  but  one  which  actually 
connects  the  manifold  of  sense  by  an  act.  "Whether,  then,  we 
inquire  what  is  involved  in  mere  sameness  of  consciousness,  or 
what  is  involved  in  an  objective  world,  we  get  the  same  answer: 
a  consciousness  which  is  not  formal  or  analytic,  but  which  is 
synthetic  of  sense,  and  which  acts  universally  (according  to 
principles)  in  this  synthesis."2 

The  term  'Self,'  as  thus  employed  by  Kant,  Dewey  says,  is  the 
correlative  of  the  intelligible  world.  "It  is  the  transcendental 
self  looked  at  as  'there,'  as  a  product,  instead  of  as  an  activity  or 
process."3  This,  however,  by  no  means  exhausts  what  Kant 
means  by  the  self,  for  while  he  proceeds  in  the  '  Deduction '  as  if 
the  manifold  of  sense  and  the  synthetic  unity  of  the  self  were 
strictly  correlative,  he  assumes  a  different  attitude  elsewhere. 
The  manifold  of  sense  is  something  in  relation  to  the  thing-in- 
itself,  and  the  forms  of  thought  have  a  reference  beyond  their 
mere  application  to  the  manifold.  In  the  other  connections 
the  self  appears  as  something  purely  formal;  something  apart 
from  its  manifestation  in  experience.  In  view  of  the  wider 
meaning  of  the  self,  Dewey  asks,  "Can  the  result  of  the  trans- 
cendental deduction  stand  without  further  interpretation?" 
It  would  appear  that  the  content  of  the  self  is  not  the  same  as 
the  content  of  the  known  world.  The  self  is  too  great  to  exhaust 
itself  in  relation  to  sensation.  "Sense  is,  as  it  were,  inadequate 
to  the  relations  which  constitute  self-consciousness,  and  thus 
there  must  also  remain  a  surplusage  in  the  self,  not  entering  into 

1  op.  dt. 
*ibid.,  p.  65. 
3  Ibid. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STANDPOINT.       23 

the  make-up  of  the  known  world."1  This  follows  from  the  fact 
that,  while  the  self  is  unconditioned,  the  manifold  of  sensation  is 
conditioned,  as  given,  by  the  forms  of  space  and  time.  "Ex- 
perience can  never  be  complete  enough  to  have  a  content  equal 
to  that  of  self-consciousness,  for  experience  can  never  escape  its 
limitation  through  space  and  time.  Self-consciousness  is  real, 
and  not  merely  logical ;  it  is  the  ground  of  the  reality  of  experience ; 
it  is  wider  than  experience,  and  yet  is  unknown  except  so  far  as 
it  is  reflected  through  its  own  determinations  in  experience, — 
this  is  the  result  of  our  analysis  of  Kant,  the  Ding-an-Sich  being 
eliminated  but  the  Kantian  method  and  all  presuppositions  not 
involved  in  the  notion  of  the  Ding-an-Sich  being  retained."2 

Dewey's  interpretation  of  Kant's  doctrine  as  presented  in  the 
'Deductions'  is  no  doubt  essentially  correct.  But  granting 
that  Kant  found  it  necessary  to  introduce  a  synthesis  in  imagi- 
nation to  account  for  the  unity  of  experience  and  justify  our 
knowledge  of  its  relations,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  this 
necessity  followed  from  the  nature  of  his  presuppositions.  If 
the  primal  reality  is  a  'manifold  of  sensations,'  proceeding  from  a 
noumenal  source,  and  lacking  meaning  and  relations,  it  follows 
that  the  manifold  must  be  gathered  up  into  a  unity  before  the 
experience  which  we  actually  apprehend  can  be  accounted  for. 
But  if  reality  is  experience,  possessing  order  and  coherence  in  its 
own  nature,  the  productive  imagination  is  rendered  superfluous. 
Dewey,  however,  clings  to  the  notion  that  thought  is  a  "syn- 
thetic activity"  which  makes  experience,  and  draws  support 
from  Kant  for  his  doctrine.  > 

Dewey  now  inquires  what  relation  this  revised  Kantian  con- 
ception of  the  self  bears  to  the  view  advanced  by  Seth,  viz.,  that 
the  idea  of  self-consciousness  is  the  highest  category  of  thought 
and  explanation.  Kant  had  tried  to  discover  the  different 
forms  of  synthesis,  by  a  method  somewhat  artificial  to  be  sure, 
and  had  found  twelve  of  them.  While  Hegel's  independent 
derivation  and  independent  placing  of  the  categories  must  be 
accepted,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  idea  of  self-consciousness 
can  be  included  in  the  list,  even  if  it  be  considered  the  highest 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  67. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  68. 


24  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

category.  "For  it  is  impossible  as  long  as  we  retain  Kant's 
fundamental  presupposition — the  idea  of  the  partial  determina- 
tion of  sensation  by  relation  to  perception,  apart  from  its  relation 
to  conception — to  employ  self-consciousness  as  a  principle  of 
explaining  any  fact  of  experience."1  It  cannot  be  said  of  the 
self  of  Kant  that  it  is  simply  an  hypostatized  category.  "It  is 
more,  because  the  self  of  Kant  ...  is  more  than  any  category: 
it  is  a  real  activity  or  being."2 

Hegel,  Dewey  continues,  develops  only  one  aspect  of  Kant's 
Critique,  that  is,  the  logical  aspect,  and  consequently  does  not 
fulfil  Kant's  entire  purpose.  "This  is,  I  repeat,  not  an  immanent 
'criticism  of  categories'  but  an  analysis  of  experience  into  its 
aspects  and  really  constituent  elements."3  Dewey,  as  usual, 
shows  his  opposition  to  a  '  merely  logical '  method  in  philosophy. 
He  plainly  indicates  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  Hegelian  develop- 
ment of  Kant's  standpoint.  He  is  unfair  to  Hegel,  however,  in 
attributing  to  him  a  '  merely  logical '  method.  Kant's  self  was,  as 
Dewey  asserts,  something  more  than  a  category  of  thought,  but 
it  is  scarcely  illuminating  to  say  of  Kant  that  his  purpose  was  the 
analysis  of  experience  into  its  'constituent  elements.'  Kant  did, 
indeed,  analyze  experience,  but  this  analysis  must  be  regarded 
as  incidental  to  a  larger  purpose.  No  criticism  need  be  made  of 
Dewey 's  preference  for  the  psychological,  as  opposed  to  the  logical 
aspects  of  Kant's  work.  The  only  comment  to  be  made  is  that 
this  attitude  is  not  in  line  with  the  modern  development  of 
idealism. 

The  question  which  finally  emerges,  as  the  result  of  Dewey 's 
inquiry,  is  this :  What  is  the  nature  of  this  self-activity  which  is 
more  than  the  mere  category  of  self -consciousness?  "As  long 
as  sensation  was  regarded  as  given  by  a  thing-in-itself,  it  was 
possible  to  form  a  conception  of  the  self  which  did  not  identify 
it  with  the  world.  But  when  sense  is  regarded  as  having  meaning 
only  because  it  is  'there'  as  determined  by  thought,  just  as 
thought  is  '  there '  only  as  determining  sense,  it  would  seem  either 
that  the  self  is  just  their  synthetic  unity  (thus  equalling  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  70. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  71. 

3  Ibid., 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STANDPOINT.       25 

world)  or  that  it  must  be  thrust  back  of  experience,  and  become 
a  thing-in-itself.  The  activity  of  the  self  can  hardly  be  a  third 
something  distinct  from  thought  and  from  sense,  and  it  cannot 
be  their  synthetic  union.  What,  then,  is  it?"1  Green,  Dewey 
says,  attempted  to  solve  the  difficulty  by  his  "idea  of  a  completely 
realized  self  making  an  animal  organism  the  vehicle  of  its  own 
reproduction  in  time."2  This  attempt  was  at  least  in  the  right 
direction,  acknowledging  as  it  did  the  fact  that  the  self  is  some- 
thing more  than  the  highest  category  of  thought. 

Dewey  admits  his  difficulties  in  a  way  that  makes  extended 
comment  unnecessary.  He  does  not  challenge  the  validity  of 
the  Hegelian  development  of  the  Kantian  categories,  but  pro- 
poses to  make  more  of  the  self  than  the  Hegelians  ordinarily  do. 
This  synthetic  self-activity  must  reveal  itself  as  a  concrete 
process;  that  is  one  of  the  demands  of  his  psychological  stand- 
point. It  is  impossible  to  foresee  what  this  process  would  be  as 
an  actual  fact  of  experience. 

Although  the  next  article  which  is  to  be  considered  does  not 
offer  a  direct  answer  to  the  problems  which  have  so  far  been 
raised,  it  nevertheless  indicates  the  general  direction  which 
Dewey 's  thought  is  to  take.  This  article,  on  "The  Present 
Position  of  Logical  Theory,"  was  published  in  the  Monist  in 
1 89 1.3  Dewey  appears  at  this  time  as  the  champion  of  the 
transcendental,  or  Hegelian  logic,  in  opposition  to  formal  and 
inductive  logic.  His  attitude  toward  Hegel  undergoes  a  marked 
change  at  this  period.  Dewey 's  general  objection  to  formal 
logic  is  well  expressed  in  the  following  passage:  "It  is  assumed, 
in  fine,  that  thought  has  a  nature  of  its  own  independent  of  facts 
or  subject-matter;  that  this  thought,  per  se,  has  certain  forms, 
and  that  these  forms  are  not  forms  which  the  facts  themselves 
take,  varying  with  the  facts,  but  are  rigid  frames,  into  which  the 
facts  are  to  be  set.  Now  all  of  this  conception — the  notion  that 
the  mind  has  a  faculty  of  thought  apart  from  things,  the  notion 
that  this  faculty  is  constructed,  in  and  of  itself,  with  a  fixed 
framework,  the  notion  that  thinking  is  the  imposing  of  this  fixed 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  73. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Vol.  II,  pp.  1-17. 


26  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

framework  on  some  unyielding  matter  called  particular  objects, 
or  facts — all  of  this  conception  appears  to  me  as  highly  scholas- 
tic."1 The  inductive  logic,  Dewey  says,  still  clings  to  the  notion 
of  thought  as  a  faculty  apart  from  its  material,  operating  with 
bare  forms  upon  sensations.  Kant  had  been  guilty  of  this 
separation  and  never  overcame  it  successfully.  Because  formal 
logic  views  thought  as  a  process  apart  from  the  matter  with 
which  it  has  to  deal,  it  can  never  be  the  logic  of  science.  "  For  if 
science  means  anything,  it  is  that  our  ideas,  our  judgments  may 
in  some  degree  reflect  and  report  the  fact  itself.  Science  means, 
on  one  hand,  that  thought  is  free  to  attack  and  get  hold  of  its 
subject-matter,  and,  on  the  other,  that  fact  is  free  to  break 
through  into  thought;  free  to  impress  itself — or  rather  to  express 
itself — in  intelligence  without  vitiation  or  deflection.  Scientific 
men  are  true  to  the  instinct  of  the  scientific  spirit  in  fighting  shy 
of  a  distinct  a  priori  factor  supplied  to  fact  from  the  mind. 
Apriorism  of  this  sort  must  seem  like  an  effort  to  cramp  the 
freedom  of  intelligence  and  of  fact,  to  bring  them  under  the  yoke 
of  fixed,  external  forms."2 

In  opposition  to  this  formal,  and,  as  he  calls  it,  subjective 
standpoint  in  logic,  Dewey  stands  for  the  transcendental  logic, 
which  supposes  that  there  is  some  kind  of  vital  connection  be- 
tween thought  and  fact;  "that  thinking,  in  short,  is  nothing  but 
the  fact  in  its  process  of  translation  from  brute  impression  to 
lucent  meaning."3  Hegel  holds  this  view  of  logic.  "This,  then, 
is  why  I  conceive  Hegel — entirely  apart  from  the  value  of  any 
special  results — to  represent  the  quintessence  of  the  scientific 
spirit.  He  denies  not  only  the  possibility  of  getting  truth  out 
of  a  formal,  apart  thought,  but  he  denies  the  existence  of  any 
faculty  of  thought  which  is  other  than  the  expression  of  fact 
itself."4  At  another  place  Dewey  expresses  his  view  of  Hegel  as 
follows:  "Relations  of  thought  are,  to  Hegel,  the  typical  forms 
of  meaning  which  the  subject-matter  takes  in  its  various  pro- 
gressive stages  of  being  understood."5 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  4. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  12. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  3. 
*Ibid.,  p.  1.1. 
6  Ibid.,  p.  13. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STANDPOINT.       27 

Dewey's  defence  of  the  transcendental  logic  is  vigorous.  He 
maintains  that  the  disrespect  into  which  the  transcendental  logic 
had  fallen,  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  popular  comprehension 
of  the  transcendental  movement  had  been  arrested  at  Kant,  and 
had  never  gone  on  to  Hegel. 

The  objection  made  to  Kant's  standpoint  is  that  it  treated 
thought  as  a  process  over  against  experience,  imposing  its  forms 
upon  it  from  without.  "Kant  never  dreams,  for  a  moment,  of 
questioning  the  existence  of  a  special  faculty  of  thought  with  its 
own  peculiar  and  fixed  forms.  He  states  and  restates  that 
thought  in  itself  exists  apart  from  fact  and  occupies  itself  with 
fact  given  to  it  from  without."1  While  Kant  gave  the  death 
blow  to  a  merely  formal  conception  of  thought,  indirectly,  and 
opened  up  the  way  for  an  organic  interpretation,  he  did  not 
achieve  the  higher  standpoint  himself.  Remaining  at  the  stand- 
point of  Kant,  therefore,  the  critic  of  the  transcendental  logic 
has  much  to  complain  of.  Scientific  men  deal  with  facts,  look 
to  them  for  guidance,  and  must  suppose  that  thought  and  fact 
pass  into  each  other  directly,  and  without  vitiation  or  deflection. 
They  are  correct  in  opposing  a  conception  which  would  inter- 
pose conditions  between  thought  on  the  one  hand  and  the  facts 
on  the  other. 

But  Hegel  is  true  to  the  scientific  spirit.  "When  Hegel  calls 
thought  objective  he  means  just  what  he  says:  that  there  is  no 
special,  apart  faculty  of  thought  belonging  to  and  operated  by  a 
mind  existing  separate  from  the  outer  world.  What  Hegel 
means  by  objective  thought  is  the  meaning,  the  significance  of 
the  fact  itself ;  and  by  methods  of  thought  he  understands  simply 
the  processes  in  which  this  meaning  of  fact  is  evolved."2 

If  Hegel  is  true  to  the  scientific  spirit;  if  his  logic  presupposes 
that  there  is  an  intrinsic  connection  of  thought  and  fact,  and 
views  science  simply  as  the  progressive  realization  of  the  world's 
ideality,  then  the  only  questions  to  be  asked  about  his  logic  are 
questions  of  fact  concerning  his  treatment  of  the  categories. 
Is  the  world  such  a  connected  system  as  he  holds  it  to  be?  "And, 
if  a  system,  does  it,  in  particular,  present  such  phases  (such 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  ii. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  12  f. 


28  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

relations,  categories)  as  Hegel  shows  forth?"1  These  questions 
are  wholly  objective.  Such  a  logic  as  Hegel's  could  scarcely 
make  headway  when  it  was  first  produced,  because  the  significance 
of  the  world,  its  ideal  character,  had  not  been  brought  to  light 
through  the  sciences.  We  are  now  reaching  a  stage,  however, 
where  science  has  brought  the  ideality  of  the  world  into  the 
foreground,  where  it  may  become  as  real  and  objective  a  material 
of  study  as  molecules  and  vibrations. 

This  appreciation  of  Hegel  would  seem  to  indicate  that  Dewey 
has  finally  grasped  the  significance  of  Hegel's  development  of 
the  Kantian  standpoint.  A  close  reading  of  the  article,  however, 
dispels  this  impression.  Dewey  believes  that  he  has  found  in 
Hegel  a  support  for  his  own  psychological  method  in  philosophy. 
It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  Hegel's  standpoint  was  any- 
thing but  psychological.  Dewey  has  already  given  up  Kant; 
he  will  presently  desert  Hegel.  A  psychological  interpretation 
of  the  thought-process  in  its  relations  to  reality  is  not  compatible 
with  the  critical  method  in  philosophy. 

In  the  next  article  to  be  examined,  "The  Superstition  of 
Necessity,"  in  the  Monist  (i893),2  Dewey  begins  to  attain  the 
psychological  description  of  thought  at  which  he  had  been  aiming. 
This  article  was  suggested,  as  Dewey  indicates  in  a  foot-note,  by 
Mr.  C.  S.  Pierce's  article,  "The  Doctrine  of  Necessity  Examined," 
in  the  Monist  (1892). 3  Although  Dewey  acknowledges  his  in- 
debtedness to  Pierce  for  certain  suggestions,  the  two  articles  have 
little  in  common. 

Dewey  had  consistently  maintained  that  thought  is  a  synthetic 
activity  through  which  reality  is  idealized  or  takes  on  meaning. 
Is  it  from  this  standpoint  that  he  approaches  the  subject  of 
necessity.  The  following  passage  reveals  the  connection  between 
his  former  position  and  the  one  that  he  is  now  approaching: 
"The  whole,  although  first  in  the  order  of  reality,  is  last  in  the 
order  of  knowledge.  The  complete  statement  of  the  whole  is 
the  goal,  not  the  beginning  of  wisdom.  We  begin,  therefore, 
with  fragments,  which  are  taken  for  wholes;  and  it  is  only  by 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  14. 

2  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  362-379. 

3  Vol.  II,  pp.  321-337- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STANDPOINT.       29 

piecing  together  these  fragments,  and  by  the  transformation  of 
them  involved  in  this  combination,  that  we  arrive  at  the  real 
fact.  There  comes  a  stage  at  which  the  recognition  of  the  unity 
begins  to  dawn  upon  us,  and  yet,  the  tradition  of  the  many 
distinct  wholes  survives;  judgment  has  to  combine  these  two 
contradictory  conceptions;  it  does  so  by  the  theory  that  the 
dawning  unity  is  an  effect  necessarily  produced  by  the  inter- 
action of  the  former  wholes.  Only  as  the  consciousness  of  the 
unity  grows  still  more  is  it  seen  that  instead  of  a  group  of  inde- 
pendent facts,  held  together  by  'necessary'  ties,  there  is  one 
reality,  of  which  we  have  been  apprehending  various  fragments 
in  succession  and  attributing  to  them  a  spurious  wholeness  and 
independence.  We  learn  (but  only  at  the  end)  that  instead  of 
discovering  and  then  connecting  together  a  number  of  separate 
realities,  we  have  been  engaged  in  the  progressive  definition  of 
one  fact."1 

Dewey  adds  to  his  idea  that  our  knowledge  of  reality  is  a 
progressive  development  of  its  implicit  ideality  through  a  syn- 
thetic thought-process,  the  specification  that  the  process  of 
idealization  occurs  in  connection  with  particular  crises  and  situa- 
tions. There  comes  a  stage,  he  says,  when  unity  begins  to  dawn 
and  meaning  emerges.  Necessity  is  a  term  used  in  connection 
with  these  transitions  from  partial  to  greater  realization  of  the 
world's  total  meaning.  Necessity  is  a  middle  term,  or  go-be- 
tween. It  marks  a  critical  stage  in  the  development  of  know- 
ledge. No  necessity  attaches  to  a  whole,  as  such.  "  Qua  whole, 
the  fact  simply  is  what  it  is;  while  the  parts,  instead  of  being 
necessitated  either  by  one  another  or  by  the  whole,  are  the  ana- 
lyzed factors  constituting,  in  their  complete  circuit,  the  whole."2 
But  when  the  original  whole  breaks  up,  through  its  inability  to 
comprehend  new  facts  under  its  unity,  a  process  of  judgment 
occurs  which  aims  at  the  establishment  of  a  new  unity.  "The 
judgment  of  necessity,  in  other  words,  is  exactly  and  solely  the 
transition  in  our  knowledge  from  unconnected  judgments  to  a 
more  comprehensive  synthesis.  Its  value  is  just  the  value  of 
this  transition;  as  negating  the  old  partial  and  isolated  judg- 

1  The  Monist,  Vol.  Ill,  1893,  p.  364. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  363. 


30  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

ments — in  its  backward  look — necessity  has  meaning;  in  its 
forward  look — with  reference  to  the  resulting  completely  or- 
ganized subject-matter — it  is  itself  as  false  as  the  isolated  judg- 
ments which  it  replaces."1  We  say  that  things  must  be  so,  when 
we  do  not  know  that  they  are  so;  that  is,  while  we  are  in  course 
of  determining  what  they  are.  Necessity  has  its  value  exclusively 
in  this  transition. 

Dewey  attempts  to  show,  in  a  discussion  which  need  not  be 
followed  in  detail,  that  there  is  nothing  radical  in  his  view,  and 
that  it  finds  support  among  the  idealists  and  empiricists  alike. 
Thinkers  of  both  schools  (he  quotes  Caird  and  Venn)  admit  that 
the  process  of  judgment  involves  a  change  in  objects,  at  least  as 
they  are  for  us.  There  is  a  transformation  of  their  value  and 
meaning.  "This  point  being  held  in  common,  both  schools 
must  agree  that  the  progress  of  judgment  is  equivalent  to  a  change 
in  the  value  of  objects — that  objects  as  they  are  for  us,  as  known, 
change  with  the  development  of  our  judgments."2  Dewey  pro- 
poses to  give  a  more  specific  description  of  this  process  of  trans- 
formation, and  especially,  to  show  how  the  idea  of  necessity  is 
involved  in  it. 

The  process  of  transformation  is  occasioned  by  practical 
necessity.  Men  have  a  tendency  to  take  objects  as  just  so  much 
and  no  more;  to  attach  to  a  given  subject-matter  these  predicates, 
and  no  others.  There  is  a  principle  of  inertia,  or  economy,  in 
the  mind,  which  leads  it  to  maintain  objects  in  their  status  quo 
as  long  as  possible.  "There  is  no  doubt  that  the  reluctance  of 
the  mind  to  give  up  an  object  once  made  lies  deep  in  its 
economies.  ...  I  wish  here  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  forming  of  a  number  of  distinct  objects  has  its  origin  in 
practical  needs  of  our  nature.  The  analysis  and  synthesis  which 
is  first  made  is  that  of  most  practical  importance.  .  .  .  "3  We 
tend  to  retain  such  objects  as  we  have,  and  it  is  not  until  "the 
original  subject-matter  has  been  overloaded  with  various  and 
opposing  predicates  that  we  think  of  doubting  the  correctness  of 
our  first  judgments,  of  putting  our  first  objects  under  suspicion."4 

1  op.  dt. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  364  f. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  367. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  366. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STANDPOINT.       31 

Once  the  Ptolemaic  system  is  well  established,  cycles  and  epi- 
cycles are  added  without  number,  rather  than  reconstruct  the 
original  object.  When,  finally,  we  are  compelled  to  make  some 
change,  we  tend  to  invent  some  new  object  to  which  the  predicates 
can  attach.  "When  qualities  arise  so  incompatible  with  the 
object  already  formed  that  they  cannot  be  referred  to  that  object, 
it  is  easier  to  form  a  new  object  on  their  basis  than  it  is  to  doubt 
the  correctness  of  the  old.  .  .  .  "*  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that 
under  stress  of  practical  need,  we  refer  the  new  predicates  to 
some  new  object,  and  have,  as  a  consequence,  two  objects. 
(Dewey  illustrates  this  situation  by  specific  examples.)  This 
separation  of  the  two  objects  cannot  continue  long,  before  we 
begin  to  discover  that  the  two  objects  are  related  elements  in  a 
larger  whole.  "The  wall  of  partition  between  the  two  separate 
'objects'  cannot  be  broken  at  one  attack;  they  have  to  be  worn 
away  by  the  attrition  arising  from  their  slow  movement  into  one 
another.  It  is  the  'necessary'  influence  which  one  exerts  upon 
the  other  that  finally  rubs  away  the  separateness  and  leaves  them 
revealed  as  elements  of  one  unified  whole."2 

The  concept  of  necessity  has  its  validity  in  such  a  movement  of 
judgment  as  has  been  described.  "Necessity,  as  the  middle 
term,  is  the  mid-wife  which,  from  the  dying  isolation  of  judgments, 
delivers  the  unified  judgment  just  coming  into  life — it  being 
understood  that  the  separateness  of  the  original  judgments  is 
not  as  yet  quite  negated,  nor  the  unity  of  the  coming  judgment 
quite  attained."3  The  judgment  of  necessity  connects  itself 
with  certain  facts  in  the  situation  which  are  immediately  con- 
cerned with  our  practical  activities.  These  are  facts  which, 
before  the  crisis  arises,  have  been  neglected;  they  are  elements  in 
the  situation  which  have  been  regarded  as  unessential,  as  not 
yet  making  up  a  part  of  the  original  object.  "Although  after 
our  desire  has  been  met  they  have  been  eliminated  as  accidental, 
as  irrelevant,  yet  when  the  experience  is  again  desired  their 
integral  membership  in  the  real  fact  has  to  be  recognized.  This 
is  done  under  the  guise  of  considering  them  as  means  which  are 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  367. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  368. 
3 1  bid.,  p.  363. 


32  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

necessary  to  bring  about  the  end."1  We  have  the  if  so,  then  so 
situation.  "If  we  are  to  reach  an  end  we  must  take  certain 
means;  while  so  far  as  we  want  an  undefined  end,  an  end  in 
general,  conditions  which  accompany  it  are  mere  accidents."2 
The  end  of  this  process  of  judgment  in  which  necessity  appears 
as  a  half-way  stage,  is  the  unity  of  reality;  a  whole  into  which 
the  formerly  discordant  factors  can  be  gathered  together. 

Only  a  detailed  study  of  the  original  text,  with  its  careful 
illustrations,  can  furnish  a  thorough  understanding  of  Dewey's 
position.  Enough  has  been  said,  however,  to  show  that  this 
psychological  account  of  the  judgment  process  is  a  natural 
outgrowth  of  his  former  views,  and  that,  as  it  stands,  it  is  still  in 
conformity  with  his  original  idealism.  The  article  as  a  whole 
marks  a  half-way  stage  in  Dewey's  philosophical  development. 
Looking  backward,  it  is  a  partial  fulfilment  of  the  demands  of 
"The  Psychological  Standpoint."  It  is  a  psychological  descrip- 
tion of  the  processes  whereby  self-consciousness  specifies  itself 
into  parts  which  are  still  related  to  the  whole.  Looking  forward, 
it  forecasts  the  functional  theory  of  knowledge.  We  have,  to 
begin  with,  objects  given  as  familiar  or  known  experiences.  So 
long  as  these  are  not  put  under  suspicion  or  examined,  they  simply 
are  themselves,  or  are  non-cognitionally  experienced.  But  on 
the  occasion  of  a  conflict  in  experience  between  opposed  facts 
and  their  meanings,  a  process  of  judgment  arises,  whose  function 
is  to  restore  unity.  It  is  in  this  process  of  judgment  as  an  opera- 
tion in  the  interests  of  the  unity  of  experience,  that  the  concepts, 
necessity  and  contingency,  have  their  valid  application  and  use. 
They  are  instruments  for  effecting  a  transformation  of  experience. 
This  is  the  root  idea  of  functional  instrumentalism.  It  is  ap- 
parent, therefore,  that  Dewey's  later  functionalism  resulted  from 
the  natural  growth  and  development  of  the  psychological  stand- 
point which  he  adopted  at  the  beginning  of  his  philosophical 
career. 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  372. 

2  Ibid. 


CHAPTER   III 

"MORAL   THEORY  AND   PRACTICE" 

DEWEY'S  ethical  theory,  as  has  already  been  indicated,  stands 
in  close  relation  to  his  general  theory  of  knowledge.  Since  it  has 
been  found  expedient  to  treat  the  ethical  theory  separately,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  go  back  some  two  years  and  trace  it  from  its 
beginnings.  The  order  of  arrangement  that  has  been  chosen  is 
fortunate  in  this  respect,  since  it  brings  into  close  connection  two 
articles  which  are  really  companion  pieces,  in  spite  of  the  two- 
year  interval  which  separates  them.  These  are  "The  Super- 
stition of  Necessity,"  which  was  considered  at  the  close  of  the 
last  chapter,  and  "Moral  Theory  and  Practice,"  an  article 
published  in  The  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  in  January, 
iSQi.1  This  latter  article,  now  to  be  examined,  is  one  of  Dewey's 
first  serious  undertakings  in  the  field  of  ethical  theory,  and  prob- 
ably represents  some  of  the  results  of  his  study  in  connection  with 
his  text-book,  Outlines  of  a  Critical  Theory  of  Ethics,  published  in 
the  same  year  (1891). 

The  immediate  occasion  for  the  article  is  explained  by  Dewey 
in  his  introductory  remarks:  "  In  the  first  number  of  this  journal 
four  writers  touch  upon  the  same  question, — the  relation  of 
moral  theory  to  moral  practice."2  The  four  writers  mentioned 
were  Sidgwick,  Adler,  Bosanquet,  and  Salter.  None  of  them, 
according  to  Dewey,  had  directly  discussed  the  relation  of  moral 
theory  to  practice.  "  But,"  he  says,  "finding  the  subject  touched 
upon  ...  in  so  many  ways,  I  was  led  to  attempt  to  clear  up 
my  own  ideas."3 

There  seems  to  exist,  Dewey  continues,  "the  idea  that  moral 
theory  is  something  other  than,  or  something  beyond,  an  analysis 
of  conduct, — the  idea  that  it  is  not  simply  and  wholly  '  the  theory 

1  Vol.  I,  pp.  186-203. 
*Ibid.,  p.  1 86. 
3  Ibid. 

33 


34  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

of  practice.'"1  It  is  often  denned,  for  instance,  as  an  inquiry 
into  the  metaphysics  of  morals,  which  has  nothing  to  do  with 
practice.  But,  Dewey  believes,  there  must  be  some  intrinsic 
connection  between  the  theory  of  morals  and  moral  practice. 
Such  intrinsic  connection  may  be  denied  on  the  ground  that 
practice  existed  long  before  theory  made  its  appearance.  Codes 
of  morality  were  in  existence  before  Plato,  Kant,  or  Spencer  rose 
to  speculate  upon  them.  This  raises  the  question,  What  is 
theory? 

Moral  theory  is  nothing  more  than  a  proposed  act  in  idea. 
It  is  insight,  or  perception  of  the  relations  and  bearings  of  the 
contemplated  act.  "It  is  all  one  with  moral  insight,  and  moral 
insight  is  the  recognition  of  the  relationships  in  hand.  This  is  a 
very  tame  and  prosaic  conception.  It  makes  moral  insight,  and 
therefore  moral  theory,  consist  simply  in  the  everyday  workings 
of  the  same  ordinary  intelligence  that  measures  drygoods,  drives 
nails,  sells  wheat,  and  invents  the  telephone."2  The  nature  of 
theory  as  idea  is  more  definitely  described.  "  It  is  the  construc- 
tion of  the  act  in  thought  against  its  outward  construction.  // 
is,  therefore,  the  doing, — the  act  itself,  in  its  emerging"* 

Theory  is  practice  in  idea,  or  as  foreseen ;  it  is  the  perception  of 
what  ought  to  be  done.  This,  at  least,  is  what  moral  theory  is. 
Dewey's  demand  that  fact  and  theory  must  have  some  intrinsic 
connection,  unsatisfied  in  the  articles  reviewed  in  the  previous 
chapter,  is  met  here  by  discovering  a  connecting  link  in  action. 
Theory  is  "the  doing, — the  act  itself  in  its  emerging.1'  The  reduc- 
tion of  thought  to  terms  of  action,  here  implied,  is  a  serious  step. 
It  marks  a  new  tendency  in  Dewey's  speculation.  Dewey  does 
not  claim,  in  the  present  article,  that  his  remarks  hold  good  for 
all  theory.  "Physical  science,"  he  remarks,  "does  deal  with 
abstractions,  with  hypothesis.  It  says,  'If  this,  then  that.' 
It  deals  with  the  relations  of  conditions  and  not  with  facts,  or 
individuals,  at  all.  It  says,  'I  have  nothing  to  do  with  your 
concrete  falling  stone,  but  I  can  tell  you  this,  that  it  is  a  law  of 
falling  bodies  that,  etc.'  "4  But  moral  theory  is  compelled  to  deal 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  187. 
*Ibid.,  p.  188. 
3  Ibid. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  191  f . 


"MORAL   THEORY  AND  PRACTICE."  35 

with  concrete  situations.  It  must  be  a  theory  which  can  be 
applied  directly  to  the  particular  case.  Moral  theory  cannot 
exist  simply  in  a  book.  Since,  moreover,  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  theory  in  the  abstract,  there  can  be  no  abstract  theory  of 
morals. 

There  can  be  no  difficulty,  Dewey  believes,  in  understanding 
moral  theory  as  action  in  idea.  All  action  that  is  intelligent,  all 
conduct,  that  is,  involves  theory.  "  For  any  act  (as  distinct  from 
mere  impulse)  there  must  be  'theory,'  and  the  wider  the  act, 
the  greater  its  import,  the  more  exigent  the  demand  for  theory."1 
This  does  not,  however,  answer  the  question  how  any  particular 
moral  theory,  the  Kantian,  the  Hedonistic,  or  the  Hegelian,  is 
related  to  action.  These  systems  present,  not  'moral  ideas'  as 
explained  above,  but  'ideas  about  morality.'  What  relation 
have  ideas  about  morality  to  specific  moral  conduct? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be  obtained  through  an  under- 
standing of  the  nature  of  the  moral  situation.  If  an  act  is  moral, 
it  must  be  intelligent;  as  moral  conduct,  it  implies  insight  into 
the  situation  at  hand.  This  insight  is  obtained  by  an  examina- 
tion and  analysis  of  the  concrete  situation.  "This  is  evidently  a 
work  of  analysis.  Like  every  analysis,  it  requires  that  the  one 
making  it  be  in  possession  of  certain  working  tools.  I  cannot 
resolve  this  practical  situation  which  faces  me  by  merely  looking 
at  it.  I  must  attack  it  with  such  instruments  of  analysis  as  I 
have  at  hand.  What  we  call  moral  rules  are  precisely  such  tools 
of  analysis.'"'2'  The  Golden  Rule  is  such  an  instrument  of 
analysis.  Taken  by  itself,  it  offers  no  direct  information  as  to 
what  is  to  be  done.  "The  rule  is  a  counsel  of  perfection;  it  is  a 
warning  that  in  my  analysis  of  the  moral  situation  (that  is,  of 
the  conditions  of  practice)  I  be  impartial  as  to  the  effects  on 
me  and  thee.'  "3  Every  rule  which  is  of  any  use  at  all  is  em- 
ployed in  a  similar  fashion. 

But  this  is  not,  so  far,  a  statement  of  the  nature  of  moral 
theory,  since  only  particular  rules  have  been  considered.  Ethical 
theory,  in  its  wider  significance,  is  a  reflective  process  in  which,  as 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  189. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  194.    Author's  Italics. 

3  Ibid. 


36  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

one  might  say,  the  '  tools  of  analysis '  are  shaped  and  adapted  to 
their  work.  These  rules  are  not  fixed  things,  made  once  and  for 
all,  but  of  such  a  nature  that  they  preserve  their  effectiveness 
only  as  they  are  constantly  renewed  and  reshaped.  Ethical 
theory  brings  the  Golden  Rule  together  with  other  general  ideas, 
conforms  them  to  each  other,  and  in  this  way  gives  the  moral 
rule  a  great  scope  in  practice.  All  moral  theory,  therefore,  is 
finally  linked  up  with  practice.  "It  bears  much  the  same  rela- 
tion to  the  particular  rule  as  this  to  the  special  case.  It  is  a  tool 
for  the  analysis  of  its  meaning,  and  thereby  a  tool  for  giving  it 
greater  effect."1  In  ethical  theory  we  find  moral  rules  in  the 
making.  Ideas  about  morals  are  simply  moral  ideas  in  the  course 
of  being  formed. 

Dewey  presents  here  an  instrumental  theory  of  knowledge  and 
concepts.  But  it  differs  widely  from  the  instrumentalism  of  the 
Neo-Hegelian  school  both  in  its  form  and  derivation.  Dewey 
reaches  his  instrumentalism  through  a  psychological  analysis  of 
the  judgment  process.  He  finds  that  theory  is  related  to  fact 
through  action,  and  since  he  had  been  unable  to  give  a  concrete 
account  of  this  relationship  at  a  previous  time,  the  conclusion 
may  be  regarded  as  a  discovery  of  considerable  moment  for  his 
philosophical  method.  Dewey's  instrumentalism  rests  upon  a 
very  special  psychological  interpretation,  which  puts  action 
first  and  thought  second.  Unable  to  discover  an  overt  connec- 
tion between  fact  and  thought,  he  delves  underground  for  it,  and 
finds  it  in  the  activities  of  the  nervous  organism.  This  dis- 
covery, he  believes,  solves  once  and  for  all  the  ancient  riddle  of 
the  relation  of  thought  to  reality. 

In  the  concluding  part  of  the  article  Dewey  takes  up  the  con- 
sideration of  moral  obligation.  "What  is  the  relation  of  know- 
ledge, of  theory,  to  that  Ought  which  seems  to  be  the  very  essence 
of  moral  conduct?"2  The  answer  anticipates  in  some  measure 
the  position  which  was  taken  later,  as  has  been  seen,  in  regard  to 
necessity.  The  concept  of  obligation,  like  that  of  necessity, 
Dewey  believes,  has  relevance  only  for  the  judgment  situation. 
"But,"  Dewey  says,  "limiting  the  question  as  best  I  can,  I 

1  op.  cit.,  p.  195. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  198. 


"MORAL   THEORY  AND  PRACTICE."  37 

should  say  (first)  that  the  'ought*  always  rises  from  and  falls 
back  into  the  'is,'  and  (secondly)  that  the  'ought'  is  itself  an 
'is,' — the  'is'  of  action."1  Obligation  is  not  something  added 
to  the  conclusion  of  a  judgment,  something  which  gives  a  moral 
aspect  to  what  had  been  a  coldly  intellectual  matter.  The 
'ought'  finds  an  integral  place  in  the  judgment  process.  "The 
difference  between  saying,  '  this  act  is  the  one  to  be  done  .  .  .  ,' 
and  saying,  'The  act  ought  to  be  done,'  is  merely  verbal.  The 
analysis  of  action  is  from  the  first  an  analysis  of  what  is  to  be 
done;  how,  then,  should  it  come  out  excepting  with  a  'this 
should  be  done'?"2  The  peculiarity  of  the  'ought'  is  that  it 
applies  to  conduct  or  action,  whereas  the  'is'  applies  to  the  facts. 
It  has  reference  to  doing,  or  acting,  as  the  situation  demands. 
"This,  then,  is  the  relation  of  moral  theory  and  practice.  Theory 
is  the  cross-section  of  the  given  state  of  action  in  order  to  know 
the  conduct  that  should  be ;  practice  is  the  realization  of  the  idea 
thus  gained:  in  is  theory  in  action."3 

The  parallel  between  this  article  and  "The  Superstition  of 
Necessity"  is  too  obvious  to  require  formulation,  and  the  same 
criticism  that  applies  to  the  one  is  applicable  to  the  other.  "The 
Superstition  of  Necessity"  is  more  detailed  and  concrete  in  its 
treatment  of  the  judgment  process  than  this  earlier  article,  as 
might  be  expected,  but  the  fundamental  position  is  essentially 
the  same.  The  synthetic  activity  of  the  self,  the  thought- 
process,  finally  appears  as  the  servant  of  action,  or,  more  exactly, 
as  itself  a  special  mode  of  organic  activity  in  general. 

From  the  basis  of  the  standpoint  which  he  had  now  attained 
Dewey  attempted  a  criticism  of  Green's  moral  theory,  in  two 
articles  in  the  Philosophical  Review,  in  1892  and  1893.  The 
first  of  these,  entitled  "Green's  Theory  of  the  Moral  Motive,"4 
appeared  almost  two  years  after  the  article  on  "Moral  Theory 
and  Practice."  The  continuity  of  Dewey 's  thought  during  the 
intervening  period,  however,  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the 
first  four  pages  of  the  article  to  be  considered  are  given  over  to 

1  op.  tit. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  202. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  203. 

4  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  I,  1892,  pp.  593-612. 


3$  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

an  introductory  discussion  which  repeats  in  almost  identical 
terms  the  position  taken  in  "Moral  Theory  and  Practice." 
Dewey  himself  calls  attention  to  this  fact  in  a  foot-note. 

There  must  be,  Dewey  again  asserts,  some  vital  connection  of 
theory  with  practice.  "Ethical  theory  must  be  a  general  state- 
ment of  the  reality  involved  in  every  moral  situation.  It  must 
be  action  stated  in  its  more  generic  terms,  terms  so  generic  that 
every  individual  action  will  fall  within  the  outlines  it  sets  forth. 
If  the  theory  agrees  with  these  requirements,  then  we  have  for 
use  in  any  special  case  a  tool  for  analyzing  that  case;  a  method 
for  attacking  and  reducing  it,  for  laying  it  open  so  that  the  action 
called  for  in  order  to  meet,  to  satisfy  it,  may  readily  appear."1 
Dewey  argues  that  moral  theory  cannot  possibly  give  directions 
for  every  concrete  case,  but  that  it  by  no  means  follows  that  theory 
can  stand  aside  from  the  specific  case  and  say:  "What  have  I  to 
so  with  thee?  Thou  art  empirical,  and  I  am  the  metaphysics  of 
conduct." 

Dewey's  preliminary  remarks  are  introductory  to  a  considera- 
tion of  Green's  ethical  theory.  "His  theory  would,  I  think," 
Dewey  says,  "be  commonly  regarded  as  the  best  of  the  modern 
attempts  to  form  a  metaphysic  of  ethic.  I  wish,  using  this  as 
type,  to  point  out  the  inadequacy  of  such  metaphysical  theories, 
on  the  ground  that  they  fail  to  meet  the  demand  just  made  of 
truly  ethical  theory,  that  it  lend  itself  to  translation  into  con- 
crete terms,  and  thereby  to  the  guidance,  the  direction  of  actual 
conduct."2  Dewey  recognizes  that  Green  is  better  than  his 
theory,  but  says  that  the  theory,  taken  in  logical  strictness, 
cannot  meet  individual  needs. 

Dewey  makes  a  special  demand  of  Green's  theory.  He 
demands,  that  is,  that  it  supply  a  body  of  rules,  or  guides  to 
action  which  can  be  employed  by  the  moral  agent  as  tools  of 
analysis  in  cases  requiring  moral  judgment.  It  is  evident  in 
advance  that  Green's  theory  was  built  upon  a  different  plan, 
and  can  not  meet  the  conditions  which  Dewey  prescribes.  The 
general  nature  of  Green's  inquiry  is  well  stated  in  the  following 
summary  by  Professor  Thilly:  *The  truth  in  Green's  thought  is 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  596. 
zlbid.t  p.  597. 


"MORAL   THEORY  AND  PRACTICE."  -  39 

this:  the  purpose  of  all  social  devotion  and  reform  is,  after  all, 
the  perfection  of  man  on  the  spiritual  side,  the  development  of 
men  of  character  and  ideals.  .  .  .  The  final  purpose  of  all  moral 
endeavor  must  be  the  realization  of  an  attitude  of  the  human 
soul,  of  some  form  of  noble  consciousness  in  human  personalities. 
...  It  is  well  enough  to  feed  and  house  human  bodies,  but  the 
paramount  question  will  always  be:  What  kinds  of  souls  are  to 
dwell  in  these  bodies?"1  To  put  the  matter  in  more  technical 
terms,  Green  is  concerned  with  ends  and  values.  His  question 
is  not,  What  is  the  best  means  of  accomplishing  a  given  purpose, 
but,  What  end  is  worth  attaining?  Such  an  inquiry  has  no 
immediate  relation  to  action.  It  may  lead  to  conclusions  which 
become  determining  factors  in  action,  but  the  process  of  inquiry 
has  no  direct  reference  to  conduct.  Dewey,  having  reduced 
thought  to  a  function  of  activity,  must  proceed,  by  logical 
necessity,  to  carry  the  same  reduction  into  the  field  of  theory  in 
general.  This  he  does  in  thorough  style.  His  demand  that 
moral  theory  shall  concern  itself  with  concrete  and  'specific' 
situations  is  a  result  of  the  same  tendency.  Since  action  can 
only  be  described  as  response  to  a  'situation,'  thought,  as  a 
function  of  activity,  must  likewise  be  directed  upon  a  'situation.' 
Conduct  in  general  and  values  in  general  become  impossible 
under  his  system,  because  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  activity- 
in-general  of  the  organism.  Ends,  in  other  words,  exist  only  for 
thought,  when  thought  is  interpreted  as  transcending  action, 
and  being,  in  some  sense,  self-contained.  When  thought  is 
interpreted  as  a  kind  of  'indirect  activity,'  its  capacity  for  meta- 
physical inquiry  vanishes  along  with  its  independence. 

It  would  have  been  more  in  keeping  with  sound  criticism  had 
Dewey  himself  taken  note  of  the  important  divergence  in  aim 
and  intent  between  his  work  and  Green's.  As  a  consequence  of 
his  failure  to  do  so,  he  fails,  necessarily,  to  do  justice  to  Green's 
standpoint.  The  criticism  which  he  directs  against  Green's 
moral  theory  may  be  briefly  summed  up  as  follows. 

Green  tends  to  repeat  the  Kantian  separation  of  the  self  as 
reason  from  the  self  as  want  or  desire.  "The  dualism  between 

1  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  555. 


40  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

reason  and  sense  is  given  up,  indeed,  but  only  to  be  replaced  by  a 
dualism  between  the  end  which  would  satisfy  the  self  as  a  unity 
or  whole,  and  that  which  satisfies  it  in  the  particular  circumstances 
of  actual  conduct."1  As  a  consequence  of  the  separation  of  the 
ideal  from  the  actual,  no  action  can  satisfy  the  whole  self,  and 
thus  no  action  can  be  truly  moral.  "No  thorough-going  theory 
of  total  depravity  ever  made  righteousness  more  impossible  to 
the  natural  man  than  Green  makes  it  to  a  human  being  by  the 
very  constitution  of  his  being.  .  .  .  "2  Dewey  traces  this 
separation  of  the  self  as  reason  from  the  self  as  desire  through 
those  passages  in  which  Green  describes  the  moral  agent  as  one 
who  distinguishes  himself  from  his  desires  (Book  II,  Prolegomena 
to  Ethics).  "The  process  of  moral  experience  involves,  therefore, 
a  process  in  which  the  self,  in  becoming  conscious  of  its  want, 
objectifies  that  want  by  setting  it  over  against  itself;  distinguish- 
ing the  want  from  self  and  self  from  want.  .  .  .  Now  this  theory 
so  far  might  be  developed  in  either  of  two  directions."3 

In  the  first  place,  the  self-distinguishing  process  may  be  an 
activity  by  means  of  which  the  self  specifies  its  own  activity  and 
satisfaction.  "The  particular  desires  and  ends  would  be  the 
modes  in  which  the  self  relieved  itself  of  its  abstractness,  its 
undeveloped  character,  and  assumed  concrete  existence.  .  .  . 
The  unity  of  the  self  would  stand  in  no  opposition  to  the  particu- 
larity of  the  special  desire ;  on  the  contrary,  the  unity  of  the  self 
and  the  manifold  of  definite  desires  would  be  the  synthetic  and 
analytic  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  reality,  neither  having  any 
advantage  metaphysical  or  ethical  over  the  other !  "4  But  Green, 
unfortunately,  does  not  develop  his  theory  in  this  concrete 
direction.  The  self  does  not  specify  itself  in  the  particulars,  but 
remains  apart  from  them.  "The  objectification  is  not  of  the 
self  in  the  special  end;  but  the  self  remains  behind  setting  the 
special  object  over  against  itself  as  not  adequate  to  itself.  .  .  , 
The  unity  of  the  self  sets  up  an  ideal  of  satisfaction  for  itself  as  it 

1  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  I,  1892,  p.  598. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  599. 

4  Ibid.     Compare  with  the  passage  in  "Psychology  as  Philosophic  Method," 
Mind,  Vol.  XI,  p.  9. 


"MORAL   THEORY  AND  PRACTICE."  41 

withdraws  from  the  special  want,  and  this  ideal  set  up  through 
negation  of  the  particular  desire  and  its  satisfaction  constitutes 
the  moral  ideal.  It  is  forever  unrealizable,  because  it  forever 
negates  the  special  activities  through  which  alone  it  might,  after 
all,  realize  itself."1  In  completing  this  argument  Dewey  refers 
to  certain  well-known  passages  in  the  Prolegomena  to  Ethics, 
in  which  Green  states  that  the  moral  ideal  is  never  completely 
attainable.  Green's  abstract  conception  of  the  self  as  that  which 
forever  sets  itself  over  against  its  desires  is,  Dewey  argues,  not 
only  useless  as  an  ideal  for  action,  but  positively  opposed  to  moral  , 
striving.  "  It  supervenes,  not  as  a  power  active  in  its  own  satis- 
faction, but  to  make  us  realize  the  unsatisfactoriness  of  such 
seeming  satisfactions  as  we  may  happen  to  get,  and  to  keep  us 
striving  for  something  which  we  can  never  get!"2  The  most 
that  can  be  made  of  Green's  moral  ideal  is  to  conceive  it  as  the 
bare  form  of  unity  in  conduct.  Employed  as  a  tool  of  analy- 
sis, as  a  moral  rule,  it  might  tell  us,  "Whatever  the  situation, 
seek  for  its  unity."  But  it  can  scarcely  go  even  as  far  as  this  in 
the  direction  of  concreteness,  for  it  says :  "  No  unity  can  be  found 
in  the  situation  because  the  situation  is  particular,  and  therefore 
set  over  against  the  unity."3 

Most  students  of  Green  would .  undoubtedly  say  that  this 
account  of  his  moral  theory  is  entirely  one-sided,  and  fails  to 
reckon  with  certain  elements  which  should  properly  be  taken  into 
account.  In  the  first  place,  Green  is  defining  the  moral  agent  as  ' 
he  finds  him,  and  is  reporting  what  seems  to  him  a  fact  when  he 
says  that  the  moral  ideal  is  too  high  to  be  realized  in  this  life. 
Having  a  spiritual  nature,  man  fails  to  find  satisfaction  in  the 
goods  of  natural  life.  Dewey  should  address  himself  to  the  facts 
in  refuting  Green's  analysis  of  human  nature.  In  the  second 
place,  with  respect  to  Green's  separation  of  the  self  as  unity  from 
the  self  as  a  manifold  of  desires,  Dewey's  criticism  may  be  flatly 
rejected.  Green  raises  the  question  himself:  ' '  Do  you  mean,' 
it  may  be  asked,  'to  assert  the  existence  of  a  mysterious  abstract 
entity  which  you  call  the  self  of  a  man,  apart  from  all  his  par- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  600. 
2 1 bid.,  p.  60 1. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  602. 


42  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

ticular  feelings,  desires,  and  thoughts — alL  the  experience  of  his 
inner  life?'"1  Green  takes  time  to  state  his  position  as  clearly 
as  possible.  He  repudiates  the  idea  of  an  abstract  self  apart 
from  desire.  The  following  passage  is  typical  of  his  remarks: 
"Just  as  we  hold  that  our  desires,  feelings,  and  thoughts  would 
not  be  what  they  are — would  not  be  those  of  a  man — if  not  re- 
lated to  a  subject  which  distinguishes  itself  from  each  and  all  of 
them;  so  we  hold  that  this  subject  would  not  be  what  it  is,  if  it 
were  not  related  to  the  particular  feelings,  desires,  and  thoughts, 
which  it  thus  distinguishes  from  and  presents  to  itself."2  It  will 
be  remembered  also,  that  in  moral  action  the  agent  identifies 
himself  with  his  desires,  or  adopts  them  as  his  own,  and  the 
ability  to  do  this  is  the  chief  mark  of  human  intelligence.  But 
man  could  not  identify  himself  with  his  desires,  or  'specify  him- 
self in  them/  as  Dewey  says,  did  he  not  at  the  same  time  have 
the  capacity  to  differentiate  himself  from  them. 

Dewey's  further  remarks  on  Green's  ideal  need  not  be  followed 
in  detail,  since  they  rest  upon  a  misapprehension  of  Green's 
purpose,  and  add  little  to  what  he  has  already  said.  Taking  the 
moral  ideal  as  something  that  can  never  be  realized  in  this  life, 
Dewey  inquires  what  use  can  be  made  of  it.  He  considers  three 
modes  in  which  Green  might  have  given  content  to  the  ideal,  as  a 
working  principle,  and  finds  that  it  cannot  be  made,  in  any  of 
these  ways,  to  serve  as  a  tool  of  analysis.  Green  was  not  pre- 
pared to  meet  these  'pragmatic'  requirements.  He  did  not 
propose  his  ideal  as  a  principle  of  conduct,  in  Dewey's  sense;  he 
stated  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  man  is  more  than  natural,  and 
that,  as  such  a  being,  his  ideals  can  never  be  completely  met  by 
natural  objects.  How  man  is  to  act,  in  view  of  his  spiritual 
nature,  is  a  further  question :  but  the  realization  which  the  indi- 
vidual has  of  his  own  spiritual  nature  must  of  necessity  be  a 
large  factor  in  the  determination  of  his  conduct.  The  '  Spiritual 
Nature,'  in  Green's  terminology,  meant  a  'not-natural'  nature, 
and  '  not-natural '  in  turn  meant  a  nature  that  is  not  definable  in 
mechanical  or  biological  terms.  Dewey's  criticism,  therefore, 
went  wide  of  the  mark. 

1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  third  ed.,  p.  103. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  104. 


"MORAL   THEORY  AND   PRACTICE."  43 

In  November,  1893,  Dewey  followed  his  criticism  of  Green's 
moral  motive  by  a  second  article  in  the  Philosophical  Review 
on  "Self- realization  as  the  Moral  Ideal."1  It  continues  the 
criticism  which  has  already  been  made  of  Green,  but  from  a 
different  point  of  departure. 

The  idea  of  self-realization  in  ethics,  Dewey  begins,  may  be 
helpful  or  harmful  according  to  the  way  in  which  the  ideas 
of  the  self  and  its  realization  are  worked  out  in  the  concrete. 
The  mere  idea  of  a  self  to  be  realized  is,  of  course,  abstract;  it  is 
merely  the  statement  of  a  problem,  which  needs  to  be  worked  out 
and  given  content.  By  way  of  introducing  his  own  idea  of  self- 
realization,  Dewey  proposes  to  criticize  a  certain  conception  of 
the  self  which  he  finds  in  current  discussion.  "The  notion  which 
I  wish  to  criticize,"  he  says,  "is  that  of  the  self  as  a  presupposed 
fixed  schema  or  outline,  while  realization  consists  in  the  filling  up 
of  this  schema.  ^The  notion  which  I  would  suggest  as  substitute 
is  that  of  the  self  as  always  a  concrete  specific  activity;  and,  there- 
fore, (to  anticipate)  of  the  identity  of  self  and  realization."2 
Such  a  presupposed  fixed  self  is  to  be  found  in  Green's  "Eternally 
complete  Consciousness." 

The  idea  of  self-realization  implies  capacities  or  possibilities. 
/To  translate  capacity  into  actuality,  as  the  conception  of  the 
fixed  self  seems  to  do,  is  to  vitiate  the  whole  idea  of  possibility. 
There  must,  then,  be  some  conception  of  unrealized  powers 
which  will  meet  this  difficulty.  The  way  to  a  valid  conception 
is  through  the  realization  that  capacities  are  always  specific. 
"The  capacities  of  a  child,  for  example,  are  not  simply  of  a  child, 
not  of  a  man,  but  of  this  child,  not  of  any  other."3  Whatever 
else  capacity  may  be,  whether  infinite  or  not,  it  must  be  an  ele- 
ment in  an  actual  situation.  As  specific  things,  moreover, 
capacities  reside  in  activities,  which  are  now  going  on.  The 
capacity  of  a  child  to  become  a  musician  consists  in  this  fact: 
"Even  now  he  has  a  certain  quickness,  vividness,  and  plasticity 
of  vision,  a  certain  deftness  of  hand,  and  a  certain  motor  coordi- 

1  Vol.  II,  pp.  652-664. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  653. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  655. 


44  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

nation  by  which  his  hand  is  stimulated  to  work  in  harmony  with 
his  eye."1 

How  do  these  specific,  actual  activities  come  to  be  called 
capacities?  There  is  a  peculiar  psychological  reason  for  this 
which  James  has  pointed  out,  in  his  statement  that  essence  "is 
that  which  is  so  important  for  my  interests  that,  comparatively, 
other  properties  may  be  omitted."2  When  we  pay  attention  to 
any  activity,  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  select  only  that 
portion  of  it  that  is  of  immediate  interest,  and  to  exclude  the 
rest  as  irrelevant.  "In  the  act  of  vision,  for  example,"  Dewey 
tells  us,  "the  thing  that  seems  nearest  us,  that  which  claims  con- 
tinuously our  attention,  is  the  eye  itself.  We  thus  come  to 
abstract  the  eye  from  all  special  acts  of  seeing ;  we  make  the  eye 
the  essential  thing  in  sight,  and  conceive  of  the  circumstances  of 
vision  as  indeed  circumstances;  as  more  or  less  accidental  con- 
comitants of  the  permanent  eye."3  There  is  no  eye  in  general; 
the  eye  is  always  given  along  with  other  circumstances  which 
in  their  totality  make  up  a  concrete  seeing  situation.  Neverthe- 
less, we  abstract  the  eye  from  other  circumstances  and  set  it  up 
as  the  essence  of  seeing.  But  we  cannot  retain  the  eye  in  abso- 
lute abstraction,  because  the  concrete  circumstances  of  vision 
force  themselves  upon  the  attention.  So  we  lump  these  together 
on  the  other  side  as  a  new  object,  and  take  as  their  essence  the 
vibrations  of  ether.  "  The  eye  now  becomes  the  capacity  of  seeing; 
the  vibrations  of  ether,  conditions  required  for  the  exercise  of  the  ca- 
pacity"* We  keep  the  two  abstractions,  but  try  to  restore  the 
unity  of  the  situation  through  taking  one  as  capacity  and  the 
other  as  the  condition  of  the  exercise  of  capacity. 

But  we  cannot  stop  even  with  this  double  abstraction.  "The 
eye  in  general  and  the  vibrations  in  general  do  not,  even  in  their 
unity,  constitute  the  act  of  vision.  A  multitude  of  other  factors 
are  included."5  Preserving  the  original  'core'  as  capacity,  we 
tend  to  treat  all  the  attendant  circumstances  which  occur  fre- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  656. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  657. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  658.     Author's  italics. 
6  Ibid. 


"MORAL   THEORY  AND  PRACTICE."  45 

quently  enough  to  require  taking  account  of,  as  conditions  which 
help  realize  the  abstracted  reality  called  capacity. 

The  discussion  here  is  very  much  like  that  in  "The  Super- 
stition of  Necessity"  (published  in  the  same  year),  which  was 
reviewed  in  the  last  chapter.  Dewey  calls  attention  to  this 
connection  in  a  foot-note,  remarking  that  he  has  already  de- 
veloped at  greater  length  "the  idea  that  necessity  and  possibility 
are  simply  the  two  correlative  abstractions  into  which  the  one 
reality  falls  apart  during  the  process  of  our  conscious  apprehen- 
sion of  it."1  The  danger,  Dewey  says,  is  that  the  merely  relative 
character  of  a  given  capacity  may  be  overlooked,  and  that  it 
may  be  ontologized  into  a  fixed  entity.  This  is  the  error,  he 
thinks,  into  which  Green  fell.  The  ideal  self,  as  that  which 
capacity  may  realize,  is  ontologized  into  an  already  existent  fact. 
Then  we  get  a  separation  between  the  present  self,  as  capacity, 
and  the  ideal  self  which  is  to  be  realized.  The  self  already  real- 
ized is  opposed  to  the  self  as  yet  ideal.  "This  'realized  self 
is  no  reality  by  itself;  it  is  simply  our  partial  conception  of  the 
self  erected  into  an  entity.  Recognizing  its  incomplete  character, 
we  bring  in  what  we  have  left  out  and  call  it  the  'ideal  self.' 
Then  by  way  of  dealing  with  the  fact  that  we  have  not  two  selves 
here  at  all,  but  simply  a  less  and  a  more  adequate  insight  into  the 
same  self,  we  insert  the  idea  of  one  of  these  selves  realizing  the 
other."2  It  is  in  this  manner  that  error  arises. 

But  what  is  the  correct  attitude  toward  the  self?  First  of  all, 
the  self  must  be  conceived  as  "a  working,  practical  self,  carrying 
within  the  rhythm  of  its  own  process  both  '  realized '  and  '  ideal ' 
self.  The  current  ethics  of  the  self  .  .  .  are  too  apt  to  stop  with 
a  metaphysical  definition,  which  seems  to  solve  problems  in 
general,  but  at  the  expense  of  the  practical  problems  which  alone 
really  demand  or  admit  solution."3  The  first  point  of  the  argu- 
ment is  that  the  self  activity  is  individual,  concrete,  and  specific, 
here  and  now,  and  the  second  point  is  that  if  the  self  is  to  be 
talked  of  in  an  intelligent  way  it  must  be  taken  as  something 
empirically  given.  "The  whole  point  is  expressed  when  we  say 

1  Op.  cit.,  note. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  663. 

3  Ibid. 


46  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

that  no  possible  future  activities  or  conditions  have  anything 
to  do  with  the  present  action  except  as  they  enable  us  to  take 
deeper  account  of  the  present  activity,  to  get  beyond  the  mere 
superficies  of  the  act,  to  see  it  in  its  totality."1  The  phrase, 
1  realize  yourself,'  is  a  direction  for  knowledge;  it  means,  see  the 
wider  consequences  of  your  act,  realize  its  wider  bearings. 

Dewey  says :  "The  fixed  ideal  is  as  distinctly  the  bane  of  ethical 
science  today  as  the  fixed  universe  of  medievalism  was  the  bane 
of  the  natural  science  of  the  Renascence."2  This  is  a  strong 
statement,  which  indicates  how  wide  was  the  gulf  which  now 
separated  Dewey  from  Green,  whom  he  formerly  acknowledged 
as  his  master. 

Dewey's  interpretation  of  Green's  ideal  self  is  far  from  satis- 
factory, largely  because  of  its  lack  of  insight  and  appreciation. 
The  reduction  of  thought  to  a  '  form  of  activity '  renders  a  purely 
theoretical  inquiry  impossible.  The  'present  activity,'  the 
biological  situation,  becomes  the  measure  of  all  things,  even  of 
thought.  Ideals,  in  his  own  words,  have  nothing  to  do  with 
present  action,  "except  as  they  enable  us  to  take  deeper  account 
of  the  present  activity."  Dewey 's  self  and  Green's  are  incom- 
mensurable. The  former  is  the  biological  organism,  with  a 
capacity  for  indirect  activity  called  thinking;  the  latter  is  a  not- 
natural  being,  whose  reality  escapes  the  logic  of  descriptive 
science,  because  of  the  fulness  of  its  content.  Dewey's  failure 
to  understand  this  difference  is  significant.  His  acquaintance 
with  Green  seems  to  have  been  formal  from  the  beginning,  never 
intimate,  and  the  articles  just  reviewed  mark  the  end  of  Dewey's 
idealistic  discipleship.  His  psychological  idealism,  in  fact,  was 
fundamentally  antithetical  to  the  Neo-Hegelianism  which  he  had 
sought  to  espouse,  and  the  development  of  his  own  standpoint 
brought  out  the  vital  differences  which  had  been  hidden  from 
his  earlier  understanding.  The  idealism  which  seeks  to  view 
reality  together  and  as  a  whole  is  forever  incompatible  with  a 
method  which  seeks  to  interpret  the  whole  in  terms  of  one  of  its 
parts. 

1  Op.  cit.t  p.  65Qr 
*  Ibid.,  p.  664. 


CHAPTER   IV 

FUNCTIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY 

IT  now  becomes  necessary  to  review  that  period  of  Dewey's 
philosophical  career  which  is  marked  by  the  definite  abandonment 
of  the  idealistic  standpoint,  and  the  adoption  of  the  method  of 
instrumental  pragmatism.  It  has  already  been  seen  that  there 
is  a  close  connection  between  the  "functionalism"  which  now 
begins  to  appear,  and  the  "Psychological  Standpoint"  set  forth 
in  the  preceding  pages  of  this  review.  It  is  not  possible,  however, 
to  account  for  all  the  elements  which  contribute  to  this  develop- 
ment. Dewey  was  active  in  many  fields  and  received  suggestions 
from  many  sources.  It  seems  best,  in  dealing  with  this  period, 
to  "follow  the  lead  of  the  subject-matter"  and  avoid  a  priori 
speculation  on  the  factors  which  determined  the  precise  form  of 
Dewey's  mature  standpoint  in  philosophy. 

Dewey  had  always  kept  in  mind  the  idea  that  the  synthetic 
activity  whereby  self-consciousness  evolves  the  ideality  of  the 
world  must  operate  through  the  human  organism.  He  had  fre- 
quently referred  to  Green's  saying  that  the  Eternal  Self-Con- 
sciousness reproduces  itself  in  man,  and  to  similar  notions  in 
Caird  and  Kant;  but  he  had  never  considered,  in  a  detailed  way, 
how  the  organism  might  serve  as  the  vehicle  for  such  a  process. 
His  ethical  theory,  with  its  analysis  of  individuality  into  capacity 
and  environment,  tended  to  bring  the  body-world  relationship 
into  the  foreground,  and  the  idea  that  theory  is  relative  to  action 
tended  to  emphasize  still  more  the  relation  of  thought  to  the 
bodily  processes.  Dewey  finally  discovers  the  basis  upon  which 
the  synthetic  activity  of  the  self,  the  thought  process,  may  be 
described  empirically  and  concretely.  Organism-in-relation-to- 
environment  becomes  the  key-stone  of  his  theory  of  knowledge. 
Thought  is  interpreted  as  a  function  of  the  organism,  biologically 
considered,  and  the  biological  psychology  which  results  from  this 
mode  of  interpretation  is  commonly  known  as"  'functional  psy- 
chology.' 

47 


48  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

The  functional  psychology  is  presented  in  a  series  of  articles 
in  the  Philosophical  Review  and  the  Psychological  Review,  pub- 
lished between  1894  and  1898.  The  most  important  of  these  is 
"The  Reflex  Arc  Concept  in  Psychology,"  published  in  the 
Psychological  Review  in  I896.1  Since  it  is  the  only  article  in  the 
series  which  gives  a  complete  view  of  the  theory,  it  will  be  made 
the  basis  for  the  discussion  of  the  functional  theory  of  psychology. 

The  reflex  arc  concept  in  psychology,  Dewey  says,  recognizes 
that  the  sensory-motor  arc  is  to  be  taken  as  the  unit  of  nerve 
*  structure,  and  the  type  of  nerve  function.  But  psychologists 
do  not  avail  themselves  of  the  full  value  of  this  conception, 
because  they  still  retain  in  connection  with  it  certain  distinctions 
which  were  used  in  the  older  psychology.  "The  older  dualism 
between  sensation  and  idea  is  repeated  in  the  current  dualism  of 
peripheral  and  central  structures  and  functions ;  the  older  dualism 
of  body  and  soul  finds  a  distinct  echo  in  the  current  dualism  of 
stimulus  and  response."2  These  rigid  distinctions  must  be  set 
aside,  and  the  separated  elements  must  be  viewed  as  elements  in 
one  sensory-motor  coordination.  Each  is  to  be  defined,  not  as 
something  existing  by  itself,  but  as  an  element  functioning  in  a 
concrete  whole  of  activity.  Thus,  if  we  are  to  study  vision,  we 
must  first  take  vision  as  a  sensory- mo  tor  coordination,  the  act 
of  seeing,  and  within  the  whole  we  may  then  be  able  to  distinguish 
certain  elements,  sensations,  or  movements,  and  define  them 
according  to  their  function  in  the  total  act  of  seeing.  The  reflex 
arc  idea,  as  commonly  employed,  takes  sensation  as  stimulus, 
and  movement  as  response,  as  if  they  were  actually  separate 
existences,  apart  from  a  coordination.  Response  is  said  to  follow 
sensation,  but  it  is  forgotten  that  the  sensation  which  preceded 
was  correlated  with  a  response,  and  that  the  response  which 
follows  is  also  correlated  with  sensation.  Sound,  for  instance, 
is  not  a  mere  sensation  in  itself,  apart  from  sensory-motor  coordi- 
nation. Hearing  is  an  act,  and  while  sound  may,  for  purposes  of 
study,  be  abstracted  from  the  total,  it  is  not,  in  itself,  independent 
of  the  total  act  of  hearing. 

1  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  357-370. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  357. 


FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  49 

"But,  in  spite  of  all  this,  it  will  be  urged,  there  is  a  distinction 
between  stimulus  and  response,  between  sensation  and  motion. 
Precisely;  but  we  ought  now  to  be  in  a  condition  to  ask  of  what 
nature  is  the  distinction,  instead  of  taking  it  for  granted  as  a 
distinction  somehow  lying  in  the  existence  of  the  facts  them- 
selves."1 The  distinction  which  is  to  be  made  between  them  must 
,be  made  on  a  teleological  basis.  "The  fact  is  that  stimulus  and 
response  are  not  distinctions  of  existence,  but  teleological  dis- 
tinctions, that  is,  distinctions  of  function,  or  part  played,  with 
reference  to  reaching  or  maintaining  an  end."2  There  are  two 
kinds  of  teleological  distinction  that  can  be  made  between  stim- 
ulus and  response,  or  rather,  the  teleological  interpretation  has 
two  phases. 

In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  assumed  that  all  of  man's  activity 
furthers  some  general  end,  as,  for  instance,  the  maintenance  of 
life.  Then  man's  activity  may  be  viewed  as  a  sequence  of  acts, 
which  tend  to  further  this  end,  and  on  this  basis  we  may  separate 
out  stimulus  and  response.  "It  is  only  when  we  regard  the 
sequence  of  acts  as  if  they  were  adapted  to  reach  some  end  that 
it  occurs  to  us  to  speak  of  one  as  stimulus  and  the  other  as  re- 
sponse. Otherwise,  we  look  at  them  as  a  mere  series."3  In 
these  cases  the  stimulus  is  as  truly  an  act  as  the  response,  and 
what  we  have  is  a  series  of  sensory-motor  coordinations.  Look- 
ing, for  instance,  is  a  sensory-motor  coordination  which  is  the 
stimulus  or  antecedent  of  another  coordinated  act,  running  away. 
The  first  coordination  passes  into  the  second,  and  the  second  may 
be  viewed  as  a  modification  or  reconstitution  of  the  first. 

But  this  external  teleological  distinction  between  sensation 
and  response  is  not  so  important  as  the  distinction  now  to  be 
made.  So  far  only  fixed  coordinations,  habitual  modes,of  action, 
have  been  considered.  But  there  are  situations  in  which  habitual 
responses  and  fixed  modes  of  action  fail :  situations  in  which  new 
habits  are  formed.  In  these  situations  there  arises  a  special 
distinction  between  stimulus  and  response,  for  in  these  formative 
situations  the  stimuli  and  responses  are  consciously  present  in 

1  Op.  ciL,  p.  365. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  366,  note. 


50  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

experience  as  such.  "The  circle  is  a  coordination,  some  of  whose 
members  have  come  into  conflict  with  each  other.  It  is  the 
temporary  disintegration  and  need  of  reconstitution  which  occa- 
sions, which  affords  the  genesis  of,  the  conscious  distinction  into 
sensory  stimulus  on  one  side  and  motor  response  on  the  other."1 
The  distinction  which  arises  between  stimulus  and  response  is  a 
distinction  of  function  within  the  problematical  situation. 
Suppose  that  a  sound  is  heard,  the  character  of  which  is  uncer- 
tain, and  which,  as  a  coordination,  does  not  readily  pass  into  its 
following  coordination,  or  habitual  response.  The  sound  is 
puzzling,  and  moves  into  the  center  of  attention.  It  is  fixed 
upon,  abstracted,  studied  on  its  own  account.  In  that  event, 
the  sound  may  be  spoken  of  as  a  sensation.  As  a  sensation,  it  is 
the  datum  of  a  reflective  process  of  thought,  or  conscious  in- 
ference, whose  aim  is  to  constitute  the  sound  a  stimulus,  or,  in 
other  words,  to  find  what  response  belongs  to  it.  When  this 
response  is  determined  the  problem  is  done  with  and  sensory- 
motor  unity  is  achieved. 

The  stimulus,  in  these  cases,  is  simply  "that  phase  of  activity 
requiring  to  be  defined  in  order  that  a  coordination  may  be  com- 
pleted."2 It  is  not  any  particular  existence,  and  is  not  to  be 
taken  as  an  element  apart  from  others,  having  an  independent 
existence.  But  the  conscious  process  of  attending  to  the  sensa- 
tion and  finding  a  response  to  it  arises  only  when  coordination  is 
disturbed  by  conflicting  factors,  and  the  separation  of  stimulus 
from  response  arises  only  as  a  means  for  bringing  unity  into  the 
coordination.  The  sensation,  then,  is  that  element  which  is  to 
be  attended  to;  upon  which  further  response  depends.  This 
phase  of  the  teleological  interpretation  defines  each  element  by 
the  part  which  it  plays  in  the  reflective  process. 

If  this  brief  summary  of  the  article  is  difficult  to  comprehend,  a 
reading  of  the  original  text  will  do  little  towards  making  it  more 
intelligible.  The  doctrine  presented  there,  however,  is  simple 
and  coherent  enough  when  its  bearings  and  purpose  are  once 
understood,  and,  at  the  risk  of  being  over-elaborate,  it  seems 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  370. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  368. 


FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  51 

advisable  to  attempt  some  remarks  on  the  general  bearing  and 
applications  of  the  theory. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Dewey  is  seeking  an  interpre- 
tation of  the  thought  process  which  shall  reveal  it  as  an  actual 
fact  of  experience.  A  thought  which  is  apart  from  experience 
and  not  in  it,  which  is  shut  up  to  the  contemplation  of  its  own 
mental  states  is,  by  its  definition,  non-experienced.  It  is,  like 
Kant's  'productive  imagination,'  formative  of  experience,  but 
not  a  part  of  it.  Dewey  holds  to  the  belief  that  experience  must 
be  explained  in  terms  of  itself;  he  would  do  away  with  all  trans- 
cendental factors  in  the  explanation  of  reality.  But  modern 
psychological  theory,  Dewey  believes,  tends  to  shut  thought  in 
to  the  contemplation  of  its  own  subjective  states,  and  thus  gives 
it  an  extra-experiential  status.  A  stimulus  is  said  to  strike  upon 
an  end  organ,  which  sends  an  impulse  to  the  cortex  and  there 
gives  rise  to  a  sensation  which,  as  the  effect  of  a  stimulus,  is 
representative  of  the  real,  but  not  real  in  itself.  Thought,  again, 
interprets  the  sensation,  and  sends  out  a  motor  impulse  appro- 
priate to  the  situation.  These  mental  states  and  the  thought 
which  interprets  them  are,  in  Dewey's  mind,  wholly  fictitious. 
The  problem,  then,  is  to  give  an  account  of  the  perceptual  pro- 
cesses which  shall  eliminate  the  artificial  states  of  mind  and 
present  mental  operations  as  natural  processes. 

The  difficulty  with  customary  psychological  explanation  is 
}  that  it  breaks  the  reflex  arc  of  the  nervous  system  into  three 
parts  whose  relations  are  successive  and  causal  rather  than 
simultaneous  and  organic.  There  is  not  first  a  stimulus,  then 
perception,  then  response;  these  processes  are  supplementary, 
not  separate.  Or,  from  another  point  of  view,  psychological 
explanation  must  begin  with  a  whole  process  which,  when  ana- 
lyzed, is  seen  to  contain  the  three  moments  or  phases:  stimulus, 
sensation,  and  response.  The  whole  process  is  primary  and 
actual,  the  abstracted  phases  are  secondary  and  derivative. 

With  the  disappearance  of  the  mechanical  interpretation  of 
the  perceptual  process,  mental  states  vanish.  Representative 
perceptionism  is  thus  done  away  with,  together  with  all  the 
problems  which  it  generates. 


52  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

The  position  of  conscious,  or  reflective  thought,  in  Dewey's 
scheme,  is  especially  interesting.  This  mode  of  thought  is  not 
constantly  operative,  but  arises  only  in  situations  of  stress  and 
strain,  when  habitual  modes  of  response  break  down.  A  dualism 
is  established  between  reflective  thought  and  the  habitual  life 
processes.  Dewey  does  not  take  the  ground  that  these  processes 
are  supplementary,  as  he  had  done  in  the  case  of  stimulus, 
sensation,  and  response.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Dewey 
had  defined  judgment,  in  his  logical  and  ethical  writings  of  an 
earlier  period,  as  a  special  activity  operating  in  critical  situations. 
This  conception  of  judgment  is  now  carried  over  into  his  psy- 
chology, and  given  a  biological  basis.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
this  view  of  judgment  was  worked  out  in  logical  terms  before  it 
was  reinforced  by  biological  data.  Nevertheless,  it  is  through 
biology  that  Dewey  is  able  to  give  his  interpretation  of  the 
thought  process  that  empirical  concreteness  which  he  demanded 
from  the  beginning,  but  achieved  very  slowly. 

The  value  of  the  functional  psychology,  considered  merely  as 
.psychology,  is  undeniable.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  natural  and  almost 
inevitable  step  in  the  development  of  psychological  theory. 
Dewey's  achievement  consists  in  the  establishment  of  an  organic 
mode  of  interpretation  in  psychology,  intended  to  displace  the 
\  mechanical  interpretation.  The  mechanical  causal  series  is 
\  displaced  by  an  organic  system  of  internally  related  parts. 
Dewey,  however,  does  not  display  any  interest  in  the  logical 
aspects  of  his  doctrine.  He  takes  the  biological  situation  liter- 
ally, as  a  fact  empirically  given,  and  to  be  accepted  without  criti- 
cism. 

A  discussion  of  the  period  now  under  consideration  would  not 
be  complete  without  reference  to  certain  articles  which  supple- 
ment the  essay  discussed  above.  The  first  of  these  is  an  article  on 
"The  Psychology  of  Effort,"  published  in  the  Philosophical 
Review  in  I897.1 

It  is  not  proposed  to  follow  the  argument  of  this  article  in 
detail,  but  to  center  attention  upon  those  parts  of  it,  especially 
the  concluding  pages,  which  have  a  special  interest  in  connection 

1  Vol.  vi,  pp.  43-56. 


FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  53 

with  the  subject  under  discussion.  Dewey  returns,  in  this 
article,  to  the  situation  of  effort  at  adjustment;  to  the  situation 
in  which  an  effort  is  made  to  determine  the  proper  response  to  a 
stimulus.  The  opening  pages  are  devoted,  in  the  first  place,  to 
a  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  conscious  effort  and  the 
mere  expenditure  of  energy  or  effort  as  it  appears  to  an  outsider, 
and,  in  the  second  place,  to  maintaining,  by  means  of  examples, 
the  proposition  that  the  sense  of  effort  is  sensationally  mediated. 
"How  then  does,  say,  a  case  of  perception  with  effort  differ  from 
a  case  of  'easy'  or  effortless  perception?  The  difference,  I 
repeat,  shall  be  wholly  in  sensory  quale;  but  in  what  sensory 
quale?"1 

The  conscious  sense  of  effort  arises,  Dewey  answers,  when  there 
is  a  rivalry  or  conflict  between  two  sensational  elements  in  ex- 
perience. "In  the  case  of  felt  effort,  certain  sensory  quales, 
usually  fused,  fall  apart  in  consciousness,  and  there  is  an  alter- 
nation, an  oscillation,  between  them,  accompanied  by  a  disa- 
greeable tone  when  they  are  apart,  and  an  agreeable  tone  when 
they  become  fused  again."2  These  two  sets  of  sensory  elements 
have  each  a  significance  in  terms  of  adjustment;  one  of  them  is  a 
correlate  of  a  habit,  or  fixed  mode  of  response,  and  the  other  is 
an  intruder  which  resists  absorption  into,  or  fusion  with,  the 
dominant  images  of  the  current  habit  or  purpose.  The  same 
idea  of  a  natural  tendency  to  persist  in  a  habitual  mode  of  re- 
garding things  was  met  with  in  the  last  two  chapters,  and  is 
qualified  here  by  the  addition  of  the  idea  that  each  sensory 
element  represents  a  typical  mode  of  response  on  the  part  of  the 
organism.  Dewey  illustrates  his  notion  by  the  case  of  learning 
to  ride  a  bicycle.  "  Before  one  mounts  one  has  perhaps  a  pretty 
definite  visual  image  of  himself  in  balance  and  in  motion.  This 
image  persists  as  a  desirability.  On  the  other  hand,  there  comes 
into  play  at  once  the  consciousness  of  the  familiar  motor  adjust- 
ments,— for  the  most  part,  related  to  walking.  The  two  sets  of 
sensations  refuse  to  coincide,  and  the  result  is  an  amount  of 
stress  and  strain  relevant  to  the  most  serious  problems  of  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  46. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  48. 


54  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

universe."1  In  another  passage,  which  brings  out  even  more 
clearly  the  rivalry  of  the  two  sets  of  sensations,  he  says:  "It 
means  that  the  activity  already  going  on  (and,  therefore,  re- 
porting itself  sensationally)  resists  displacement,  or  transforma- 
tion, by  or  into  another  activity  which  is  beginning,  and  thus 
making  its  sensational  report."2 

The  sense  of  effort,  then,  reduces  itself  to  an  awareness  of 
/  conflict  between  two  sensational  elements  and  their  motor  cor- 
relates. "Practically  stated,  this  means  that  effort  is  nothing 
more,  and  also  nothing  less,  than  tension  between  means  and 
ends  in  action,  and  that  the  sense  of  effort  is  the  awareness  of 
this  conflict."3 

The  important  aspect  of  Dewey's  argument,  for  the  present 
'discussion,  is  that  awareness  reduces  to  these  sensational  ele- 
ments and  their  attributes.  Throughout  the  article  Dewey  is 
opposing  his  sensational  view  of  the  sense  of  effort  to  what  he 
calls  the  '  spiritual '  or  non-sensational  view,  which  supposes  that 
the  sense  of  effort  is  something  purely  psychical,  which  accom- 
panies the  expenditure  of  physical  energy.  The  consciousness  of 
effort,  Dewey  says,  is  not  something  added  to  the  effort,  but  is 
itself  a  certain  condition  existing  in  the  sensory  quales. 

This  provision  would  make  it  necessary  to  identify  conscious- 
ness, and,  therefore,  conscious  inference,  with  the  tensional 
situation  which  has  been  described.  This  being  granted,  all 
that  pertains  to  conscious  inference,  all  the  methods  and  cate- 
gories of  science,  would  be  applicable  only  in  such  situations  of 
^  stress  and  strain ;  they  would  appear  simply  as  instruments  for 
effecting  a  readjustment;  they  would  be  employed  exclusively 
in  the  interests  of  action.  This  is  the  direction  in  which  Dewey 
is  tending.  No  criticism  of  this  treatment  of  judgment  need  be 
made  at  this  time,  beyond  pointing  out  that  it  presents  itself,  at 
first  sight,  as  an  awkward  and  indirect  mode  of  describing  the 
relations  between  organic  activity  and  intelligence,  and  between 
psychology  and  logic. 

Nothing  has  so  far  been  said  of  the  historical  sources  of  Dewey's 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  50. 
2 1 bid.,  p.  52. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  51. 


FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  55 

theory,  and  these  may  be  briefly  considered.  There  are  at  least 
two  sources  which  must  be  taken  into  account:  the  James- 
Lange  theory  of  the  emotions,  and  the  Neo-Hegelian  ethical 
theory.  The  latter  has  already  been  considered  to  some  extent, 
as  it  manifests  itself  in  Dewey's  own  ethical  theory,  but  its 
relation  to  his  psychology  has  not  been  indicated.  In  his  text- 
book, the  Outlines  of  a  Critical  Theory  of  Ethics  (1891),  Dewey 
advanced  certain  ideas  for  which  he  claimed  originality,  at  least 
in  treatment.  Among  these  was  the  analysis  of  individuality 
into  function  including  capacity  and  environment.1 

Bradley  appears  to  have  been  the  first  among  English  philoso- 
phers to  introduce  that  synthesis  of  the  internal  and  external, 
of  the  intuitional  and  utilitarian  modes  of  judging  conduct,  which 
became  characteristic  of  Neo-Hegelian  ethics.  The  synthesis, 
of  course,  is  Hegelian  in  temper,  and  the  Ethical  Studies  are  much 
more  suggestive,  in  general  method,  of  the  Philosophie  des  Rechts 
than  of  any  previous  English  work.  Utilitarianism  tended  to 
judge  the  moral  act  by  its  external,  de  facto  results;  intuitionism, 
on  the  contrary,  attributed  morality  to  the  will  of  the  agent. 
The  former  found  morality  to  consist  in  a  certain  state  of  affairs, 
the  latter  in  a  certain  internal  attitude.  According  to  the  syn- 
thetic point  of  view,  these  opposed  ethical  systems  are  one-sided 
representations  of  the  moral  situation,  each  being  true  in  its 
own  way.  To  state  the  matter  in  another  form,  the  moral  act 
has  a  content  as  well  as  a  purpose.  "Let  us  explain,"  says 
Bradley.  "The  moral  world,  as  we  said,  is  a  whole,  and  has 
two  sides.  There  is  an  outer  side,  systems  and  institutions, 
from  the  family  to  the  nation ;  this  we  may  call  the  body  of  the 
moral  world.  And  there  must  also  be  a  soul,  or  else  the  body  goes 
to  pieces;  every  one  knows  that  institutions  without  the  spirit  of 
them  are  dead.  .  .  .  We  must  never  let  this  out  of  our  sight,  that, 
where  the  moral  world  exists,  you  have  and  you  must  have  these 
two  sides."2  Dewey  expresses  the  same  idea  in  a  more  detailed 
fashion.  "What  do  we  mean  by  individuality?  We  may  dis- 
tinguish two  factors — or  better  two  aspects,  two  sides — in  indi- 

1  Op.  eit.,  p.  viii. 

2  Ethical  Studies,  p.  160  f. 


56  JOHN  DEWEY' S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

viduality.  On  one  side  it  means  special  disposition,  tempera- 
ment, gifts,  bent,  or  inclination ;  on  the  other  side  it  means  special 
station,  situation,  limitations,  surroundings,  opportunities,  etc. 
Or,  let  us  say,  it  means  specific  capacity  and  specific  environment. 
Each  of  these  elements  apart  from  the  other,  is  a  bare  abstraction, 
and  without  reality.  Nor  is  it  strictly  correct  to  say  that  individ- 
uality is  contributed  by  these  two  factors  together.  It  is,  rather, 
as  intimated  above,  that  each  is  individuality  looked  at  from  a 
certain  point  of  view,  from  within  and  from  without."1  It  is  a 
fact,  empirically  demonstrable,  according  to  Dewey,  that  body 
and  object,  intention  and  foreseen  consequence,  interest  and 
environment,  attitude  and  objectivity,  are  parts  of  one  another 
and  of  the  whole  moral  situation.  Each  is  relative  to  the  other. 
"It  is  not,  then,  the  environment  as  physical  of  which  we  are 
speaking,  but  as  it  appears  to  consciousness,  as  it  is  affected  by 
the  make-up  of  the  agent.  This  is  the  practical  or  moral  en- 
vironment."2 When  this  relation  of  the  inner  to  the  outer  is 
taken  literally  and  universally,  we  have  the  essence  of  the 
functional  psychology.  Organism-in-relation-to-environment  be- 
comes the  catch-word  of  instrumental  pragmatism. 

The  other  source  of  Dewey's  psychology,  which  is  now  to  be 
considered,  is  the  James-Lange  theory  of  the  emotions.  The 
connection  here  is  more  obvious,  but  perhaps  not  so  vital,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  ethical  theory.  From  the  numerous  references 
which  Dewey  made  to  James's  Principles  of  Psychology  (1890), 
it  is  evident  that  he  was  much  impressed  with  this  work.  The 
theory  of  emotion  there  presented  seems  to  have  had  a  special 
interest  for  him;  so  much  so  that  he  made  it  the  subject  of  two 
articles  in  the  Psychological  Review,  in  1894  and  1895,  under  the 
general  title,  "The  Theory  of  Emotion."3  These  studies  bear  a 
very  close  relation  to  the  article  on  "The  Reflex  Arc  Concept  in 
Psychology"  (1896),  the  standpoint  being  essentially  the  same, 
although  developed  in  reference  to  a  technical  problem.  Some 
indications  may  be  given  here  of  the  relationships  which  they 

1  Outlines  of  Ethics,  p.  97. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  99. 

3  Vol.  I,  pp.  553-569;  Vol.  II,  pp.  13-32. 


FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY.  57 

bear  to  the  James-Lange  theory  on  the  one  side,  and  functional 
psychology  on  the  other.  The  James-Lange  theory  is  itself 
concerned  with  order  and  connection  between  emotional  states, 
perceptions,  and  responses.  James  says:  "Our  natural  way  of 
thinking  about  these  coarser  emotions  is  that  the  mental  per- 
ception of  some  fact  excites  the  mental  affection  called  the  emo- 
tion, and  that  this  latter  state  of  mind  gives  rise  to  the  bodily 
expression.  My  theory,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  the  bodily 
changes  follow  directly  the  perception  of  the  exciting  fact,  and  that 
our  feeling  of  -the  same  changes  as  they  occur  IS  the  emotion"1  It 
is  all  a  question,  James  says,  of  the  order  and  sequence  of  these 
elements,  and  his  contention  is  that  the  bodily  changes  should 
be  interposed  between  the  two  mental  states.  This  is  the  ques- 
tion with  which  Dewey's  functional  psychology  is  also  concerned, 
the  relation  of  response  to  stimulus,  and  the  manner  in  which  a 
stimulus  is  determined  by  a  reaction  'into  it.'  Dewey's  theory 
rises  so  naturally  out  of  James's  theory  of  the  emotions  as  to 
seem  but  little  more  than  its  universal  application. 

This  connection  is  revealed  in  several  passages  in  Dewey's 
study  of  the  emotions.  It  is  said,  for  instance,  that  the  emotional 
situation  must  be  taken  as  a  whole,  as  a  state,  for  instance,  of 
'being  angry.'  The  several  constituents  of  the  state  of  anger, 
idea  or  object,  affect  or  emotion,  and  mode  of  expression  or 
behavior,  are  not  to  be  taken  separately,  but  all  together  as 
elements  in  one  whole.2  Another  characteristic  doctrine  appears 
in  the  affirmation  that  the  emotional  attitude  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  other  attitudes  by  certain  special  features  which  it 
possesses.  Particularly,  it  involves  a  special  relation  of  stimulus 
to  response.3  Again,  there  is  a  tendency  to  translate  meaning 
in  terms  of  projected  activity.  "The  consciousness  of  our  mode 
of  behavior  as  affording  data  for  other  possible  actions  constitutes 
the  bear  an  objective  or  ideal  content."4 

It  is  enough,  perhaps,  to  reveal  these  two  sources  as  probable 
factors  in  the  development  of  Dewey's  psychological  method. 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  449. 
*Psy.  Rev.,  Vol.  II,  p.  15  f. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  24  f. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  24. 


58  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

No  speculation  upon  them  is  necessary.  At  most,  they  were 
merely  contributory  to  Dewey's  thought,  and  by  fitting  in  with 
his  previous  ideas  enabled  him  to  give  a  more  concrete  presen- 
tation of  his  psychological  theory  than  would  otherwise  have 
been  possible. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT 

DEWEY'S  psychology  is  linked  up  with  his  logical  theory,  as 
has  already  been  suggested,  through  the  interpretation  of  the 
thought-process  as  a  mode  of  adjustment  involving  inference. 
This  conception  of  thought  implies,  of  course,  that  thought  is  an 
instrument  of  adaptation,  and  this  in  turn  suggests  that  the  organ 
of  reflection  is  a  product  of  evolutionary  forces  operating  on  the 
individual  and  on  the  race.  In  the  period  now  to  be  reviewed 
Dewey,  for  the  first  time  in  his  career,  displays  an  active  and 
intense  interest  in  evolutionary  theory,  especially  as  applied  in 
the  fields  of  ethics  and  psychology. 

An  article  published  in  the  Monist,  in  1898,  on  "Evolution 
and  Ethics,"1  deserves  special  attention.  The  central  thought 
of  the  article  is  to  be  found  in  the  following  passage:  "The  belief 
that  natural  selection  has  ceased  to  operate  [in  the  human  sphere] 
rests  upon  the  assumption  that  there  is  only  one  form  of  such 
selection:  that  where  improvement  is  indirectly  effected  by  the 
failure  of  species  of  a  certain  type  to  continue  to  reproduce; 
carrying  with  it  as  its  correlative  that  certain  variations  con- 
tinue to  multiply,  and  finally  come  to  possess  the  land.  This 
ordeal  by  death  is  an  extremely  important  phase  of  natural 
selection,  so  called.  .  .  .  However,  to  identify  this  procedure 
absolutely  with  selection,  seems  to  me  to  indicate  a  somewhat 
gross  and  narrow  vision.  Not  only  is  one  form  of  life  as  a  whole 
selected  at  the  expense  of  other  forms,  but  one  mode  of  action  in  the 
same  individual  is  constantly  selected  at  the  expense  of  others.  There 
is  not  only  the  trial  by  death,  but  there  is  the  trial  by  the  success 
or  failure  of  special  acts — the  counterpart,  I  suppose,  of  physio- 
logical selection  so  called."2  We  have  here  a  refinement  upon 
the  doctrine  of  natural  selection.  The  ke^iote  of  Dewey 's  new 

1  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  321-341.     The  article  is  a  criticism  of  Huxley's  essay  with  the 
same  title. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  337.     Italics  mine. 

59 


60  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

psychology  is  a  process  of  selection  constantly  occurring  within 
the  individual  organism.  He  points  out  that,  in  dealing  with 
man,  we  have  a  highly  adaptable,  not  merely  a  highly  adapted 
animal.  "It  is  certainly  implied  in  the  idea  of  natural  selection 
that  the  most  effective  modes  of  variation  should  themselves  be 
finally  selected."1  The  capacity  to  vary,  or  adapt,  is  highly 
developed  in  man.  Through  these  variations,  the  organism  is 
able  to  react  against  the  environment,  changing  its  character 
quite  completely.  The  environment  of  the  modern  human  is 
tremendously  complicated  by  his  reaction  upon  it.  "The 
growth  of  science,  its  application  in  invention  to  industrial 
life,  the  multiplication  and  acceleration  of  means  of  transpor- 
tation and  intercommunication,  have  created  a  peculiarly  un- 
stable environment."2  Under  these  conditions,  the  ability  of 
the  individual  to  adapt  himself  to  changing  circumstances  is 
largely  determined  by  his  degree  of  flexibility  in  the  selection  of 
right  acts  and  responses.  "In  the  present  environment,  flexi- 
bility of  function,  the  enlargement  of  the  range  of  uses  to  which 
one  and  the  same  organ,  grossly  considered,  may  be  put,  is  a 
great,  almost  the  supreme,  condition  of  success."3  The  human 
mind  is  to  be  interpreted  as  a  highly  developed  organ  whose 
special  function  is  to  make  adaptation  more  flexible  and  response 
more  varied  and  discriminating.  "That  which  was  'tendency 
to  vary '  in  the  animal  is  conscious  foresight  in  man.  That  which 
was  unconscious  adaptation  and  survival  in  the  animal,  taking 
place  by  the  '  cut  and  try '  method  until  it  worked  itself  out,  is 
with  man  conscious  deliberation  and  experimentation."4 

This  view  of  consciousness  is  worked  out  on  the  basis  of  an 
evolutionary  metaphysics.  Man  is  viewed  as  an  organism, 
placed  amid  the  changing  whirl  of  things,  stimulated  into  action 
by  his  needs  and  wants,  adapting  himself  to  conditions,  making 
the  situation  over,  or  meeting  it  habitually  where  he  can  and 
suffering  the  consequences  where  he  cannot  make  the  necessary 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  338. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  340. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Ibid.     It  should  be  observed  that  this  conclusion  is  reached  on  a  purely  theo- 
retical basis. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT.  6 1 

adjustment.  If  this  be  taken,  as  would  seem,  for  the  ultimate 
truth  about  reality  and  man's  place  in  it,  it  must  be  called  a 
metaphysics.  Against  this  background  Dewey's  logical  theory 
is  developed.  The  most  important  result,  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  student  of  mind  and  spirit,  is  the  reduction  of  self-con- 
scious reflection  to  the  position  of  a  nervous  function  of  the 
organism.  The  purely  theoretical  evidence  by  which  this 
position  is  sustained  should  be  subjected  to  closer  scrutiny  than 
can  be  undertaken  in  this  limited  space. 

The  purpose  of  reflection,  then,  is  to  enable  man  to  adapt 
himself  to  his  environment,  understanding  by  the  environment 
the  whole  of  the  reality  which  surrounds  him.  The  test  of  the 
mind  and  its  newly  projected  modes  of  response  [ideas]  lies 
in  its  ability  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  situation.  The  capaci- 
ties and  limits  of  mind  are  determined  by  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  evolved ;  it  can  enable  a  man  to  deal  more  effectively  with 
his  environment;  it  can  do  nothing  else.  It  cannot  speculate  on 
the  nature  of  reality  as  such,  nor  voyage  on  long  journeys  in 
search  of  truth.  Its  business  is  practical,  here  and  now.  Its 
problems  are  always  set  for  it  by  circumstances,  and  these  cir- 
cumstances are  concrete  and  specific.  There  is  no  such  thing  as 
adaptation  at  large  or  in  general. 

The  business  of  mind  is  to  have,  and  to  continually  reconstruct, 
useful  habits.  So  Dewey  assures  the  American  Psychological 
Association  in  1899,  in  an  address  on  "Psychology  and  Social 
Practice."1  We  must  recognize,  he  says,  "that  the  existing  order 
is  determined  neither  by  fate  nor  by  chance,  but  is  based  on  law 
and  order,  on  a  system  of  existing  stimuli  and  modes  of  reaction, 
through  knowledge  of  which  we  can  modify  the  practical  out- 
come."2 Psychology  uninterpreted,  he  says,  will  never  provide 
ready-made  materials  and  prescriptions  for  the  ethical  life. 
"But  science,  both  physical  and  psychological,  makes  known  the 
conditions  upon  which  certain  results  depend,  and  therefore  puts 
at  the  disposal  of  life  a  certain  method  of  controlling  them."3 
These  statements  show  the  extent  to  which  Dewey's  view  of 

1  Printed  in  the  Psychological  Review,  Vol.  VII,  1900,  pp.  105-124. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  123. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  124. 


62  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

knowledge  has  come  to  be  controlled  by  biological  conceptions. 

The  evolutionary  method  is  investigated  in  considerable 
detail  in  the  next  article  to  be  considered,  which  was  published 
in  two  parts  in  the  Philosophical  Review,  1902,  under  the  title, 
"The  Evolutionary  Method  as  Applied  to  Morality."1 

The  fact  that  some  philosophers  deny  the  importance  of  the 
evolutionary  method  for  ethics,  holding  that  morality  is  purely  a 
matter  of  value,  and  that  the  evolutionary  method  tends  only  to 
obscure  differences  of  value,  makes  it  necessary  to  inquire  into 
the  import  and  nature  of  this  method.  "Anyway,"  Dewey  says, 
"before  we  either  abuse  or  recommend  genetic  method  we  ought 
to  have  some  answers  to  these  questions:  Just  what  is  it?  Just 
what  is  to  come  of  it  and  how  ?  "2 

The  experimental  method  in  science  has  at  least  some  of  the 
traits  of  a  genetic  method.  The  nature  of  water,  for  instance, 
cannot  be  determined  by  simply  observing  it.  But  experiment 
brings  to  light  the  exact  conditions  under  which  it  came  into 
being  and  therefore  explains  it.  "Through  generating  water  we 
single  out  the  precise  and  sole  conditions  which  have  to  be  fulfilled 
that  water  may  present  itself  as  an  experienced  fact.  If  this 
case  be  typical,  then  the  experimental  method  is  entitled  to 
rank  as  genetic  method;  it  is  concerned  with  the  manner  or 
process  by  which  anything  comes  into  experienced  existence."3 

Some  would  deny  this,  on  the  ground  that  a  genuinely  his- 
torical event  occupies  a  particular  place  in  a  historical  series, 
from  which  it  is  inseparable,  while  in  experimental  science  the 
sets  or  pairs  of  terms  are  not  limited  to  any  particular  place  in  a 
historical  series,  but  occur  and  recur.  "Water  is  made  over  and 
over  again,  and,  so  to  speak,  at  any  date  in  the  cosmic  series. 
This  deprives  any  account  of  it  of  genuinely  historic  quality."4 
Again,  it  might  be  said  in  opposition  to  treating  the  experimental 
method  as  a  genetic  method,  that  it  is  interested  in  individual  cases 
not  as  such,  but  as  samples  or  instances.  The  particular  case 
is  only  an  illustration  of  the  general  relation  which  is  being  sought. 

1  Vol.  xi,  pp.  107-124;  353-371. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  108. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  109. 

4  Ibid. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT.  63 

It  will  turn  out  in  the  course  of  the  discussion,  Dewey  says, 
that,  although  science  deals  with  origins,  it  is  not,  in  strictness,  a 
historical  discipline.  The  distinction  between  the  historical 
and  other  sciences  is  based  on  an  abstraction,  which  has  been 
introduced  for  the  sake  of  more  adequate  control.  It  is  only  by 
abstraction  that  we  get  the  pairs  of  facts  that  may  show  up  at 
any  time,  and  by  abstraction  we  attribute  to  them  a  generalized 
character.  The  facts,  in  themselves,  are  historic. 

There  is  no  such  thing  as  water  in  general,  but  water  is  just 
this  water,  at  this  time,  in  this  place,  and  it  never  shows  itself 
twice,  never  recurs.  The  scientist  must  deal,  therefore,  with 
particular  historic  cases  of  water,  and  with  their  specific  origins. 
"  Experiment  has  to  do  with  the  conditions  of  production  of  a 
specific  amount  of  water,  at  a  specific  time  and  place,  under 
specific  circumstances:  in  a  word,  it  must  deal  with  just  this 
water.  The  conditions  which  define  its  origin  must  be  stated 
with  equal  definiteness  and  circumstantiality."1  The  instance 
has  as  definite  a  place  in  an  historical  series  as  has  Julius  Caesar. 
But  the  difference  in  treatment  of  the  water  and  Caesar  is  due  to 
the  difference  in  interest.  "Julius  Caesar  served  a  purpose 
which  no  other  individual,  at  any  other  time,  could  have  served. 
There  is  a  peculiar  flavor  of  human  meaning  and  accomplishment 
about  him  which  has  no  substitute  or  equivalent.  Not  so  with 
water.  While  each  portion  is  absolutely  unique  in  its  occur- 
rence, yet  one  lot  will  serve  our  intellectual  or  practical  needs 
just  as  well  as  any  other."2  For  this  reason  the  specific  case 
of  water  is  not  dealt  with  on  its  own  account,  but  only  as  giving 
insight  into  the  processes  of  its  generation  in  general.  In  this 
way  the  difference  arises  between  the  generalized  statements  of 
physical  science  and  the  individualized  form  demanded  in  his- 
torical science.  The  abstract  character  of  the  physical  result  is 
recognized  by  the  hypothetical  form  of  judgment  in  modern 
logic;  if  certain  conditions,  then  certain  consequences.  But  the 
counterpart  of  this  must  not  be  forgotten,  that  every  categorical 
proposition  applies  to  an  individual.  Experimental  propositions > 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  no. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  in. 


64  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

therefore,  have  an  historical  value.  "They  take  their  rise  in, 
and  they  find  their  application  to,  a  world  of  unique  and  changing 
things:  an  evolutionary  universe."1  The  recognition  of  the 
historical  character  of  experimental  science  does  not  in  any  way 
derogate  from  its  value,  but,  properly  understood,  gives  a  deeper 
insight  into  its  significance.  It  should  be  observed  that  here 
also  Dewey  treats  thought,  hypothesis,  as  coming  'after  some- 
thing, and  for  the  sake  of  something.' 

This  attempt  to  justify  the  historical  method  by  showing 
that  it  is  implied  in  physical  experiment  is  of  dubious  value. 
Its  net  result  would  seem  to  be  the  conclusion  that  every  fact 
may  be  dealt  with  either  as  a  historical  fact  or  as  a  datum  for 
physical  science.  Even  here,  however,  Dewey  slurs  over  certain 
difficulties  which  demand  close  scrutiny.  The  treatment  of 
individuality  is  most  unsatisfactory.  While  each  portion  or 
instance  of  water  is  itself,  and  has  its  own  unquestionable  unique- 
ness, no  case  is  a  mere  particular,  but  each  is  a  true  individual, 
which  means  that  it  is,  as  it  occurs,  an  instance  of  a  general 
phenomenon.  While  the  scientist  must  deal  with  specific  cases 
of  water,  he  has  no  regard  for  their  particularity,  but  chooses 
them  as  instances,  and  is  from  first  to  last  occupied  with  their 
typical  characteristics.  The  historian,  also,  selects  relevant 
and  representative  instances,  in  so  far  as  his  history  is  inter- 
pretative and  not  mere  narrative. 

A  merely  factual  account  of  a  series  of  events  is  not  science, 
and  never  could  be. 

Dewey  now  turns  to  the  ethical  field,  with  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing that  the  historical  method  in  ethics  does  for  this  science  pre- 
cisely what  the  experimental  method  does  for  other  sciences. 
"History  offers  to  us  the  only  available  substitute  for  the  isola- 
tion and  for  the  cumulative  recombination  of  experiment.  The 
early  periods  present  us  in  their  relative  crudeness  and  simplicity  \ 
with  a  substitute  for  the  artificial  operation  of  an  experiment: 
following  the  phenomenon  into  the  more  complicated  and  refined 
form  which  it  assumes  later,  is  a  substitute  for  the  synthesis  of 
the  experiment."2  Hydrogen  and  oxygen  are  the  historical 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  112. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  113. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT.  65 

antecedents  of  water,  whose  synthesis  the  scientist  observes, 
and  so  the  more  primitive  forms  of  conduct  are  the  elements 
which  the  moralist  traces  in  their  process  of  becoming  fused  into 
the  present  social  fabric.  Primitive  social  practices  cannot 
be  artificially  isolated,  like  the  physical  elements,  but  they  can 
be  traced  to  their  historical  origins,  and  their  interweaving  to- 
wards present  complex  conditions  can  be  observed. 

The  historical  method  is  subject  to  two  misunderstandings, 
Dewey  says,  one  by  the  empiricists  and  materialists,  the  other 
by  the  idealists.  The  former,  having  isolated  the  primitive  facts, 
suppose  them  to  have  a  superior  logical  and  existential  value. 
"The  earlier  is  regarded  as  somehow  more  'real'  than  the  later, 
or  as  furnishing  the  quality  in  terms  of  which  the  reality  of  all 
the  later  must  be  stated."1  The  later  is  looked  upon  as  simply  a 
recombination  of  the  earlier  existences.  "Writers  who  ought  to 
know  better  tell  us  that  if  we  only  had  an  adequate  knowledge 
of  the  'primitive'  state  of  the  world,  if  we  only  had  some  general 
formula  by  which  to  circumscribe  it,  we  could  deduce  down  to 
its  last  detail  the  entire  existing  constitution  of  the  world,  life, 
and  society."2  The  primitive  elements,  however,  take  on  new 
qualities  on  entering  into  new  combinations.  Water  is  more 
than  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  There  is  a  similar  process  inter- 
vening between  the  earlier  and  the  later  in  the  moral  field,  of 
which  the  primitive  state  and  the  present  are  merely  end  terms. 
Actual  study  must  take  account  of  the  whole  process. 

The  idealistic  fallacy  is  of  the  opposite  nature.  It  takes  the 
final  term  of  the  process  to  be  exclusively  real.  "The  later 
reality  is,  therefore,  to  him  the  persistent  reality  in  contrast 
with  which  the  first  forms  are,  if  not  illusions,  at  least  poor  ex- 
cuses for  being.  .  .  .  It  is  enough  for  present  purposes  to  note 
that  we  have  here  simply  a  particular  case  of  the  general  fallacy 
just  discussed — the  emphasis  of  a  particular  term  of  the  series 
at  the  expense  of  the  process  operative  in  reference  to  all  terms."3 
The  true  reality  is  the  whole  process,  which  is  represented  in 
empiricism  only  by  the  primitive  terms,  and  in  idealism  only  by 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  114. 
*Ibid.,  p.  116. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  118. 


66  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

the  end  terms.  Only  a  historical  method  can  deal  with  it  in  its 
entirety. 

In  summing  up  the  advantages  of  the  historical  method, 
Dewey  says  that  it  gives  a  complete  account  of  the  origin  and 
development  of  ethical  ideas,  opinions,  beliefs,  and  practices. 
"It  is  concerned  with  the  origin  and  development  of  these  cus- 
toms and  ideas ;  and  with  the  question  of  their  mode  of  operation 
after  they  have  arisen.  The  described  facts — yes;  but  among 
the  facts  described  is  precisely  certain  conditions  under  which 
various  norms,  ideals,  and  rules  of  action  have  originated  and 
functioned."1  Dewey  finds  it  irritating  that  the  facts  thus  singled 
out  should  be  treated  as  mere  facts,  apart  from  their  significance. 
The  historical  method  employs  description,  to  be  sure,  but  it 
also  aims  at  interpretation.  "The  historic  method  is  a  method, 
first,  for  determining  how  specific  moral  values  (whether  in  the 
way  of  customs,  expectations,  conceived  ends,  or  rules)  came  to 
be;  and  second,  for  determining  their  significance  as  indicated 
in  their  career."2 

It  is  true,  as  Dewey  holds,  that  the  historical  method  may 
furnish  a  basis  for  interpretation,  as  well  as  description.  But 
the  mere  scrutiny  of  what  has  happened  will  not  reveal  the  ele- 
ments, nor  determine  their  significance.  The  historian  must 
approach  his  material  with  something  more  than  his  eyes.  But 
there  are  many  historical  methods.  Which  shall  be  used  in 
dealing  with  the  development  of  morals?3  Chemistry,  for  in- 
stance, in  interpreting  the  fusion  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  into 
water,  employs  a  system  of  atoms  related  to  each  other  in  a 
mathematical  order,  and  something  similarly  definite  must 
underlie  the  study  of  morals.  The  historical  method,  in  general, 
needs  no  defence,  but  since  it  takes  many  forms,  great  care  must 
be  exercised  in  its  application.  Dewey  seems  to  ignore  these 
difficulties. 

Dewey's  argument  now  leads  him  to  a  comparison  of  the 

K  evolutionary  methods  with  the  intuitional  and  empirical  methods 

in  ethics.     In  making  the  comparison,  he  does  not  propose  to 

1  op.  tit.,  p.  355. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  356. 

3  See  Bosanquet's  Logic,  second  edition,  Chapter  VII,  and  especially  page  240. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT.  67 

raise  the  question  of  fact  concerning  the  existence  of  intuitions. 
The  question  to  be  confronted  is  rather  a  logical  one,  concerning 
the  validity  of  beliefs.  "Under  what  conditions  alone,  and  in 
what  measure  or  degree,  are  we  justified  in  arguing  from  the 
existence  of  moral  intuitions  as  mental  states  and  acts  to  facts 
taken  to  correspond  to  them?"1 

The  answer  is  that  the  existence  of  a  belief  argues  nothing  as 
to  its  validity.  The  intuitionist  takes  his  belief  as  a  brute  fact, 
unrelated  to  objective  conditions.  The  'inexpugnable'  char- 
acter of  the  belief  cannot  establish  its  validity,  because  the  life 
of  a  single  individual  occupies  but  a  brief  span  in  the  continuity 
of  the  social  life  in  which  the  belief  is  embedded.  Beliefs  last 
for  generations,  and  then  very  often  disappear.  "What  guar- 
antee have  we  that  our  present  'intuitions'  have  more  validity 
than  hundreds  of  past  ideas  that  have  shown  themselves  by 
passing  away  to  be  empty  opinion  or  indurated  prejudice?"2 
Intuitionism  has  no  way  of  guaranteeing  its  beliefs. 

The  evolutionary  method,  on  the  other  hand,  is  able  to  deter- 
mine the  validity  of  beliefs.  "The  worth  of  the  intuition  de- 
pends upon  genetic  considerations.  In  so  far  as  we  can  state 
the  intuition  in  terms  of  the  conditions  of  its  origin,  development, 
and  later  career,  in  so  far  we  have  some  criterion  for  passing  judg- 
ment upon  its  pretensions  to  validity.  .  .  .  But  if  we  cannot 
find  such  historic  origin  and  functioning,  the  intuition  remains  a 
mere  state  of  consciousness,  a  hallucination,  an  illusion,  which  is 
not  made  more  worthy  by  simply  multiplying  the  number  of 
people  who  have  participated  in  it."3  Certain  savage  races, 
for  instance,  possessed  moral  intuitions  which  made  the  practice 
of  infanticide  an  obligation.  But  the  fact  that  it  was  universally 
held  does  not  establish  its  validity.  It  must  be  condemned  or 
justified  by  the  results  to  which  it  led. 

Dewey's  criticism  of  intuitionism  scarcely  does  justice  to  that 
method,  whatever  may  be  its  inherent  weakness.  There  doubt- 
less have  been  thinkers  who  held  that  truth  is  revealed  to  the 
reason  of  man  in  its  naked  purity,  in  the  shape  of  apodictic  intel- 

1  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XI,  p.  357- 

2  Ibid.,  p.  360. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  358- 


68  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

lectual  principles.  But  even  in  the  case  of  so  extreme  a  position 
as  that  of  Kant,  there  are  important  qualifying  considerations  to 
be  taken  into  account.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  moral 
judgment,  as  Kant  conceived  it,  was  excluded  from  the  considera- 
tion of  relevant  data,  such  as  the  knowledge  of  actual  effects 
produced  by  given  courses  of  conduct.  His  position  seems  to 
have  been,  not  that  moral  judgment  lacked  specific  content,  but 
that  reason  took  something  with  it  to  the  moral  situation. 
The  intuitionists  may  have  over-estimated  the  original  endow- 
ment of  the  mind,  but  it  must  be  admitted  with  them  that  the 
mind  which  approaches  the  moral  situation  empty  of  concepts 
cannot  make  moral  decisions.  If  man  is  to  hold  no  beliefs  except 
those  proved  valid  by  experience,  how  can  there  be  any  to 
validate?  Intelligence  must  have  the  capacity  to  frame  beliefs 
in  the  light  of  its  past  knowledge,  and  its  acts  of  judgment, 
consequently,  presuppose  a  test  of  the  validity  of  ideas  which 
;  belongs  to  intelligence  as  such,  and  not  to  history  taken  abstractly. 
Beliefs  are  adapted  to  their  objects  in  the  making,  and  on  this 
account  are  usually  found  to  have  had  some  justification,  even 
where  set  aside.  'A  principle  that  is  suitable  for  universal 
legislation  already  presupposes  a  content.' 

Dewey  next  considers  the  relation  of  the  evolutionary  methods 
to  empiricism.  "Empiricism,"  he  says,  "is  no  more  historic  in 
character  .than  is  intuitionalism.  Empiricism  is  concerned  with 
the  moral  idea  or  belief  as  a  grouping  or  association  of  various 
elementary  feelings.  It  regards  the  idea  simply  as  a  complex 
state  which  is  to  be  explained  by  resolving  it  into  its  elementary 
constituents.  By  its  logic,  both  the  complex  and  the  elements 
are  isolated  from  an  historic  context.  .  .  .  The  empirical  and 
the  genetic  methods  thus  imply  a  very  different  relationship 
between  the  moral  state,  idea,  or  belief,  and  objective  reality. 
.  .  .  The  empirical  theory  holds  that  the  idea  arises  as  a  reflex 
of  some  existing  object  or  fact.  Hence  the  test  of  its  objectivity  is 
the  faithfulness  with  which  it  reproduces  that  object  as  copy.  The 
genetic  theory  holds  that  the  idea  arises  as  a  response,  and  that 
the  test  of  its  validity  is  found  in  its  later  career  as  manifested 
with  reference  to  the  needs  of  the  situation  that  evoked  it."1 

1  op.  tit.,  p.  364  f. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT.  69 

Only  a  method  that  takes  the  world  as  a  changing,  historical 
thing,  can  deal  with  the  adaptation  of  morality  to  new  conditions. 
"Both  empiricism  and  intuitionalism,  though  in  very  different 
ways,  deny  the  continuity  of  the  moralizing  process.  They 
set  up  timeless,  and  hence  absolute  and  disconnected,  ultimates; 
thereby  they  sever  the  problems  and  movements  of  the  present 
from  the  past,  rob  the  past,  the  sole  object  of  calm,  impartial, 
and  genuinely  objective  study,  of  all  instructing  power,  and  leave 
our  experience  to  form  undirected,  at  the  mercy  of  circumstance 
and  arbitrariness,  whether  that  of  dogmatism  or  scepticism."1 

In  evaluating  the  article  as  a  whole,  it  must  be  said  that 
Dewey's  study  is  not  productive  of  definite  results.  The  history 
of  the  past  can  undoubtedly  offer  to  the  student  a  mass  of  data 
that  is  interesting  and  instructive.  The  importance  of  this  or 
that  belief,  or  its  value,  can  be  gauged  by  the  results  which  it  is 
known  to  have  produced.  But  when,  in  this  day  and  age,  the 
moralist  sets  out  to  find  the  principles  which  shall  guide  his  own 
conduct,  the  history  of  morals  is  of  no  more  importance  than  the 
observations  of  every  day  life,  which  reveal  the  consequences  of 
conduct  in  the  lives  of  men  about  him.  But  more  particu- 
larly, it  should  be  added,  an  estimate  of  present  moral  action 
depends,  not  upon  truth  uttered  by  the  past,  but  upon  truth 
discovered  and  interpreted  by  an  intelligence  which  surveys  the 
past  and  makes  it  meaningful.  The  past  in  itself  is  nothing; 
thought  alone  can  create  real  history. 

Another  article,  published  by  Dewey  in  the  Philosophical 
Review  in  1900,  "Some  Stages  of  Logical  Thought,"  illustrates 
the  employment  of  the  genetic  method  in  a  more  specific  way.2 
In  his  introductory  remarks,  Dewey  says:  "I  wish  to  show  how 
a  variety  of  modes  of  thinking,  easily  recognizable  in  the  progress 
of  both  the  race  and  the  individual,  may  be  identified  and  ar- 
ranged as  successive  species  of  the  relationship  which  doubting 
bears  to  assurance;  as  various  ratios,  so  to  speak,  which  the  vigor 
of  doubting  bears  to  mere  acquiescence.  The  presumption  is 
that  the  function  of  questioning  is  one  which  has  continually 
grown  in  intensity  and  range,  that  doubt  is  continually  chased 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  370. 

a  Vol.  IX,  pp.  465-489- 


70  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

back,  and,  being  cornered,  fights  more  desperately,  and  thus 
clears  the  ground  more  thoroughly."1  Dewey  finds  four 
stages  of  relationship  between  questioning  and  dogmatism: 
dogmatism,  discussion,  proof,  and  empirical  science;  and  he 
seeks  to  show  how  each  stage  involves  a  higher  degree  of  free 
inquiry.  "Modern  scientific  procedure,  as  just  set  forth,  seems 
to  define  the  ideal  or  limit  of  this  process.  It  is  inquiry  emanci- 
pated, universalized,  whose  sole  aim  and  criterion  is  discovery, 
and  hence  it  makes  the  terminus  of  our  description.  It  is  idle 
to  conceal  from  ourselves,  however,  that  this  scientific  procedure, 
as  a  practical  undertaking,  has  not  as  yet  reflected  itself  into 
any  coherent  and  generally  accepted  theory  of  thinking.  .  .  .  "2 

It  is  not  necessary  to  comment  on  Dewey 's  stages  of  thought. 
The  similarity  of  this  division  to  Comte's  theological,  metaphy- 
sical and  scientific  stages  of  explanation  will  be  apparent. 
Dewey's  remarks  on  the  logic  of  the  scientific  stage,  however, 
are  interesting.  "The  simple  fact  of  the  case  is,"  he  says, 
"that  there  are  at  least  three  rival  theories  on  the  ground,  each 
claiming  to  furnish  the  sole  proper  interpretation  of  the  actual 
procedure  of  thought."3  There  is  the  Aristotelian  logic,  with 
its  fixed  forms;  the  empirical  logic,  which  holds  "that  only 
particular  facts  are  self-supporting,  and  that  the  authority  al- 
lowed to  general  principles  is  derivative  and  second  hand;"4 
and  finally  there  is  the  transcendental  logic,  which  claims,  "by 
analysis  of  science  and  experience,  to  justify  the  conclusion  that 
the  universe  itself  is  a  construction  of  thought,  giving  evidence 
throughout  of  the  pervasive  and  constitutive  action  of  reason; 
and  holds,  consequently,  that  our  logical  processes  are  simply 
the  reading  off  or  coming  to  consciousness  of  the  inherently 
rational  structure  already  possessed  by  the  universe  in  virtue  of 
the  presence  within  it  of  this  pervasive  and  constitutive  action 
of  thought."5 

None  of  these  logics,  Dewey  finds,  is  capable  of  dealing  with 

1  Op.  ciL,  p.  465. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  486  f. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  487. 

4  Ibid. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  STANDPOINT.  7* 

the  actual  procedure  of  science,  because  none  of  them  treats 
thought  as  a  doubt-inquiry  process,  but  rather  as  something 
fixed  and  limited  by  conditions  which  determine  its  operations 
in  advance.  Dewey  asks:  "Does  not  an  account  or  theory  of 
thinking,  basing  itself  on  modern  scientific  procedure,  demand  a 
statement  in  which  all  the  distinctions  and  terms  of  thought — 
judgment,  concept,  inference,  subject,  predicate  and  copula  of 
judgment,  etc.  ad  indefinitum — shall  be  interpreted  simply  and 
entirely  as  distinctive  functions  or  divisions  of  labor  within  the 
doubt-inquiry  process?"1 

Seven  years  before,  Dewey  had  been  an  ardent  champion 
of  the  transcendental  logic,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  progressive, 
and  he  contrasted  it  most  favorably  with  the  formal  logics  which 
treat  thought  as  a  self-contained  process.  Now,  however,  he 
has  a  new  insight.  Logic  must  be  reinterpreted  in  the  light  of 
the  evolutionary  or  biological  method.  We  shall  see  how  this 
is  accomplished  in  the  next  chapter. 

To  the  student  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  Dewey's  treatment 
of  the  genetic  and  historical  methods  must  seem  seriously  inade- 
quate. The  idealist,  moreover,  will  feel  that  Dewey  should 
have  taken  note,  in  his  criticism  of  the  idealistic  standpoint,  of 
the  fact  that  Hegelianism  was  from  first  to  last  a  historical 
method;  that  the  German  idealists  gave  the  impulse  to  modern 
historical  research,  and  provoked  a  study  of  the  historical  method 
whose  results  are  still  felt.  But  in  turning  away  from  idealism, 
Dewey  has  no  word  of  appreciation  for  this  aspect  of  the  Hegelian 
philosophy. 

When  the  truth  is  boiled  down,  it  appears  that  Dewey's 
historical  method,  in  so  far  as  he  had  one,  was  based  on  biological 
evolutionism.  He  had  no  interest  in  any  other  form  of  his- 
torical interpretation. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  489- 


CHAPTER  VI 

"STUDIES   IN  LOGICAL   THEORY" 

IN  1903  a  volume  entitled  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  consisting 
of  essays  on  logical  topics  by  Dewey  and  his  colleagues  and  pupils, 
was  published  under  the  auspices  of  the  University  of  Chicago. 
In  a  review  of  this  volume,  Professor  Pringle-Pattison  remarks: 
"It  is,  indeed,  most  unusual  to  find  a  series  of  philosophical 
papers  by  different  writers  in  which  (without  repetition  or  dup- 
lication) there  is  so  much  unity  in  the  point  of  view  and  har- 
mony in  results.  That  this  is  so  is  a  striking  evidence  of  the 
moulding  influence  of  Professor  Dewey  upon  his  pupils  and 
coadjutors  in  the  Chicago  School  of  Philosophy."1  It  would  be 
a  needless  task  to  review  the  whole  volume,  and  attention  will 
be  confined  to  the  essays  which  constitute  Dewey's  special 
contribution  to  the  undertaking.  These  constitute  the  first  four 
chapters  of  the  volume,  and  are  devoted  to  a  critical  examination 
of  Lotze's  logic.2  Here,  for  the  first  time,  Dewey  presents  in 
complete  form  the  logical  theory  which  stands  as  the  goal  of  his 
previous  endeavors,  and  marks  the  beginning  of  his  career  as  a 
pragma  tist.3 

The  first  chapter  of  the  "Studies"  is  devoted  to  a  general 
consideration  of  the  nature  of  logical  theory.  Dewey  begins  his 
discussion  with  an  account  of  the  naive  view  of  thought,  the 
view  of  the  man  of  affairs  or  of  the  scientist,  who  employs  ideas 
and  reflection  but  has  never  become  critical  of  his  mental  pro- 

1  The  Philosophical  Radicals,  "Dewey's  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,"  p.  179.     The 
essay  was  originally  printed  as  a  critical  notice  in  the  Philosophical  Review,  Novem- 
ber, 1904. 

2  Since  this  was  written  (1915-16),  Dewey's  chapters  have  been  reprinted  in  a 
volume   entitled  Essays  in  Experimental  Logic,  published   by  the   University  of 
Chicago  Press  (June,  1916).     They  are  preceded,  in  this  new  setting,  by  a  special 
introductory  chapter,  and   numerous  alterations   have   been  made  which  do  not, 
however,  affect  the  fundamental  standpoint. 

3  See  James's  review,  "The  Chicago   School,"  Psychological   Bulletin,  Vol.  I, 
1904,  PP.  1-5- 

72 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY."  73 

cesses;  who  has  never  reflected  upon  reflection.  "If  we  were  to 
ask,"  he  says,  "the  thinking  of  naive  life  to  present,  with  a 
minimum  of  theoretical  elaboration,  its  conception  of  its  own 
practice,  we  should  get  an  answer  running  not  unlike  this:  Think- 
ing is  a  kind  of  activity  which  we  perform  at  specific  need,  just 
as  at  other  need  we  engage  in  other  sorts  of  activity."1  While  the 
standpoint  of  the  naive  man  is  usually  hard  to  determine,  there 
appears  to  be  considerable  justification  for  Dewey's  statement. 
The  common  man  does  tend  to  view  thinking  as  a  special  kind 
of  activity,  performed  by  an  organ  which  can  be  'trained,'  and 
he  is  inclined  to  speak  of  education  as  a  process  of  '  training  the 
mind.'2 

Dewey  finds  a  large  measure  of  truth  in  this  naive  view  of 
thought.  Thought  appears  to  be  derivative  and  secondary. 
"It  comes  after  something  and  out  of  something,  and  for  the 
sake  of  something."3  It  is  employed  at  need,  and  ceases  to 
operate  when  not  needed.  "Taking  some  part  of  the  universe 
of  action,  of  affection,  of  social  construction,  under  its  special 
charge,  and  having  busied  itself  therewith  sufficiently  to  meet 
the  special  difficulty  presented,  thought  releases  that  topic  and 
enters  upon  further  more  direct  experience."4  There  is  a  rhythm 
of  practice  and  thought;  man  acts,  thinks,  and  acts  again.  The 
business  of  thought  is  to  solve  practical  difficulties,  such  as  arise 
in  connection  with  the  conduct  of  life.  The  purpose  for  which 
thought  intervenes  is  to  enable  action  to  get  ahead  by  discovering 
a  way  out  of  the  given  difficulty.  Ordinarily,  the  transition  from 
thought  to  action  and  the  reverse  is  accomplished  without  break 
or  difficulty. 

Occasions  arise,  however,  when  thought  is  balked  by  a  situation 
with  which  it  is  unable  to  deal,  after  repeated  attempts.  Critical 
reflection  is  then  directed  upon  thought  itself,  and  logical  theory 
is  the  result.  "The  general  theory  of  reflection,  as  over  against 
its  concrete  exercise,  appears  when  occasions  for  reflection  are 

1  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  2. 

2  Compare  Dewey,  How  We  Think  (1910),  Chapter  II,  "The  Need  for  Training 
Thought." 

3  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  I. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  2. 


74  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

so  overwhelming  and  so  mutually  conflicting  that  specific  ade- 
quate response  in  thought  is  blocked."1  The  purpose  of  logical 
theory  is  therefore  a  practical  one,  and  logical  theory,  like  ordi- 
nary reflection,  is  directed  toward  the  removal  of  difficulties 
which  stand  in  the  way  of  the  achievement  of  practical  ends. 

This  description  of  thought  and  of  the  nature  of  logical  theory 
invites  suspicion  by  its  very  simplicity.  Nobody  would  deny 
that  thought  is  linked  up  with  practice,  that  the  processes  of  life 
link  up  into  one  whole  organic  process,  and  that  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  treat  the  cognitive  processes  as  if  they  were  separate 
from  the  whole.  But  Dewey's  account  of  thought  seems  to  fall 
into  the  very  abstractness  which  he  is  so  anxious  to  avoid. 
Experience  is  represented  as  a  series  of  acts,  attitudes,  or  func- 
tions, which  follow  one  another  in  succession.  "Thinking  fol- 
lows, we  will  say,  striving,  and  doing  follows  thinking.  Each 
in  the  fulfilment  of  its  own  function  inevitably  calls  out  its  suc- 
cessor."2 The  functions  are  distinct,  but  are  united  to  each 
other,  end  to  end,  like  links  in  a  chain.  They  pass  into  and  out 
of  one  another,  but  are  not  simultaneous.  This  description 
gives  rise,  as  Bosanquet  observes,3  to  a  kind  of  dualism  between 
thinking  and  the  other  processes  of  life,  which  is  made  deeper 
because  thinking  is  regarded  as  a  very  special  activity,  which 
"passes  judgment  upon  both  the  processes  and  contents  of  other 
functions,"  and  whose  aim  and  work  is  "distinctively  recon- 
structive or  transformatory."4 

Dewey's  description  of  the  processes  of  experience  is  undoubt- 
edly plausible,  but  should  not  be  accepted  without  close  scrutiny 
of  the  facts.  It  has  been  held,  in  opposition  to  such  a  view,  that 
the  cognitive  processes  are  so  bound  up  with  perception,  feeling, 
willing,  and  doing,  that  they  cannot  be  separated  from  the  com- 
plex.5 Or  it  might  be  held  that  thinking  and  doing  are  simul- 

1  Op.  cit,.  p.  3  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  16. 

3  Logic,  second  ed.,  Vol.  II,  p.  270. 

4  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  x. 

6  "  Thinking  or  rationality  is  not  limited  to  the  process  of  abstract  cognition, 
but  it  includes  feeling  and  will,  and  in  the  course  of  its  development  carries  these 
along  with  it.  There  is,  of  course,  such  a  thing  as  what  we  have  called  abstract 
cognition;  but  the  different  moments  are  all  united  in  the  concrete  experience  which 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL    THEORY.1'  75 

taneous  and  complementary  processes,  rather  than  successive 
and  supplementary.  Dewey  does  not  concern  himself  with 
these  possibilities,  seeming  to  take  it  for  granted  that  his  inter- 
pretation is  the  'natural'  one.  It  must  be  said,  however,  that 
Dewey's  description  of  thought  as  a  process  is  by  no  means 
obvious  and  simple;  thought  is  not  easy  to  describe. 

When  we  turn  to  logical  theory,  Dewey  says,  there  are  two 
directions  which  may  be  taken.  The  general  features  of  logical 
theory  are  indicated  by  its  origin.  When  ordinary  thinking  is 
impeded,  an  examination  of  the  thinking  function  is  undertaken, 
with  the  purpose  of  discovering  its  business  and  its  mode  of 
operation.  The  object  of  the  examination  is  practical;  to  enable 
thinking  to  be  carried  on  more  effectively.  If  these  conditions 
are  kept  in  mind,  logical  theory  will  be  guided  into  its  proper 
channels:  it  will  be  assumed  that  every  process  of  reflection 
arises  with  reference  to  some  specific  situation,  and  has  to  sub- 
serve a  specific  purpose  dependent  upon  the  occasion  which  calls 
it  forth.  Logical  theory  will  determine  the  conditions  which 
arouse  thought,  the  mode  of  its  operation,  and  the  testing  of  its 
results.  Such  a  logic,  being  true  to  the  problems  set  for  it  by 
practical  needs,  is  in  no  danger  of  being  lost  in  generalities. 

But  there  is  another  direction  which  logical  theory  sometimes 
takes,  unmindful  of  the  conditions  imposed  by  its  origin.  This 
is  the  epistemological  direction.  Epistemological  logic  concerns 
itself  with  the  relation  of  thought  at  large  to  reality  at  large. 
It  assumes  that  thought  is  a  self-contained  activity,  having  no 
vital  connection  with  the  world  which  is  to  be  known.  Such  a 
logic  can  never  be  fruitful,  for  it  has  lost  sight  of  its  purpose  in 
the  formulation  of  its  problem. 

Dewey  is  quite  right  in  opposing  a  conception  of  thought 
which  makes  it  a  self-contained  activity,  having  no  vital  con- 
nection with  other  life  processes.  Few  recent  thinkers  have 
been  guilty  of  that  error.  Lotze,  to  be  sure,  made  the  mistake 
of  separating  thought  from  the  reality  to  be  known,  and  therefore 
serves  as  a  ready  foil  for  Dewey's  criticism.  But  Lotze's  age  is 
past  and  gone. 

we  may  name  the  life  of  thought."  Creighton,  "Experience  and  Thought," 
Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XV,  1906,  p.  487  f. 


76  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL    THEORY. 

When  the  abstract  conception  of  thought  is  set  aside,  and  it  is 
agreed  that  thought  must  be  treated  as  a  process  among  the 
processes  of  experience,  there  is  still  room  for  divergence  of 
opinion  as  to  the  exact  manner  in  which  thought  is  related  to 
other  functions.  Dewey's  logical  theory,  as  outlined  above, 
depends  upon  a  very  special  interpretation  of  the  place  which 
thought  occupies  in  experience.  For  this  reason  he  considers 
logic  to  be  inseparable  from  psychology.  "Psychology  ...  is 
indispensable  to  logical  evaluation,  the  moment  we  treat  logical 
theory  as  an  account  of  thinking  as  a  mode  of  adaptation  to  its 
own  generating  conditions,  and  judge  its  validity  by  reference  to 
its  efficiency  in  meeting  its  problems."1  Psychology,  in  other 
words,  must  substantiate  Dewey's  account  of  thought,  else  his 
'logic'  has  no  foundation.  But  if  it  were  held  that  the  cognitive 
processes  cannot  be  separated  (except  by  abstraction  for  psy- 
chological purposes)  from  other  processes,  there  could  manifestly 
be  no  such  logical  problem  as  Dewey  has  posited.  Logic  would 
be  freed  from  reliance  upon  psychology.  In  this  case,  logical 
inquiry  would  be  directed  to  the  study  of  concepts,  forms  of 
judgment,  and  methods  of  knowledge,  with  the  purpose  of  de- 
termining their  relations,  proper  applications,  and  spheres  of 
relevance.  Logic  would  be  a  'criticism  of  categories'  rather 
than  a  criticism  of  the  function  of  thinking.  Dewey  recognizes 
that  such  a  study  of  method  might  be  useful,  but  holds  that  it 
would  be  subsidiary  to  the  larger  problems  of  logic.  "The 
distinctions  and  classifications  that  have  been  accumulated  in 
'  formal '  logic  are  relevant  data ;  but  they  demand  interpretation 
from  the  standpoint  of  use  as  organs  of  adjustment  to  material 
antecedents  and  stimuli."2  It  will  be  seen  that  the  treatment 
of  the  forms  of  thought  as  "organs  of  adjustment"  makes  logic 
subsidiary  to  psychology,  necessarily  and  completely.  All 
follows,  however,  from  the  original  assumption  that  thought  is  a 
special  activity,  clearly  distinguishable  from  other  experienced 
processes,  and  possessing  a  special  function  of  its  own. 

In  his  further  analysis  of  logical  theory,  Dewey  states  that  it 

1  op,  dt.,  p.  15. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  8. 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY:'  77 

has  two  phases,  one  general  and  one  specific.  The  general 
problem  concerns  the  relations  of  the  various  functions  of  expe- 
rience to  one  another ;  how  they  give  rise  to  each  other,  and  what 
is  their  order  of  succession.  This  wider  logic  is  identified  with 
philosophy  in  general.1  The  specific  phase  of  logic,  logic  proper, 
concerns  itself  with  the  function  of  knowing  as  such,  inquiring 
into  its  typical  behavior,  occasion  of  operation,  divisions  of 
labor,  content,  and  successful  employment.  Dewey  indicates 
the  danger  of  identifying  logic  with  either  of  these  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  other,  or  of  supposing  that  they  can  be  finally  isolated 
from  one  another.  "It  is  necessary  to  work  back  and  forth 
between  the  larger  and  the  narrower  fields."2 

Why  is  it  necessary  to  make  such  a  distinction  at  all?  And 
why  necessary  to  move  back  and  forth  between  the  two  pro- 
visional standpoints?  Dewey  might  answer  by  the  following 
analogy:  The  thought  function  may  be  studied,  first  of  all,  as  a 
special  organ,  as  an  anatomist  might  study  the  structure  of  any 
special  organ  of  the  body;  but  in  order  to  understand  the  part 
played  by  this  member  in  the  organism  as  a  whole,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  adopt  a  wider  view,  so  that  its  place  in  the  sys- 
tem could  be  determined.  This  is  probably  what  Dewey  means 
by  his  two  standpoints.  He  says:  "We  keep  our  paths  straight 
because  we  do  not  confuse  the  sequential,  efficient,  and  functional 
relationship  of  types  of  experience  with  the  contemporaneous, 
correlative,  and  structural  distinctions  of  elements  within  a 
given  function."3  The  first  objection  to  be  made  to  this  treat- 
ment of  thought  is  that  it  makes  knowing  the  activity  of  a  special 
organ,  like  liver  or  lungs.  If  this  objection  is  surmounted,  there 
remains  another  from  the  side  of  general  method.  The  biologist 
not  only  studies  the  particular  organs  as  to  their  structure  and 
their  relationships  within  the  body,  but  he  has  a  view  of  the  body 
as  a  whole,  of  its  general  end  and  purpose.  His  study  of  the 
particular  organ  is  in  part  determined  by  his  knowledge  of  the 
relations  between  body  and  environment.  But  experience  as  a 
whole  cannot  be  treated  like  a  body,  because  it  has  no  environ- 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  18-19. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  23. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  17. 


\ 


78  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

ment.  The  analogy  between  body  and  its  processes  and  expe- 
rience and  its  processes  breaks  down,  therefore,  at  a  vital  point. 
Dewey's  genetic  interpretation  gains  in  plausibility  when  the 
human  body,  and  not  the  whole  of  experience,  is  taken  as  the 
ground  upon  which  the  'functions'  are  to  be  explained,  for  the 
body  has  an  environment  and  purposes  in  relation  to  that  en- 
vironment. Experience  as  a  whole  possesses  no  such  external 
reference. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Dewey's  interpretation  of  the  function  of 
knowing  is  not  as  empirical  as  it  proposes  to  be.  Its  underlying 
conceptions  are  biological  in  character,  and  these  conceptions 
are  brought  ready-made  to  the  study  of  thought.  Logical 
theory  does  not  arise  naturally  and  spontaneously  from  a  study 
of  the  facts  of  mind,  but  the  facts  are  aligned  and  interpreted  in 
terms  of  categories  selected  in  advance.  Empiricism  develops 
its  theories  in  connection  with  facts,  but  rationalism  (in  the  bad 
sense  of  the  word)  fits  the  facts  into  prepared  theories.  Dewey's 
treatment  of  thought  is,  after  all,  more  rationalistic  than  em- 
pirical. 

To  sum  up  Dewey's  conclusions  so  far:  Logic  is  the  study  of 
the  function  of  knowing  in  relation  to  the  other  functions  of 
experience.  The  wider  logic  distinguishes  the  function  of  know- 
ing from  other  activities,  and  discovers  its  general  purpose;  the 
narrower  logic  examines  the  function  of  knowing  in  itself,  with 
the  object  of  determining  its  structure  and  operation.  The  aim 
of  logic  as  a  whole  is  to  understand  the  operations  of  the  concrete 
activity  called  knowing,  with  the  purpose  of  rendering  it  more 
efficient.  This  concrete  treatment  of  thought  contrasts  sharply 
with  the  ' epistemological'  method,  which  sets  thought  over 
against  the  concrete  processes  of  experience,  and  thus  generates 
the  false  problem  of  the  relation  of  thought  in  general  to  reality 
in  general. 

Having  stated  his  position,  we  might  expect  Dewey,  in  the 
course  of  the  next  three  chapters,  to  enter  upon  a  consideration 
of  one  phase  or  other  of  his  logic.  On  the  contrary,  he  proposes  to 
take  up  "some  of  the  considerations  that  lie  on  the  borderland  be- 
tween the  larger  and  the  narrower  conceptions  of  logical  theory."1 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  23. 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY."  79 

First,  he  will  consider  the  antecedent  conditions  and  cues  of  the 
thought-process;  the  conditions  which  lead  up  to  and  into  the 
function  of  knowing.  These  conditions  lie  between  the  thought- 
process  and  the  preceding  function  (in  order  of  time),  and  are 
therefore  on  the  borderland  between  the  wider  and  narrower 
spheres  of  logic. 

In  defining  the  conditions  which  precede  and  evoke  thought, 
Dewey  says:  "There  is  always  as  antecedent  to  thought  an 
experience  of  some  subject-matter  of  the  physical  or  social 
world,  or  organized  intellectual  world,  whose  parts  are  actively 
at  war  with  each  other — so  much  so  that  they  threaten  to  disrupt 
the  entire  experience,  which  accordingly  for  its  own  maintenance 
requires  deliberate  re-definition  and  re-relation  of  its  tensional 
parts."1  Thought  is  always  called  into  action  by  the  whole  con- 
crete situation  in  which  it  occurs,  not  by  any  particular  sensation, 
idea,  or  feeling. 

The  opposite  interpretation  of  the  nature  of  the  antecedents 
of  thought  is  furnished  by  Lotze,  who  makes  them  consist  in 
bare  impressions,  'moods  of  ourselves,'  mere  states  of  conscious- 
ness. Dewey  is  quite  right  in  calling  these  bare  impressions 
purely  fictitious,  though  the  observation  is  by  no  means  original. 
From  the  manner  in  which  he  approaches  the  study  of  the  "an- 
tecedents of  thought"  it  appears,  however,  that  Dewey  has 
something  in  common  with  Lotze.  The  functional  theory,  that 
is,  allows  a  certain  initial  detachment  of  thought  from  reality, 
which  must  be  bridged  over  by  an  empirical  demonstration  of 
its  natural  connection  with  preceding  processes. 

Dewey  is  wholly  justified,  again,  in  maintaining  that  thought 
is  not  a  faculty  set  apart  from  reality,  and  that  what  is  'given* 
to  thought  is  a  coherent  world,  not  a  mass  of  unmeaning  sen- 
sations. He  recognizes  his  substantial  agreement  with  the 
modern  idealists  in  these  matters.2  But  the  idealists,  he  believes, 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  39  f.  Bradley  suggests  a  similar  idea  of  the  'tensional  situation.' 
See,  for  instance,  Ethical  Studies,  p.  65,  where  he  remarks:  "We  have  conflicting 
desires,  say  A  and  B;  we  feel  two  tensions,  two  drawings  (so  to  speak)  but  we  can 
not  actually  affirm  ourselves  in  both."  A  more  complete  statement  of  the  'ten- 
sional situation '  will  be  found  on  page  239  of  the  same  work  and  in  various  other 


2  Ibid.,  pp.  43-44- 


80  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

hold  a  constitutive  conception  of  thought  which  is  in  conflict 
with  the  empirical  description  of  thinking  as  a  concrete  activity 
in  time.  Reality,  according  to  this  conception,  is  a  vast  system 
of  sensations  brought  into  a  rational  order  by  logical  forms,  and 
finite  thought,  in  its  operations,  simply  apprehends  or  discovers 
the  infinite  order  of  the  cosmos.  "How  does  it  happen,"  Dewey 
asks,  "that  the  absolute  constitutive  and  intuitive  Thought  does 
such  a  poor  and  bungling  job  that  it  requires  a  finite  discursive 
activity  to  patch  up  its  products?"1 

Against  Lotze,  such  an  indictment  has  considerable  force, 
but  its  applicability  to  modern  idealism  is  not  so  obvious. 
Modern  idealism  has  insisted  upon  an  empirical  treatment  of 
thought,  and  has  definitely  surrendered  the  abstract  sensations 
of  the  older  psychologies.  Nor  does  idealism  tend  to  treat 
finite  thought  as  a  process  which  merely  'copies'  an  eternally 
present  nature.  The  issue  between  Dewey  and  the  idealists  is 
this:  Does  functionalism  render  an  accurate  empirical  account 
of  the  nature  of  thought  as  a  concrete  process? 

In  his  third  chapter  Dewey  discusses  "Thought  and  its 
Subject-matter:  The  Datum  of  Thinking."  The  tensional 
situation  passes  into  a  thought  situation,  and  reflection  enters 
upon  its  work  of  restoring  the  equilibrium  of  experience.  Certain 
characteristic  processes  attend  the  operation  of  thought.  "The 
conflicting  situation  inevitably  polarizes  or  dichotomizes  itself. 
There  is  somewhat  which  is  untouched  in  the  contention  of  in- 
compatibles.  There  is  something  which  remains  secure,  un- 
questioned. On  the  other  hand,  there  are  elements  which  are 
rendered  doubtful  and  precarious."2  The  unquestioned  element 
is  the  datum;  the  uncertain  element,  the  ideatum.  Ideas  are 
"impressions,  suggestions,  guesses,  theories,  estimates,  etc.,  the 
facts  are  crude,  raw,  unorganized,  brute."3  There  is  an  approxi- 
mation to  bare  meaning  on  the  one  hand,  and  bare  existence  on 
the  other. 

The  first  dichotomy  passes  into  a  second.  "Once  more,  and 
briefly,  both  datum  and  ideatum  may  .  .  .  break  up,  each  for 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  45. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  52. 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY."  8 1 

itself,  into  physical  and  psychical."1  The  datum,  or  sense 
material,  is  all,  somehow,  matter  and  real,  but  one  part  of  it 
turns  out  to  have  a  psychical,  another  a  physical  form.  Simi- 
larly, the  ideatum  divides  into  what  is  mere  fancy,  the  psychical, 
and  what  is  objectively  valid,  the  physical. 

These  distinctions  are  divisions  of  labor  within  the  thought- 
process.  "All  the  distinctions  of  the  thought-function,  of  con- 
ception as  over  against  sense-perception,  of  judgment  in  its 
various  modes  and  forms,  of  inference  in  its  vast  diversity  of 
operation — all  these  distinctions  come  within  the  thought  situa- 
tion as  growing  out  of  a  characteristic  antecedent  typical  for- 
mation of  experience.  .  .  .  "2  Great  confusion  results  in  logical 
theory,  Dewey  believes,  when  it  is  forgotten  that  these  distinc- 
tions are  valid  only  within  the  thought  process.  Their  order  of 
occurrence  within  the  thought  process  must  also  be  observed,  if 
confusion  is  to  be  prevented.  Datum  and  ideatum  come  first, 
psychical  and  physical  next  in  order.  "Thus  the  distinction 
between  subjectivity  and  objectivity  is  not  one  between  meaning 
as  such  and  datum  as  such.  It  is  a  specification  that  emerges, 
correspondently,  in  both  datum  and  ideatum,  as  affairs  of  the 
direction  of  logical  movement.  That  which  is  left  behind  in  the 
evolution  of  accepted  meaning  is  characterized  as  real,  but  only 
in  a  psychical  sense;  that  which  is  moved  toward  is  regarded  as 
real  in  an  objective,  cosmic  sense."3 

Dewey  does  well  to  call  attention  to  the  limitations  of  these 
categories,  which  cannot,  indeed,  be  treated  as  absolute  without 
serious  error.  It  may  be  questioned,  however,  whether  their 
limitations  are  of  the  precise  nature  which  he  describes.  All 
depends  upon  the  initial  conception  of  the  nature  of  thought. 
From  Dewey 's  standpoint,  these  categories  are  'tools  of  analysis* 
which  function  only  within  the  thinking  process;  but  his  descrip- 
tion of  the  function  of  knowing  may  be  questioned,  in  which  case 
his  instrumental  view  of  the  concepts  is  rendered  meaningless. 
A  logical,  as  distinct  from  a  psychological,  treatment  of  the  con- 
cepts mentioned,  would  show  that  their  validity  is  limited  to  a 

1  Op.  cit. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  47. 
•  Ibid.,  p.  S3. 


82  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

certain  'sphere  of  relevance;'  that  they  are  applicable  within  a 
certain  context  and  to  a  particular  subject-matter.  The  danger 
of  indiscriminate  use  of  the  categories  would  be  avoided  by  the 
logical  criticism  even  better,  perhaps,  than  by  Dewey's  method. 

The  discussion  in  Dewey's  fourth  and  last  chapter,  concerning 
"The  Content  and  Object  of  Thought,"  hinges  upon  a  detailed 
criticism  of  Lotze's  position,  which  cannot  be  presented  here. 
The  general  bearing  of  the  discussion,  however,  may  be  indicated. 
"To  regard,"  says  Dewey,  "the  thought-forms  of  conception, 
judgment,  and  inference  as  qualifications  of  'pure  thought,  apart 
from  any  difference  in  objects,'  instead  of  as  successive  dispo- 
sitions in  the  progressive  organization  of  the  material  (or  objects) 
is  the  fallacy  of  rationalism."1 

Pure  thought,  of  course,  cannot  be  defended.  At  the  same 
time,  Dewey,  like  Lotze,  tends  to  regard  thought  as  a  special 
function  with  a  'content'  of  its  own.  If  thought  is  regarded  as  a 
special  kind  of  process,  having  its  own  content  in  the  way  of 
instrumental  concepts,  the  question  inevitably  arises:  How 
shall  these  forms  be  employed  to  reach  truth?  How  apply  them 
correctly  to  the  matter  in  hand? 

Dewey  answers  that  the  forms  and  hypotheses  of  thought, 
like  the  tools  and  scaffoldings  for  its  operations,  are  especially 
designed  for  the  labor  which  they  have  to  perform.  "There  is 
no  miracle  in  the  fact  that  tool  and  material  are  adapted  to  each 
other  in  the  process  of  reaching  a  valid  conclusion.  .  .  .  Each 
has  been  slowly  evolved  with  reference  to  its  fit  employ  in  the 
entire  function;  and  this  evolution  has  been  checked  at  every 
point  by  reference  to  its  own  correspondent."2 

It  is  no  doubt  true  that  established  conceptions,  no  less  than 
temporary  hypotheses,  have  been  evolved  in  connection  with,  as 
a  feature  or  part  of,  the  subject-matter  to  which  they  pertain. 
But  it  is  quite  another  thing  to  say  that  these  evolved  forms 
belong  to  thought,  if  by  thought  be  meant  the  functional  activity 
of  Dewey's  description.  Dewey  stresses  the  relevance  of  these 
forms  to  the  thought-process,  rather  than  their  relevance  to  a 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  61  f. 
*Ibid.,  p.  80. 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY."  83 

particular  sphere  of  discourse.  His  purpose  is  to  show  that  dis- 
tinctions which  are  valid  within  the  process  of  knowing  are  not 
valid  elsewhere,  and  the  net  result  is  to  limit  the  faculty  of  thought 
as  a  whole,  as  well  as  the  forms  of  thought. 

This  result  reveals  itself  most  clearly  in  his  discussion  of  the 
test  of  truth.  "In  that  sense  the  test  of  reality  is  beyond 
thought,  as  thought,  just  as  at  the  other  limit  thought  originates 
out  of  a  situation  which  is  not  reflectional  in  character.  Inter- 
pret this  before  and  beyond  in  a  historic  sense,  as  an  affair  of  the 
place  occupied  and  role  played  by  thinking  as  a  function  in 
experience  in  relation  to  other  functions,  and  the  intermediate 
and  instrumental  character  of  thought,  its  dependence  upon 
unreflective  antecedents  for  its  existence,  and  upon  a  consequent 
experience  for  its  test  of  final  validity,  becomes  significant  and 
necessary."1  This  notion  that  the  test  of  thought  must  be 
external  to  thought  depends  directly  upon  the  doctrine  that 
thought  is  a  special  activity  of  the  kind  heretofore  described. 
It  results  from  the  occasionalism  attributed  by  Dewey  to  the 
thinking  process. 

If  the  truth  or  falsity  of  an  idea  is  not  discovered  by  thought, 
then  by  what  faculty  might  it  be  discovered?  Perhaps  by  ex- 
perience as  a  whole  or  in  general.  Dewey,  on  occasion,  speaks 
as  follows:  "Experience  is  continually  integrating  itself  into  a 
wholeness  of  coherent  meaning  deepened  in  significance  by  passing 
through  an  inner  distraction  in  which  by  means  of  conflict  certain 
contents  are  rendered  partial  and  hence  objectively  conscious."2 
Perhaps  Dewey  means  to  say  that  truth  is  determined  by  this 
cosmic  automatism.  It  is  confusing,  however,  to  be  told  in  one 
moment  that  thought  transforms  experience,  and  in  another 
that  experience  transforms  itself. 

Experience,  not  reflection,  is,  then,  the  test  of  truth  and 
thought.  Such  a  statement  would  not  be  possible,  except  in 
connection  with  a  psychology  which  deliberately  sets  experience 
over  against  reflection,  making  the  latter  a  peculiar,  although 
dependent,  process.  Lotze,  indeed,  makes  the  separation  of 
thought  from  experience  quite  complete.  Dewey  attempts  to 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  85. 

2  Ibid. 


84  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

bring  them  together  by  his  psychological  method,  but  does  not 
completely  succeed.  In  the  meantime  modern  idealism  has 
suggested  that  thought  and  experience  are  merely  parts  of  one 
general  process,  constantly  operating  in  conjunction.  To  one 
who  believes  that  the  various  processes  or  '  functions '  of  experience 
constitute  a  single  organ  of  life,  the  proposition  that  experience, 
rather  than  reflection,  is  the  judge  of  truth,  becomes  meaningless. 

In  an  essay  on  "The  Logical  Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Treat- 
ment of  Morality"  in  another  volume  of  the  Chicago  Publications 
of  I9O3,1  Dewey  presents  a  positive  statement  of  his  logical 
theory  which  is  an  excellent  supplement  to  the  critical  study  of 
Lotze. 

Science,  Dewey  remarks  in  introducing  this  essay,  is  a  syste- 
matized body  of  knowledge.  Knowledge  may  be  taken  either 
as  a  body  of  facts  or  as  a  process  of  arranging  a  body  of  facts ;  as 
results  or  the  acquiring  of  results.  The  latter  phase  of  science 
is  the  more  important.  "As  used  in  this  article,  'scientific' 
means  regular  methods  of  controlling  the  formation  of  judgments 
regarding  some  subject-matter."2  In  the  scientific  attitude, 
beliefs  are  looked  upon  as  conclusions,  and  as  conclusions  they 
look  in  two  directions.  They  look  backward  towards  the  ground 
from  which  they  are  empirically  derived,  and  which  renders  them 
valid,  and  they  look  forward,  as  meaning,  to  being  the  ground 
from  which  further  conclusions  can  be  deduced.  "So  far  as  we 
engage  in  this  procedure,  we  look  at  our  respective  acts  of  judging 
not  as  independent  and  detached,  but  as  an  interrelated  system, 
within  which  every  assertion  entitles  us  to  other  assertions 
(which  must  be  carefully  deduced  since  they  constitute  its  mean- 
ing) and  to  which  we  are  entitled  only  through,  other  assertions 
(so  that  they  must  be  carefully  searched  for).  'Scientific'  as 
used  in  this  article  thus  means  the  possibility  of  establishing  an 
order  of  judgments  such  that  each  one  when  made  is  of  use  in 
determining  other  judgments,  thereby  securing  control  of  their 
formation."3 

1  Decennial  Publications  of  the  University  of  Chicago,  First  Series,  Vol.  Ill,  pp. 
H5-I39. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  115. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  116. 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY:1  85 

This  view  of  science  as  an  order  of  judgments  requires  a 
special  treatment  of  the  generic  ideas,  the  'conclusions,'  or 
universals  of  science.  The  individual  judgment,  'This,  A,  is  B,' 
expresses  an  identity.  But  it  is  much  better  expressed  in  hypo- 
thetical form.  "Identification,  in  other  words,  is  secure  only 
when  it  can  be  made  through  (i)  breaking  up  the  analyzed. 
This  of  nai've  judgment  into  determinate  traits,  (2)  breaking  up 
the  predicate  into  a  similar  combination  of  elements,  and  (3) 
establishing  uniform  connection  between  some  of  the  elements  in 
the  subject  and  some  in  the  predicate."1  Identity  exists  amid 
relevant  differences,  and  the  more  intimately  the  system  of 
differents  is  understood,  the  more  positive  is  the  determination 
of  identity.  This  will  be  recognized  as  the  'concrete  universal' 
of  the  Hegelian  logicians. 

But,  Dewey  says,  modern  logicians  tend  to  disregard  judgment 
as  act,  and  pay  attention  to  it  only  as  content.  The  generic 
ideas  are  studied  in  independence  of  their  applications,  as  if  this 
were  a  matter  of  no  concern  in  logic.  "  In  truth,  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  control  of  one  content  by  mere  reference  to  anothei 
content  as  such.  To  recognize  this  impossibility  is  to  recognize 
that  the  control  of  the  formation  of  the  judgment  is  always  through 
the  medium  of  an  act  by  which  the  respective  contents  of  both 
the  individual  judgment  and  of  the  universal  proposition  are 
selected  and  brought  into  relationship  to  each  other."2  The 
individual  act  of  judgment  is  necessary  to  logical  theory,  because 
the  act  of  the  individual  forms  the  connecting  link  between  the 
generic  idea  and  the  specific  details  of  the  situation.  There  must 
be  some  means  whereby  the  instrumental  concept  is  brought  to 
bear  upon  its  appropriate  material.  "The  logical  process  in- 
cludes, as  an  organic  part  of  itself,  the  selection  and  reference  of 
that  particular  one  of  the  system  which  is  relevant  to  the  par- 
ticular case.  This  individualized  selection  and  adaptation  is  an 
integral  portion  of  the  logic  of  the  situation.  And  such  selection 
and  adjustment  is  clearly  in  the  nature  of  an  act."3 

This  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  categories  to  their  subject- 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  120. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  121. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  122. 


86  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

matter  is  an  acute  one  for  Dewey,  because  of  limitations  placed 
upon  thought.  He  decides  that  the  idea  must  be,  in  some  fashion, 
self-selective,  must  signify  its  own  fitness  to  a  given  subject- 
matter.  But  it  can  only  be  self-selective  by  being  itself  in  the 
nature  of  an  act.  It  turns  out  that  the  generic  idea  has  been 
evolved  in  connection  with  acts  of  judgment,  and  its  own  applic- 
ability is  born  in  it.  "The  activity  which  selects  and  employs 
is  logical,  not  extra-logical,  just  because  the  tool  selected  and 
employed  has  been  invented  and  developed  precisely  for  the 
sake  of  just  such  future  selection  and  use."1 

The  logic  and  system  of  science  must  be  embodied  in  the 
individual.  He  must  be  a  good  logical  medium,  his  acts  must  be 
orderly  and  consecutive,  and  generic  ideas  must  have  a  good 
motor  basis  in  his  organism,  if  he  is  to  think  successfully.  This 
is  the  essence  of  Dewey's  argument  in  the  essay  under  discussion. 
The  inference  seems  to  be  that  logic  cannot  be  separated  from 
biology  and  psychology,  since  the  act  of  knowing  and  the  ideas 
which  it  employs  have  a  physiological  basis. 

It  is  difficult  to  see,  however,  how  such  a  standpoint  could 
prove  useful  in  the  practical  study  of  logic.  Certainly  little 
headway  could  be  made  toward  a  study  of  the  proper  use  and 
limitations  of  the  categories  by  an  investigation  of  the  human 
nervous  system.  And  to  what  extent  would  physiology  illu- 
minate the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  generic  ideas  to  their 
appropriate  objects?  Although  Dewey  decides  that  the  rela- 
tionship must  have  its  ground  in  the  motor  activities  of  the 
organism,  his  conclusion  has  little  empirical  evidence  to  support  it. 

A  practical,  workable  conception  of  the  relations  between 
generic  ideas  and  their  objects  must  be  based  on  considerations 
less  obscure.  Why  not  be  content  to  verify,  by  criticism,  the 
truth  that  experience  and  thoughts  about  experience  develop 
together,  with  the  result  that  each  theory,  hypothesis,  or  method 
is  applicable  within  the  sphere  where  it  was  born?  Why  wait 
upon  psychology  for  confirmation  of  a  truth  so  obvious  and 
important? 

Bosanquet  remarks:   "Either  one  may  speak  as  if  reality  were 

1  Op.  cit. 


"STUDIES  IN  LOGICAL   THEORY."  87 

relative  to  the  individual  mind,  a  ridiculous  idea  .  .  .  ,  or  one 
may  become  interested  in  tracing  the  germination  and  growth  of 
ideas  in  the  individual  mind  as  typical  facts  indeed,  but  only  as 
one  animal's  habits  are  typical  of  those  of  others,  and  we  may 
slur  over  the  primary  basis  of  logic,  which  is  its  relation  to 
reality.  For  mental  facts  unrelated  to  reality  are  no  knowledge, 
and  therefore  have  no  place  in  logic."1  Bosanquet  emphasizes 
an  important  truth  neglected  by  Dewey.  Logic  is  not  concerned 
with  ideas  as  things  existing  in  individuals,  nor  with  concep- 
tions as  individual  modes  of  response.  Truth  has  little  to  do 
with  the  individual  as  such,  though  the  individual  might  well 
concern  himself  about  truth.  Truth  is  objective,  super-indi- 
vidual, and  logic  is  the  study  of  the  objective  verity  of  thought. 
The  proposition,  'All  life  is  from  the  living,'  finds  no  premises  in 
the  nerve  tissues  of  the  scientist  who  accepts  it.  How  does  the 
proposition  square  up  with  reality  or  experience?  That  is  the 
question,  and  it  can  only  be  answered  by  turning  away  from 
psychology  to  empirical  verification,  involving  a  critical  test  of 
the  applicability  of  the  thought  to  reality. 

In  the  strictly  ethical  part  of  the  essay,  Dewey  tries  to  show 
that  moral  judgments,  at  least,  involve  the  character  of  the 
agent  and  his  specific  acts  as  data.  Intellectual  judgments,  on 
the  other  hand,  may  disregard  the  acts  of  the  individual;  they 
are  left  out  of  account,  "when  they  are  so  uniform  in  their 
exercise  that  they  make  no  difference  with  respect  to  the  par- 
ticular object  or  content  judged."2  It  will  be  seen  that  the  dis- 
tinction between  moral  and  intellectual  judgments  is  made  on 
the  basis  of  their  content.  But  Dewey  is  commited  to  the  doc- 
trine that  judgments  are  to  be  differentiated  as  acts,  on  a  psy- 
chological basis.  In  any  case,  if  the  character  and  acts  of  a  man 
are  to  be  judged,  they  must  be  treated  objectively,  and  the 
relevance  of  the  judge's  ideas  to  the  man's  actual  character 
cannot  be  decided  by  a  psychological  analysis  of  the  judge's 
mind.  Right  and  wrong,  whether  moral  or  intellectual,  are  not 
attributes  of  the  individual  nervous  system. 

1  Logic,  second  ed.t  Vol.  I,  p.  232. 

2  Decennial  Publication  of  the  University  of  Chicago,  First  Series,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  127. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   POLEMICAL   PERIOD 

AFTER  the  publication  of  the  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  Dewey 
entered  upon  what  may  be  called  the  polemical  period  of  his 
career.  He  joined  forces  with  James  and  Schiller  in  the  pro- 
motion of  the  new  movement  called  '  Pragmatism.'  The  Journal 
of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  instituted  at 
Columbia  University  in  1904,  the  same  year  in  which  Dewey 
accepted  a  professorship  in  that  institution,  became  a  convenient 
medium  for  the  expression  of  his  views,  and  every  volume  of 
this  periodical  will  be  found  to  contain  notes,  discussions,  and 
articles  by  Dewey  and  his  followers,  bearing  on  current  con- 
troversy. He  also  published  many  articles  in  other  journals, 
technical  and  popular.  In  1910,  the  most  important  of  these 
essays  were  collected  into  a  volume,  published  under  the  title, 
The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  and  Other  Essays.  For 
purposes  of  discussion,  these  essays  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes:  those  of  a  more  constructive  character,  setting  forth 
Dewey's  own  standpoint,  and  those  which  are  mainly  polemical, 
directed  against  opposing  standpoints,  chiefly  the  idealistic. 
The  constructive  writings  will  be  given  first  consideration. 

The  essay  on  "The  Postulate  of  Immediate  Empiricism," 
first  published  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and 
Scientific  Methods,  in  July,  1905,  and  later  reprinted  in  the  volume 
of  collected,  essays,  offers  a  convenient  point  of  departure. 
Dewey  observes  that  many  of  the  difficulties  in  current  contro- 
versy can  be  traced  to  presuppositions  tacitly  held  by  thinkers 
as  to  what  experience  means.  Dewey  attempts  to  make  his  own 
presuppositions  explicit,  with  the  object  of  clearing  up  this 
confusion. 

"Immediate  empiricism,"  he  says,  "postulates  that  things — 
anything,  everything,  in  the  ordinary  or  non-technical  use  of  the 
term  'thing' — are  what  they  are  experienced  as.  Hence,  if  one 

88 


THE  POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  89 

wishes  to  describe  anything  truly,  his  task  is  to  tell  what  it  is 
experienced  as  being."1  The  idealists,  on  the  contrary,  hold 
"that  things  (or,  ultimately,  Reality,  Being)  are  only  and  just 
what  they  are  known  to  be  or  that  things  are,  or  Reality  is,  what 
it  is  for  a  conscious  knower — whether  the  knower  be  conceived 
primarily  as  a  perceiver  or  as  a  thinker  being  a  further,  and 
secondary,  question.  This  is  the  root-paralogism  of  all  ideal- 
isms, whether  subjective  or  objective,  psychological  or  epistemo- 
logical."2  Knowing  is  merely  one  mode  of  experiencing,  and 
things  may  be  experienced  in  other  ways,  as,  for  instance,  aes- 
thetically, morally,  technologically,  or  economically.  This 
follows  Dewey's  familiar  division  of  the  processes  of  experience 
into  separate  'functions'  or  activities.  It  becomes  the  duty  of 
the  philosopher,  following  this  scheme,  to  find  out  "what  sort 
of  an  experience  knowing  is — or,  concretely  how  things  are 
experienced  when  they  are  experienced  as  known  things."3 

Dewey  fails,  in  this  essay,  to  draw  a  distinction  which  is  highly 
important,  between  knowledge  as  awareness  and  knowledge  as 
reflection.  This  results  in  some  confusion.  For  the  present, 
he  is  concerned  with  knowledge  as  awareness.  He^employs  an 
illustration  to  make  his  meaning  clear;  the  experience  of  fright 
at  a  noise,  which  turns  out,  when  examined  and  known,  to  be  the 
tapping  of  a  window  shade.  What  is  originally  experienced  is  a 
frightful  noise.  If,  after  examination,  the  '  frightfulness '  is 
classified  as  'psychical,'  while  the  'real'  fact  is  said  to  be  harm- 
less, there  is  no  warrant  for  reading  this  distinction  back  into 
the  original  experience.  The  argument  is  directed  against  that 
mode  of  explaining  the  difference  between  the  psychical  and  the 
physical  which  employs  a  subjective  mind  or  'knower'  as  the 
container  of  the  merely  subjective  aspects  of  reality.  Dewey 
would  hold  that  mind,  used  in  this  sense,  is  a  fiction,  having  a 
small  explanatory  value,  and  creating  more  problems  than  it 
solves.  The  difference  between  psychical  and  physical  is  relative, 

1  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  227. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  228.     In  connection  with  the  discussion  which  follows  see  Bradley 
"On  Our  Knowledge  of  Immediate  Experience,"  in  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality, 
Chapter  VI. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  229. 


90  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL    THEORY. 

not  absolute.  The  frightful  noise  first  heard  was  neither  psy- 
chical nor  physical;  it  was  what  it  was  experienced  as,  and  the 
experience  contained  no  such  distinction,  nor  did  it  contain  a 
1  knower.'  The  noise  as  known,  after  the  intervention  of  an  act  of 
judgment,  contained  these  elements  (except  the  '  knower '), 
but  the  thing  is  not  merely  what  it  is  known  as.  There  is  no 
warrant  for  reading  the  distinctions  made  by  judgment  back 
into  a  situation  where  judgment  was  not  operative.  The  original 
fact  was  precisely  what  it  was  experienced  as. 

Dewey's  purpose,  though  not  well  stated,  seems  to  be  the  com- 
plete rejection  of  the  notion  of  knowledge  as  awareness,  or  of  the 
subjective  knower.  He  discovers  at  the  same  time  an  oppor- 
tunity to  substantiate  his  own  descriptive  account  of  knowing 
(or  reflection)  as  an  occasional  function.  The  two  enterprises, 
however,  should  be  kept  distinct.  Granting  that  the  subjective 
knower  of  the  older  epistemology  should  be  dismissed  from 
philosophy,  it  does  not  follow  that  Dewey's  special  interpretation 
of  the  function  of  reflection  is  the  only  substitute. 

The  principle  of  immediate  empiricism,  Dewey  says,  fur- 
nishes no  positive  truth.  It  is  simply  a  method.  Not  a  single 
philosophical  proposition  can  be  deduced  from  it.  The  applica- 
tion of  the  method  is  indicated  in  the  following  proposition: 
"If  you  wish  to  find  out  what  subjective,  objective,  physical, 
mental,  cosmic,  psychic,  cause,  substance,  purpose,  activity, 
evil,  being,  quality — any  philosophic  term,  in  short — means,  go 
to  experience  and  see  what  the  thing  is  experienced  as."1  This 
recipe  cannot  be  taken  literally.  Dewey  probably  means  that 
each  concept  has,  or  should  have,  a  positive  empirical  reference, 
and  is  significant  only  in  that  reference.  He  is  a  firm  believer, 
however,  in  the  descriptive  method.  In  a  note,  he  remarks  that 
he  would  employ  in  philosophy  "the  direct  descriptive  method 
that  has  now  made  its  way  in  all  the  natural  sciences,  with  such 
modifications,  of  course,  as  the  subject  itself  entails."2  This 
remark  calls  for  closer  examination  than  can  be  made  here. 
It  may  be  said  in  passing,  however,  that  'scientific  description' 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  239. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  240. 


THE  POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  91 

is  by  no  means  so  simple  a  method  of  procedure  as  Dewey  would 
seem  to  indicate.  'Scientific  description,'  as  actually  employed, 
is  a  highly  elaborated  and  specialized  method  of  dealing  with 
experience.  The  whole  subject,  indeed,  is  involved,  and  requires 
cautious  treatment.  Dewey's  somewhat  ingenuous  hope,  that 
the  identification  of  his  method  with  the  methods  of  science  will 
add  to  its  impressiveness,  is  in  danger,  unfortunately,  of  being 
vitiated  through  the  suspicion  that  he  is,  after  all,  not  in  close 
touch  with  the  methods  of  science. 

Dewey  employs  the  descriptive  method  chiefly  as  a  means  for 
substantiating  his  special  interpretation  of  the  judgment  process. 
His  use  of  the  method  in  this  connection  is  well  illustrated  by  an 
article  called  "The  Experimental  Theory  of  Knowledge"1  (1906), 
in  which  he  attempts  "to  find  out  what  sort  of  an  experience 
knowing  is"  through  an  appeal  to  immediate  experience.  "It 
should  be  possible,"  he  says,  "to  discern  and  describe  a  knowing 
as  one  identifies  any  object,  concern,  or  event.  .  .  .  What  we 
want  is  just  something  which  takes  itself  as  knowledge,  rightly 
or  wrongly."2  The  difficulty  lies  not  in  finding  a  case  of  know- 
ing, but  in  describing  it  when  found.  Dewey  selects  a  case  to  be 
described,  and,  as  usual,  chooses  a  simple  one. 

"This  means,"  he  says,  "a  specific  case,  a  sample.  .  .  .  Our 
recourse  is  to  an  example  so  simple,  so  much  on  its  face  as  to  be  as 
innocent  as  may  be  of  assumptions.  .  .  .  Let  us  suppose  a  smell, 
just  a  floating  odor."3  The  level  at  which  this  illustration  is 
taken  is  significant.  Is  it  possible  to  suppose  that  anything  so 
complex,  varied,  myriad-sided  as  that  something  we  call  know- 
ledge, can  be  discovered  and  described  within  the  limits  of  so 
simple  an  instance? 

Dewey  employs  the  smell  in  three  situations,  the  first  repre- 
senting the  'non-cognitional,'  the  second  the  'cognitive,'  and 
the  third  the  genuinely  'cognitional'  situation.  The  first,  or 
' non-cognitional'  situation  is  described  as  follows:  "But,  let  us 
say,  the  smell  is  not  the  smell  of  the  rose;  the  resulting  change  of 
the  organism  is  not  a  sense  of  walking  and  reaching ;  the  delicious 

1  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  pp.  77-111. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  77. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  78. 


92  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL    THEORY. 

finale  is  not  the  fulfilment  of  the  movement,  and,  through  that, 
of  the  original  smell;  'is  not,'  in  each  case  meaning  is  'not  ex- 
perienced as'  such.  We  may  take,  in  short,  these  experiences 
in  a  brutely  serial  fashion.  The  smell,  S,  is  replaced  (and  dis- 
placed) by  a  felt  movement,  K,  this  is  replaced  by  the  gratifi- 
cation, G.  Viewed  from  without,  as  we  are  now  regarding  it, 
there  is  S-K-G.  But  from  within,  for  itself,  it  is  now  5,  now  K, 
now  G,  and  so  on  to  the  end  of  the  chapter.  Nowhere  is  there 
looking  before  and  after;  memory  and  anticipation  are  not  born. 
Such  an  experience  neither  is,  in  whole  or  in  part,  a  knowledge, 
nor  does  it  exercise  a  cognitive  function."1 

It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  this  is  not  a  description  of  an 
actual  human  experience,  but  a  schematic  story  designed  to 
illustrate  a  comparatively  simple  point.  In  this  situation  the 
person  concerned  does  not  deliberately  and  consciously  recognize 
the  smell  as  the  smell  of  a  rose;  he  is  not  aware  of  any  symbolic 
character  in  the  smell,  it  does  not  enter  as  a  middle  term  into  a 
process  of  inference.  In  such  a  situation,  Dewey  believes,  it 
would  be  wrong  to  read  into  the  smell  a  cognitive  property  which 
it  does  not,  as  experienced,  possess. 

In  the  second,  or  'cognitive'  situation,  the  smell  as  originally 
experienced  does  not  involve  the  function  of  knowing,  but  turns 
out  after  the  event,  as  reflected  upon,  to  have  had  a  significance. 
"In  saying  that  the  smell  is  finally  experienced  as  meaning 
gratification.  .  .  we  retrospectively  attribute  intellectual  force 
and  function  to  the  smell — and  this  is  what  is  signified  by  '  cog- 
nitive.' Yet  the  smell  is  not  cognitional,  because  it  did  not 
knowingly  intend  to  mean  this;  but  is  found,  after  the  event,  to 
have  meant  it."2  The  moral  is,  as  usual,  that  the  findings  of 
reflection  must  not  be  read  back  into  the  former  unreflective 
experience. 

In  the  truly  'cognitional'  experience  the  smell  is  then  and  there 
experienced  as  meaning  or  symbolizing  the  rose.  "An  experience 
is  a  knowledge,  if  in  its  quale  there  is  an  experienced  distinction 
and  connection  of  two  elements  of  the  following  sort:  one  means 

1  op.  tit. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  84. 


THE   POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  93 

or  intends  the  presence  of  the  other  in  the  same  fashion  in  which  itself 
is  already  present,  while  the  other  is  that  which,  while  not  present  in 
the  same  fashion,  must  become  so  present  if  the  meaning  or  intention 
of  its  companion  or  yoke-fellow  is  to  be  fulfilled  through  the  operation 
it  sets  up"1  In  the  '  cognitional '  situation,  the  smell  is  then  and 
there  experienced  as  signifying  the  presence  of  a  rose  in  the  vi- 
cinity, and  the  rose  must  be  experienced  as  a  present  fact,  before 
the  meaning  of  the  smell  is  completely  fulfilled  and  verified. 

It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  this  description  of  knowing  follows 
the  lines  laid  down  by  James  in  his  chapter  on  "Reasoning"  in 
the  Principles  of  Psychology.  In  the  process  of  reasoning  the 
situation  is  analyzed;  some  particular  feature  of  it  is  abstracted 
and  made  the  middle  term  in  an  inference.  The  smell,  as  thus 
abstracted,  is  said  to  have  the  function  of  knowing,  or  meaning, 
the  rose  whose  reality  it  evidences. 

Dewey's  treatment  of  knowledge,  however,  is  far  too  simple. 
The  function  of  meaning,  symbolizing,  or  'pointing*  does  not 
reside  in  the  abstracted  element  as  such;  for  the  context  in  which 
the  judgment  occurs  determines  the  choosing  of  the  'middle 
term/  as  well  as  the  direction  in  which  it  shall  point.  The 
situation  as  a  whole  has  a  rationality  which  resides  in  the  dis- 
tinctions, identities,  phases  of  emphasis,  and  discriminations  of 
the  total  experience.  Rationality  expresses  itself  in  the  organized 
system  of  experience,  not  in  particular  elements  and  their  '  point- 
ings.' Taken  in  this  sense,  rationality  is  present  in  all  experience. 
The  smell,  in  Dewey's  first  situation,  is  not  'cognitional'  because 
the  situation  as  a  whole  does  not  permit  it  to  be,  if  such  an  expres- 
sion may  be  used.  The  intellectual  drift  of  the  moment  drives 
the  smell  away  from  the  centre  of  attention  at  one  time,  just  as  at 
another  it  selects  it  to  serve  as  an  element  in  judgment.  It  is 
only  with  reference  to  a  system  of  some  kind  that  things  can  be 
regarded  as  symbols  at  all.  Things  do  not  represent  one  another 
at  haphazard,  but  definitely  and  concretely;  they  imply  an  or- 
ganization of  elements  having  mutual  implications.  One  thing 
implies  another  because  both  are  elements  in  a  whole  which 
determines  their  mutual  reference.  This  organization  is  present 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  90.     Author's  italics. 


94  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

in  all  experience,  not  in  the  form  of  'established  habits,'  but  in 
the  form  of  will  and  purpose. 

In  the  course  of  his  further  discussion,  which  need  not  be  fol- 
lowed in  detail,  Dewey  passes  on  to  a  consideration  of  truth. 
Truth  is  concerned  with  the  worth  or  validity  of  ideas.  But, 
before  their  validity  can  be  determined,  there  must  be  a  'cog- 
nitional'  experience  of  the  type  described  above.  "Before  the 
category  of  confirmation  or  refutation  can  be  introduced,  there 
must  be  something  which  means  to  mean  something  and  which 
therefore  can  be  guaranteed  or  nullified  by  the  issue."1  Ideas, 
or  meanings,  as  directly  experienced,  are  neither  true  nor  false, 
but  are  made  so  by  the  results  in  which  they  issue.  Even  then, 
the  outcome  must  be  reflected  upon,  before  they  can  be  desig- 
nated true  or  false.  "Truth  and  falsity  present  themselves  as 
significant  facts  only  in  situations  in  which  specific  meanings  and 
their  already  experienced  fulfilments  and  non-fulfilments  are  inten- 
tionally compared  and  contrasted  with  reference  to  the  question  of 
the  worth,  as  to  reliability  of  meaning,  of  the  given  meaning  or  class 
of  meanings."2  This  makes  the  whole  problem  of  truth  a  rela- 
tively simple  affair.  The  symbol  and  its  'pointing'  are  taken  as 
a  single,  objective  fact,  to  be  tested,  and,  if  verified,  labelled 
'true.'  Meanings,  after  all,  are  not  so  simple  as  this  scheme 
would  imply. 

As  the  intellectual  life  of  man  is  more  subtle  and  universal 
than  Dewey  represents  it  to  be,  so  is  truth,  as  that  which  thought 
seeks  to  establish,  something  deeper-lying  and  more  compre- 
hensive. Ideas  are  not  simple  and  isolated  facts;  their  truth  is 
not  strictly  their  own,  but  is  reflected  into  them  from  the  objec- 
tive order  to  which  they  pertain.  The  possibility  of  making 
observations  and  experiments,  and  of  having  ideas,  rests  upon 
the  presence  in  and  through  experience  of  that  directing  influence 
which  we  call  valid  knowledge,  or  truth.  An  idea,  to  be  true, 
must  fit  in  with  this  general  body  of  truth.  Not  correspondence 
with  its  single  object,  but  correspondence  with  the  whole  organ- 
ized body  of  knowledge,  is  the  test  of  the  truth  of  an  idea.  The 
attempt  to  describe  knowledge  as  a  particular  occurrence,  fact, 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  87. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  95.    Author's  italics. 


THE  POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  95 

or  function,  is  foredoomed  to  failure.  It  should  be  noted  also 
that  Dewey's  'description,'  throughout  this  essay,  is  anything 
but  a  direct,  empirical  examination  of  thought.  He  presents 
a  schematized  picture  of  reality  which,  like  an  engineer's  diagram, 
leaves  out  the  cloying  details  of  the  object  it  is  supposed  to 
represent. 

The  sceptical  and  positivistic  results  of  Dewey's  treatment  of 
knowledge  are  set  forth  in  an  article  entitled  "Some  Implications 
of  Anti-Intellectualism,"  published  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  in  iQio.1  This  was  not  in- 
cluded in  the  volume  of  collected  essays  published  in  the  same 
year,  but  may  be  regarded  as  of  some  importance. 

After  some  comments  on  current  anti-intellectualistic  ten- 
dencies, Dewey  proceeds  to  distinguish  his  own  anti-intellectual- 
ism  from  that  of  others.  This  type  "starts  from  acts,  functions, 
as  primary  data,  functions  both  biological  and  social  in  char- 
acter; from  organic  responses,  readjustments.  It  treats  the 
knowledge  standpoint,  in  all  its  patterns,  structures,  and  pur- 
poses, as  evolving  out  of,  and  operating  in  the  interests  of,  the 
guidance  and  enrichment  of  these  primary  functions.  The  vice 
of  intellectualism  from  this  standpoint  is  not  in  making  of  logical 
relations  and  functions  in  and  for  knowledge,  but  in  a  false 
abstraction  of  knowledge  (and  the  logical)  from  its  working 
context."2 

The  manner  in  which  this  exaltation  of  the  "primary"  func- 
tions at  the  expense  of  knowledge  affects  philosophy  is  indicated 
in  the  following  passage :  "Philosophy  is  itself  a  mode  of  knowing, 
and  of  knowing  wherein  reflective  thinking  is  much  in  play.  .  .  . 
As  a  mode  of  knowledge,  it  arises,  like  any  intellectual  undertak- 
ing, out  of  certain  typical  perplexities  and  conflicts  of  behavior, 
and  its  purpose  is  to  help  straighten  these  out.  Philosophy  may 
indeed  render  things  more  intelligible  or  give  greater  insight  into 
existence;  but  these  considerations  are  subject  to  the  final  cri- 
terion of  what  it  means  to  acquire  insight  and  to  make  things 
intelligible,  i.  e.,  namely,  service  of  special  purposes  in  behavior, 
and  limit  by  the  special  problems  in  which  the  need  of  insight 

1  Vol.  VII,  pp.  477-481. 
zlbid.,  p.  478. 


96  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

arises.  This  is  not  to  say  that  instrumentalism  is  merely  a 
methodology  or  an  epistemology  preliminary  to  more  ultimate 
philosophic  or  metaphysical  inquiries,  for  it  involves  the  doctrine 
that  the  origin,  structure,  and  purpose  of  knowing  are  such  as  to 
render  nugatory  any  wholesale  inquiries  into  the  nature  of 
Being."1 

In  the  last  analysis,  this  appears  to  be  a  confession,  rather 
than  an  argument.  It  is  the  inevitable  outcome  of  the  functional 
analysis  of  intelligence.  Thought  is  this  organ,  with  these 
functions,  and  is  capable  of  so  much  and  no  more.  The  limit 
to  its  capacity  is  set  by  the  description  of  its  nature.  The  nature 
of  the  functionalistic  limitation  of  thought  is  well  expressed  in 
-'the  words  'special'  and  'specific/  Since  thought  is  the  servant 
of  the  'primary'  modes  of  experience,  it  can  only  deal  with  the 
problems  set  for  it  by  preceding  non-reflective  processes.  These 
problems  are  'specific'  because  they  are  concrete  problems  of 
action,  and  are  concerned  with  particular  aspects  of  the  environ- 
ment. Dewey's  formidable  positivism  would  vanish  at  once, 
however,  if  his  special  psychology  of  the  thought-process  should 
be  found  untenable.  Thought  is  limited,  according  to  Dewey, 
because  it  is  a  very  special  form  of  activity,  operating  occasionally 
in  the  interest  of  the  direct  modes  of  experiencing. 

Probably  every  philosopher  recognizes  that  speculation  cannot 
be  allowed  to  run  wild.  Some  problems  are  worth  while,  others 
are  artificial  and  trivial,  and  some  means  must  be  found  for 
separating  the  sound  and  substantial  from  the  tawdry  and  senti- 
mental. The  question  is,  however,  whether  Dewey's  psychology 
furnishes  a  ground  for  such  distinctions.  Again,  it  should  be 
noted  that,  in  spite  of  the  limitations  placed  upon  thought  by  its 
very  nature,  as  described  by  Dewey,  certain  philosophers,  by 
his  own  confession,  are  guilty  of  "wholesale  inquiries  into  the 
nature  of  Being."  If  thought  can  deal  only  with  specific  prob- 
lems, then  there  can  be  no  question  as  to  whether  philosophy 
ought  to  be  metaphysical.  It  is  a  repetition  of  the  case  of  psy- 
chological versus  ethical  hedonism. 

Modern  idealists  would  resent  the  imputation  that  there  is  any 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  479. 


THE   POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  97 

inclination  on  their  part  to  deny  the  need  for  a  critical  attitude 
toward  the  problems  and  methods  of  philosophy.  Kant's 
criticism  of  the  'dogmatists'  for  their  undiscriminating  employ- 
ment of  the  categories  in  the  interpretation  of  reality,  established 
an  attitude  which  has  been  steadily  maintained  by  his  philoso- 
phical descendants.  The  idealist,  in  fact,  has  accused  Dewey 
of  laxity  in  the  criticism  of  his  own  methods  and  presuppositions. 
The  categories  of  description  and  natural  selection  by  means  of 
which  his  functionalism  is  established,  it  is  argued,  are  of  little 
service  in  the  sphere  of  mind.  And  while  Dewey  accepts  an 
evolutionary  view  of  reality  in  general,  the  idealist  has  found 
evolutionism,  at  least  in  its  biological  form,  too  limited  in  scope 
to  serve  the  extensive  interests  of  philosophy.  Dewey  is  right 
in  opposing  false  problems  and  fanciful  solutions  in  philosophy; 
but  these  evils  are  to  be  corrected,  not  by  functional  psychology, 
but  by  an  empirical  criticism  of  each  method  and  each  problem 
as  it  arises. 

It  has  been  seen  that,  even  in  these  more  constructive  essays, 
Dewey's  position  is  largely  defined  in  negatives.  What  might 
be  expected,  then,  of  the  essays  which  are  primarily  critical? 
Perhaps  the  best  answer  will  be  afforded  by  a  close  analysis  of 
one  or  more  of  them.  Idealism,  as  has  been  said,  receives  most 
of  Dewey's  attention.  There  are  three  essays  in  The  Influence 
of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  which  bear  directly  against  idealism. 
One,  "The  Intellectualist  Criterion  of  Truth,"  is  directed  against 
Bradley;  another,  "Experience  and  Objective  Idealism,"  is  a 
historical  discussion  of  idealistic  views.  The  third,  which  is 
broadest  in  scope,  is  entitled  "Beliefs  and  Existences."  This 
was  originally  delivered  as  the  presidential  address  at  the  meeting 
of  the  American  Philosophical  Association  in  December,  1905, 
and  was  printed  in  the  Philosophical  Review  in  March,  1906, 
under  the  title,  "Beliefs  and  Realities." 

Dewey  begins  with  a  discussion  of  the  personal  and  human 
character  of  beliefs.  "Beliefs,"  he  says,  "look  both  ways, 
towards  persons  and  towards  things.  .  .  .  They  form  or  judge — 
justify  or  condemn — the  agents  who  entertain  them  and  who  in- 
sist upon  them.  ...  To  believe  is  to  ascribe  value,  impute 


98  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

meaning,  assign  import."1  Beliefs  are  entertained  by  persons; 
by  men  as  individuals  and  not  as  professional  beings.  Because 
they  are  essentially  human,  beliefs  issue  in  action,  and  have  their 
import  in  conduct.  "That  believed  better  is  held  to,  asserted, 
affirmed,  acted  upon.  .  .  .  That  believed  worse  is  fled,  resisted, 
transformed  into  an  instrument  for  the  better."2  Beliefs,  then, 
have  a  human  side;  they  belong  to  people,  and  have  a  character 
which  is  expressed  in  the  conduct  to  which  they  lead. 

On  the  other  hand,  beliefs  look  towards  things.  "Reality' 
naturally  instigates  belief.  It  appraises  itself  and  through  this 
self-appraisal  manages  its  affairs.  ...  It  is  interpretation;  not 
merely  existence  aware  of  itself  as  fact,  but  existence  discerning, 
judging  itself,  approving  and  disapproving."3  The  vital  con- 
nection between  belief  as  personal,  and  as  directed  upon  things, 
cannot  be  disregarded.  "We  cannot  keep  connection  on  one 
side  and  throw  it  away  on  the  other.  We  cannot  preserve 
significance  and  decline  the  personal  attitude  in  which  it  is 
inscribed  and  operative.  .  .  .  "4  To  take  the  world  as  some- 
thing existing  by  itself,  is  to  overlook  the  fact  that  it  is  always 
somebody's  world,  "  and  you  shall  not  have  completed  your 
metaphysics  till  you  have  told  whose  world  is  meant  and  how 
and  what  for — in  what  bias  and  to  what  effect."5 

But  philosophers  have  been  guilty  of  error  here.  They  have 
thrown  aside  all  consideration  of  belief  as  a  personal  fact  in 
reality,  and  have  taken  "an  oath  of  allegiance  to  Reality,  ob- 
jective, universal,  complete;  made  perhaps  of  atoms,  perhaps  of 
sensations,  perhaps  of  logical  meanings."6  This  Reality  leaves 
no  place  for  belief;  for  belief,  as  having  to  do  with  human  ad- 
ventures, can  have  no  place  in  a  cut  and  dried  cosmos.  The 
search  for  a  world  which  is  eternally  fixed  in  eternal  meanings  has 
developed  the  present  wondrous  and  formidable  technique  of 
philosophy. 

1  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  169. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  170. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  171. 

4  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  172. 


THE   POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  99 

The  attempt  to  exclude  the  human  element  from  belief  has 
resulted  in  philosophical  errors.  Philosophers  have  divided 
reality  into  two  parts,  "one  of  which  shall  alone  be  good  and 
true  'Reality/  .  .  .  while  the  other  part,  that  which  is  excluded, 
shall  be  referred  exclusively  to  belief  and  treated  as  mere  ap- 
pearance. .  .  .  ni  To  cap  the  climax,  this  division  of  the  world 
into  two  parts  must  be  made  by  some  philosopher  who,  being 
human,  employs  his  own  beliefs,  and  classifies  things  on  the  basis 
of  his  own  experience.  Can  it  be  done?  We  are  today  in  the 
presence  of  a  revolt  against  such  tendencies,  Dewey  says ;  and  he 
proposes  to  give  some  sketch,  "(i)  of  the  historical  tendencies 
which  have  shaped  the  situation  in  which  a  Stoic  theory  of 
knowledge  claims  metaphysical  monopoly,  and  (2)  of  the  tenden- 
cies that  have  furnished  the  despised  principle  of  belief  oppor- 
tunity and  means  of  reassertion."2 

Throughout  this  introduction  Dewey  speaks  with  considerable 
feeling,  as  if  the  question  were  a  moral  one,  rather  than  a  dis- 
quisition concerning  the  best  method  of  dealing  with  the  personal 
aspects  of  thought.  His  meaning,  however,  is  far  from  being 
apparent.  What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  a  Stoic  theory  of 
knowledge  holds  a  monopoly  in  modern  philosophy?  In  what 
sense  has  the  philosophy  of  the  past  been  misanthropic?  Is 
Humanism  a  product  of  the  twentieth  century?  Dewey 's 
assertions  are  broad  and  sweeping ;  too  broad  even  for  a  popular 
discourse,  let  alone  a  philosophical  address.  Perhaps  his  attitude 
will  be  more  fully  expressed  in  the  historical  inquiry  which  follows. 

Dewey  begins  this  inquiry  with  the  period  of  the  rise  of  Chris- 
tianity, which,  because  it  emphasized  faith  and  the  personal 
attitude,  seemed  in  a  fair  way  to  do  justice  to  human  belief. 
"That  the  ultimate  principle  of  conduct  is  affectional  and 
volitional;  that  God  is  love;  that  access  to  the  principle  is  by 
faith,  a  personal  attitude;  that  belief,  surpassing  logical  basis 
and  warrant,  works  out  through  its  own  operation  its  own  ful- 
filling evidence :  such  was  the  implied  moral  metaphysic  of  Chris- 
tianity."3 But  these  implications  had  to  be  worked  out  into  a 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  175. 
zlbid.,  p.  177. 
zlbid.,  p.  173. 


100  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

theory,  and  the  only  logical  or  metaphysical  systems  which 
offered  themselves  as  a  basis  for  organization  were  those  Stoic 
systems  which  "identified  true  existence  with  the  proper  object 
of  logical  reason."  Aristotle  alone  among  the  ancients  gave 
practical  thought  its  due  attention,  but  he,  unfortunately,  failed 
to  assimilate  "his  idea  of  theoretical  to  his  notion  of  practical 
knowledge."1  In  the  Greek  systems  generally,  "desiring  reason 
culminating  in  beliefs  relating  to  imperfect  existence,  stands 
forever  in  contrast  with  passionless  reason  functioning  in  pure 
knowledge,  logically  complete,  of  perfect  being."2 

Dewey's  discussion  moves  too  rapidly  here  to  be  convincing. 
He  does  not  take  time,  for  instance,  to  make  a  very  important 
distinction  between  the  Greek  and  Hellenistic  philosophies. 
He  does  not  do  justice  to  the  purpose  which  animated  the  Greeks 
in  their  attempt  to  put  thought  on  a  'theoretical'  basis.  His 
confusion  of  Platonism  with  Neo-Platonism  is  especially  annoy- 
ing. And,  most  assuredly,  his  estimate  of  primitive  Christianity 
needs  corroboration.  Probably  Christianity,  in  its  primitive 
form,  did  lay  great  stress  upon  individual  beliefs  and  persuasions, 
but  it  was  expected,  nevertheless,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  working 
in  men  would  produce  uniform  results  in  the  way  of  belief. 
When  the  uniformity  failed  to  materialize,  Christianity  was 
forced,  in  the  interests  of  union,  to  fall  back  upon  some  objective 
standard  by  which  belief  could  be  tested.  After  this  was  estab- 
lished, an  end  was  made  of  individual  inspiration.  From  the 
earliest  times,  therefore,  it  may  be  said,  Christianity  sought 
means  for  the  suppression  of  free  inquiry  and  belief,  a  proceeding 
utterly  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  ancient  Greece. 

"I  need  not  remind  you,"  Dewey  continues,  "how  through 
Neo-Platonism,  St.  Augustine,  and  the  Scholastic  renaissance, 
these  conceptions  became  imbedded  in  Christian  philosophy; 
and  what  a  reversal  occurred  of  the  original  practical  principle  of 
Christianity.  Belief  is  henceforth  important  because  it  is  the 
mere  antecedent  in  a  finite  and  fallen  world,  a  temporal  and 
phenomenal  world  infected  with  non-being,  of  true  knowledge  to 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  179. 

2  Ibid. 


THE  POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  IOI 

be  achieved  only  in  a  world  of  completed  Being."1  Through  the 
hundreds  of  years  that  intervened  before  the  world's  awakening, 
the  'Stoic  dogma,'  enforced  by  authority,  held  the  world  in  thrall. 
And  still  Dewey  finds  the  mediaeval  Absolutism  in  many  re- 
spects more  merciful  than  the  Absolutism  of  modern  philosophy. 
"For  my  part,  I  can  but  think  that  mediaeval  absolutism,  with 
its  provision  for  authoritative  supernatural  assistance  in  this 
world  and  assertion  of  supernatural  realization  in  the  next,  was 
more  logical,  as  well  as  more  humane,  then  the  modern  absolut- 
ism, that,  with  the  same  logical  premises,  bids  man  find  adequate 
consolation  and  support  in  the  fact  that,  after  all,  his  strivings 
are  already  eternally  fulfilled,  his  errors  already  eternally  trans- 
cended, his  partial  beliefs  already  eternally  comprehended."2 
Dewey  takes  no  note  of  the  fact  that  philosophy,  as  involving 
really  free  inquiry,  was  dead  during  the  whole  period  of  mediaeval 
predominance. 

The  modern  age,  Dewey  continues,  brought  intelligence  back 
to  earth  again,  but  only  partially.  Fixed  being  was  still  sup- 
posed to  be  the  object  of  thought.  "The  principle  of  the  in- 
herent relation  of  thought  to  being  was  preserved  intact,  but  its 
practical  locus  was  moved  down  from  the  next  world  to  this."3 
Aristotle's  mode  of  dealing  with  the  Platonic  ideas  was  followed, 
and  Spinoza  was  the  great  exponent  of  "the  strict  correlation  of 
the  attribute  of  matter  with  the  attribute  of  thought." 

But,  again,  the  modern  conception  of  knowledge  failed  to  do 
justice  to  belief,  in  spite  of  the  compromise  that  gave  the  natural 
world  to  intelligence,  and  the  spiritual  world  to  faith.  This 
compromise  could  not  endure,  for  Science  encroached  upon  the 
field  of  religious  belief,  and  invaded  the  sphere  of  the  personal 
and  emotional.  "Knowledge,  in  its  general  theory,  as  philoso- 
phy, went  the  same  way.  It  was  pre-committed  to  the  old 
notion:  the  absolutely  real  is  the  object  of  knowledge,  and  hence  is 
something  universal  and  impersonal.  So,  whether  by  the  road 
of  sensationalism  or  rationalism,  by  the  path  of  mechanicalism 
or  objective  idealism,  it  came  about  that  concrete  selves,  specific 

1  op.  dt. 

2  Ibid.,   p.    1 80. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  181. 


102  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

feeling  and  willing  beings,  were  relegated  with  the  beliefs  in 
which  they  declare  themselves  to  the  'phenomenal.'"1  Feeling, 
volition,  desiring  thought  have  never  received  the  justice  due 
them  in  the  whole  course  of  philosophy.  This  is  Dewey's  con- 
clusion. Little  can  be  said  in  praise  of  his  historical  survey. 
There  is  scarcely  a  statement  to  which  exception  could  not  be 
taken,  for  the  history  of  philosophy  is  not  amenable  to  generalized 
treatment  of  this  character. 

The  reader  turns  more  hopefully  toward  the  third  part  of  the 
essay,  in  which  he  is  promised  a  positive  statement  of  the  new 
theory  which  does  full  justice  to  belief.  "First,  then,  the  very 
use  of  the  knowledge  standpoint,  the  very  expression  of  the 
knowledge  preoccupation,  has  produced  methods  and  tests  that, 
when  formulated,  intimate  a  radically  different  conception  of 
knowledge,  and  of  its  relation  to  existence  and  belief,  than  the 
orthodox  one."2 

But  after  this  not  unpromising  introduction,  Dewey  falls  into 
the  polemical  strain  again.  The  argument  need  not  be  followed 
in  detail,  since  it  consists  largely  in  a  reassertion  of  the  validity 
of  belief  as  an  element  in  knowledge.  The  general  conclusion  is 
that  modern  scientific  investigation  reveals  itself,  when  exam- 
ined, as  nothing  more  that  the  "rendering  into  a  systematic 
technique,  into  an  art  deliberately  and  delightfully  pursued,  the 
rougher  and  cruder  means  by  which  practical  human  beings  have 
in  all  ages  worked  out  the  implications  of  their  beliefs,  tested 
them,  and  endeavored  in  the  interests  of  economy,  efficiency, 
and  freedom,  to  render  them  coherent  with  one  another."3 
This  is  presumably  true.  If  no  more  is  implied  than  is  definitely 
asserted  in  this  passage,  the  reader  is  apt  to  wonder  who  would 
deny  it. 

Dewey  again  claims  for  his  theory  the  support  of  modern 
science.  "Biology,  psychology,  and  the  social  sciences  proffer 
an  imposing  body  of  concrete  facts  that  also  point  to  the  re- 
habilitation of  belief.  .  .  .  "4  Psychology  has  revised  its 

1Op.  cit.,  p.  183. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  184. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  187. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  189. 


THE  POLEMICAL  PERIOD.  103 

notions  in  terms  of  beliefs.  '  Motor '  is  writ  large  on  the  face  of 
sensation,  perception,  conception,  cognition  in  general.  Biology 
shows  that  the  organic  instruments  of  the  intellectual  life  were 
evolved  for  specifically  practical  purposes.  The  historical 
sciences  show  that  knowledge  is  a  social  instrument  for  the 
purpose  of  meeting  social  needs.  This  testimony  is  not  philoso- 
phy, Dewey  says,  but  it  has  a  bearing  on  philosophy.  The  new 
sciences  have  at  least  as  much  importance  as  mathematics  and 
physics.  "Such  being  the  case,  the  reasons  for  ruling  psychology 
and  sociology  and  allied  sciences  out  of  competency  to  give 
philosophic  testimony  have  more  significance  than  the  bare 
denial  of  jurisdiction."1  The  idealists,  apparently,  have  been 
the  worst  offenders  in  this  connection.  "One  would  be  almost 
justified  in  construing  idealism  as  a  Pickwickian  scheme,  so 
willing  is  it  to  idealize  the  principle  of  intelligence  at  the  expense 
of  its  specific  undertakings,  were  it  not  that  this  reluctance  is 
the  necessary  outcome  of  the  Stoic  basis  and  tenor  of  idealism — 
its  preoccupation  with  logical  contents  and  relations  in  abstrac- 
tion from  their  situs  and  function  in  conscious  living  beings."2 

In  conclusion,  Dewey  warns  against  certain  possible  misunder- 
standings. The  pragmatic  philosopher,  he  says,  is  not  opposed 
to  objective  realities,  and  logical  and  universal  thinking.  Again, 
it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  science  is  any  the  less  exact  by  reason 
of  being  instrumental  to  human  beliefs.  "Because  reason  is  a 
scheme  of  working  out  the  meanings  of  convictions  in  terms  of 
one  another  and  of  the  consequences  they  import  in  further  ex- 
perience, convictions  are  the  more,  not  the  less,  amenable  and 
responsible  to  the  full  exercise  of  reason."3  And  finally,  Dewey 
assures  the  reader  that  the  outcome  of  his  discussion  is  not  a 
solution,  but  a  problem.  Nobody  is  apt  to  dispute  that  state- 
ment. 

This  very  unsatisfactory  essay  is,  nevertheless,  a  fair  specimen 
of  the  polemical  literature  which  was  produced  by  Dewey  and 
others  during  these  years.  Pragmatism  was  trying  to  make 
converts,  and  the  argumentum  ad  hominem  was  freely  employed. 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  190. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  191  f. 
3 1  bid.,  p.  194. 


104  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

If  the  opposition  was  painted  a  good  deal  blacker  than  was 
necessary,  the  end  was  supposed  to  justify  the  evident  exaggera- 
tion. And  so,  in  this  essay,  after  accusing  his  contemporaries  of 
adherence  to  tenets  that  they  would  have  indignantly  repudiated, 
after  a  wholesale  and  indiscrimate  condemnation  of  idealism, 
Dewey  concludes  with — a  problem.  This  period  of  propaganda 
is  now  quite  definitely  a  thing  of  the  past.  Philosophical  dis- 
cussion, especially  since  the  beginning  of  the  great  war,  has 
entered  upon  a  new  epoch  of  sanity,  and,  perhaps,  of  constructive 
effort. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

LATER   DEVELOPMENTS 

NEO-REALISM  began  to  flourish  in  this  country  after  1900,  its 
rise  being  nearly  contemporary  with  the  spread  of  pragmatism. 
Many  neo-realists,  indeed,  consider  themselves  followers  of 
James.  Dewey  views  the  new  realism,  along  with  pragmatism 
and  'naturalistic  idealism/  as  "part  and  parcel  of  a  general 
movement  of  intellectual  reconstruction."1  The  neo-realists, 
like  the  pragmatists,  have  been  active  in  the  field  of  controversy, 
and  the  pages  of  the  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and 
Scientific  Methods  are  filled  with  exchanges  between  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  two  schools,  in  the  form  of  notes,  articles,  dis- 
cussions, agreements,  and  disclaimers.  Dewey  has  more  sym- 
pathy for  realism  than  for  idealism.  He  finds  among  the  writers 
of  this  school,  however,  a  tendency  toward  the  epistemological 
interpretation  of  thought  which  he  so  strongly  opposes.  An 
excellent  statement  of  his  estimate  of  realism  is  furnished  by  his 
"Brief  Studies  in  Realism,"  published  in  the  Journal  of  Philoso- 
phy, Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  in  191 1.2 

In  beginning  these  studies  Dewey  observes  that  certain  ideal- 
istic writers  (not  named)  have  been  employing  in  support  of  their 
idealism  certain  facts  which  have  an  obvious  physical  nature  and 
explanation.  Such  illusions  as  that  of  the  bent  stick  in  the  water, 
the  converging  railway  tracks,  and  the  double  image  that  occurs 
when  the  eye-ball  is  pressed,  have,  as  the  realists  have  well 
proved,  a  physical  explanation  which  is  entirely  adequate. 
Why  is  it  that  the  idealists  remain  unimpressed  by  this  demon- 
stration? There  is  a  certain  element  in  the  realistic  explanation 
which  undoubtedly  explains  the  reluctance  of  the  idealists  to  be 
convinced.  "Many  realists,  in  offering  the  type  of  explanation 

1  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  Introduction,  p.  iv. 

2  Vol.  VIII:    "I.  Naive  Realism  vs.  Presentative  Realism,"  pp.  393-400.     "II. 
Epistemological  Realism:     The  Alleged  Ubiquity  of  the  Knowledge  Relation," 
pp.  546-554. 

105 


106  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

adduced  above,  have  treated  the  cases  of  seen  light,  doubled 
imagery,  as  perception  in  a  way  that  ascribes  to  perception  an 
inherent  cognitive  status.  They  have  treated  the  perceptions 
as  cases  of  knowledge,  instead  of  as  simply  natural  events.  .  .  .  MI 
Dewey  draws  a  distinction,  at  this  point,  between  naive  and 
presentative  realism,  employing,  by  way  of  illustration,  the  'star' 
illusion,  which  turns  upon  the  peculiar  fact  that  a  star  may  be 
seen  upon  the  earth  long  after  it  has  ceased  to  exist.  The  naive 
realist  remains  in  the  sphere  of  natural  explanation.  He  ac- 
counts for  the  star  illusion  in  physical  terms.  The  astronomical 
star  and  the  perceived  star  are  two  physical  events  within  a 
continuous  physical  order  or  process.  But  the  presentative 
realist  maintains  that,  since  the  two  stars  are  numerically  separ- 
ate, the  astronomical  star  must  be  the  '  real '  star,  while  the  per- 
ceived star  is  merely  mental ;  the  real  star  exists  in  independence 
of  a  knowing  subject,  while  the  perceived  star  is  related  to  a 
mind.  The  naive  realist  has  no  need  of  the  hypothesis  of  a 
knower,  since  he  can  furnish  an  adequate  physical  account  of  the 
numerical  duplicity  of  the  star.  Dewey  favors  the  nai've  stand- 
point, and  affirms  that  presentative  realism  is  tainted  by  an 
epistemological  subjectivism.  "Once  depart,"  he  says,  "from 
this  thorough  naivete,  and  substitute  for  it  the  psychological 
theory  that  perception  is  a  cognitive  presentation  of  an  object 
to  a  mind,  and  the  first  step  is  taken  on  the  road  which  ends  in 
an  idealistic  system."2 

The  presentative  realist,  Dewey  continues,  finds  himself  pos- 
sessed of  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  when  he  comes  to  take  account 
of  inference;  for  inference  is  "in  the  field  as  an  obvious  and  un- 
disputed case  of  knowledge."  There  is  the  knowledge  of  per- 
i  ception  by  a  knower,  and  the  inferential  knowledge  which  passes 
beyond  perception.  All  reality,  consequently,  is  related,  directly 
or  indirectly,  to  the  knowing  subject,  and  idealism  is  triumphant. 
But  the  real  difficulty  of  the  realist's  position  is  that,  if  perception 
is  a  mode  of  knowing,  it  stands  in  unfavorable  contrast  with 
knowledge  by  inference.  How  can  the  inferred  reality  of  the 

1  op.  dt.,  p.  395. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  397. 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  107 

star  be  established,  considering  the  subjectivity  of  all  perception? 

Dewey  is  alert  to  the  dangers  which  result  from  subjectivism, 
but  does  not  distinguish,  as  carefully  as  he  might,  between  know- 
ledge as  inference,  and  knowledge  as  perceptual  awareness. 
Thus,  while  it  might  be  granted  that  the  subjective  mind  is  a 
vicious  abstraction,  it  does  not  follow  that  Dewey's  particular 
interpretation  of  the  function  of  inference  is  correct.  And, 
although  the  "unwinking,  unremitting  eye"  of  the  subjective 
knower  might  make  experience  merely  a  mental  affair,  there  is 
no  reason  to  believe  that  the  operation  of  inference  in  perception 
would  lead  to  the  same  result,  for  inference  and  awareness  are 
quite  distinct,  in  historical  meaning  and  function.  It  is,  in 
fact,  a  mere  accident  that  inference  and  awareness  (in  the  sub- 
jective sense)  should  both  be  called  knowledge. 

In  opposition  to  presentative  realism,  Dewey  offers  his  'natural- 
istic' interpretation  of  knowledge.1  He  finds  that  the  function 
of  inference,  "although  embodying  the  logical  relation,  is  itself 
a  natural  and  specifically  detectable  process  among  natural 
things — it  is  not  a  non-natural  or  epistemological  relation,  that 
is,  a  relation  to  a  mind  or  knower  not  in  the  natural  series.  .  .  ."2 
As  has  been  observed,  Dewey  is  safe  in  maintaining  that  in- 
ference is  not  an  operation  performed  by  a  subjective  knower,  but 
it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  his  interpretation  of  inference  is 
correct.  In  fact,  a  discussion  of  inference  is  irrelevant  to  the 
matters  which  Dewey  is  here  considering. 

In  the  second  part  of  the  essay,  the  discussion  passes  into  a 
keen  and  rather  clever  recital  of  the  difficulties  that  result  from 
taking  the  knowledge  relation  to  be  'ubiquitous.'3  Since  this 

1  In  this  connection  Dewey's  disagreements  with  Professor  McGilvary  are  of 
especial  interest.     See  especially  McGilvary's  article,  "Pure  Experience  and  Real- 
ity" (Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XVI,  1907,  pp.  266-284)  and  Dewey's  reply,  to- 
gether with   McGilvary's  rejoinder   (Ibid.,   pp.   419-424).     McGilvary  failed  to 
understand  that  Dewey's  argument  was  conducted  on  a  purely  '  naturalistic '  basis, 
an  almost  inevitable  error,  in  view  of  Dewey's  practical  identification  of  psychology, 
biology,  and  logic. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  399- 

3  Dewey  is  here  dealing  with  the  ' epistemological'  realists,  among  whom  he 
includes  such  writers  as  Bertrand  Russell.     In  an  article  entitled  "The  Existence 
of  the  World  as  a  Problem"  (Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXIV,  1915.  PP-  357-37O), 
Dewey  argues  that  Russell,  in  making  a  problem  of  the  existence  of  the  external 


108  JOHN  DEWEY' S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

relation  is  a  constant  factor  in  experience,  it  would  seem  as  if  it 
might  be  eliminated  from  philosophical  calculations.  The 
realist  would  be  glad  to  eliminate  it,  but  the  idealist  is  not  so 
willing;  for,  "since  the  point  at  issue  is  precisely  the  statement  of 
the  most  universally  defining  trait  of  existence  as  existence,  the 
invitation  deliberately  to  disregard  the  most  universal  trait 
is  nothing  more  or  less  than  an  invitation  to  philosophic  sui- 
cide."1 It  is,  Dewey  says,  as  if  two  philosophers  should  set 
out  to  ascertain  the  relation  which  holds  between  an  organism  as 
'eater'  and  the  environment  as  'food,'  and  one  should  find  the 
essential  thing  to  be  the  food,  the  other  the  eating.  The  '  food- 
ists'  would  represent  the  realists,  the  'eaterists'  the  idealists. 
No  advance,  he  believes,  can  be  made  on  this  basis. 

In  opposition  to  the  epistemologists,  Dewey  would  consider 
the  knowledge  relation  not  ubiquitous,  but  specific  and  occa- 
sional. As  man  bears  other  relations  to  his  environment  than 
that  of  eater,  so  is  he  also  something  more  than  a  knower.  "  If 
the  one  who  is  knower  is,  in  relation  to  objects,  something  else 
and  more  than  their  knower,  and  if  objects  are,  in  relation  to  the 
one  who  knows  them,  something  else  and  other  than  things  in  a 
knowledge  relation,  there  is  somewhat  to  define  and  discuss. 
.  .  .  "2  Dewey  proposes  to  advance  certain  facts  to  support  his 
contention  that  knowing  is  "a  relation  to  things  which  depends 
upon  other  and  more  primary  connections  between  a  self  and 
things ;  a  relation  which  grows  out  of  these  more  fundamental 
connections  and  which  operates  in  their  interests  at  specifiable 
crises."3 

This  brings  the  discussion  back  to  familiar  ground  again,  and 
nothing  is  added  to  his  previous  statements  of  the  functional 
conception  of  knowledge.  While  the  realist  (explicitly  or  im- 
plicitly) conceives  the  knowledge  relation  as  obtaining  between  a 
subject  knower  and  the  external  world,  Dewey  interprets  the 

world,  implies  its  existence  in  his  formulation  of  the  problem.  Dewey  argues  that, 
since  the  existence  of  the  world  is  presupposed  in  every  such  formulation,  it  cannot 
be  called  in  question.  This  is  like  disposing  of  Zeno's  paradox  on  the  ground  that 
arrows  fly  anyway. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  548. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  552. 

3  Ibid. 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  109 

knowledge  relation  in  terms  of  organism  and  environment. 
The  'ubiquity'  of  the  knowledge  relation  is  disposed  of,  as  has 
been  seen,  by  conceiving  knowledge  from  an  entirely  different 
standpoint;  by  reducing  all  knowledge  to  inference,  and  abolish- 
ing the  knowing  subject.  Dewey  is  plainly  under  the  impression 
that  the  only  alternative  to  the  ubiquitous  knower  is  his  natural- 
istic, biological  interpretation  of  the  processes  of  inference. 

In  support  of  his  naturalistic  logic,  Dewey  argues  as  follows: 
(i)  All  perception  involves  reference  to  an  organism.  "We 
might  about  as  well  talk  of  the  production  of  a  specimen  case  of 
water  as  a  presentation  of  water  to  hydrogen  as  talk  in  the  way  we 
are  only  too  accustomed  to  talk  about  perceptions  and  the  or- 
ganism."1 (2)  Awareness  is  only  a  single  phase  of  experience. 
We  'know'  only  a  small  part  of  the  causes  which  affect  us  as 
agents.  "This  means,  of  course,  that  things,  the  things  that 
come  to  be  known,  are  primarily  not  objects  of  awareness,  but 
causes  of  weal  and  woe,  things  to  get  and  things  to  avoid,  means 
and  obstacles,  tools  and  results."2  (3)  Knowing  is  only  a  special 
phase  of  the  behaver-enjoyer-sufferer  situation,  but  very  im- 
portant as  having  to  do  with  means  for  the  practical  and  scien- 
tific control  of  the  environment. 

In  the  final  analysis,  it  will  be  seen  that  Dewey  refutes  the 
realist  by  substituting  inference  for  what  the  realist  calls  'con- 
sciousness,' and  settling  the  issue  by  this  triumph  in  the  field  of 
dialectics,  rather  than  by  an  appeal  to  the  facts.  Nowhere  does 
Dewey  do  justice  to  those  concrete  situations  which,  to  the 
realist,  seem  to  necessitate  a  definition  of  consciousness  as  aware- 
ness. His  attitude  toward  the  realists  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
statement  that  he  finds  in  most  realistic  systems  the  fault  to 
which  his  logical  theory  is  especially  opposed:  the  tendency  to 
define  the  problem  of  logic  as  that  of  the  relation  oi'  thought  ar 
large  to  reality  at  large,  and  to  distinguish  the  content  of  mind 
from  the  content  of  the  world  on  an  existential  rather  than  on 
a  functional  basis. 

One  of  Dewey's  more  recent  studies,  "The  Logic  of  Judgments 

1  Op.  cit. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  553. 


HO  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL    THEORY. 

of  Practise,"1  seems  to  add  something  positive  to  his  interpre- 
tation of  knowledge.  A  practical  judgment,  Dewey  explains 
at  the  outset  of  this  study,  is  differentiated  from  others,  not  by 
having  a  separate  organ  and  source,  but  by  having  a  specific 
sort  of  subject-matter.  It  is  concerned  with  things  to  be  done 
or  situations  demanding  action.  "He  had  better  consult  a 
physician,"  and  "It  would  be  well  for  you  to  invest  in  these 
bonds,"  are  examples  of  the  practical  judgment. 

These  propositions,  as  will  be  seen,  are  not  cast  in  what  the 
logician  calls  logical  form,  with  regular  terms  and  copula.  When 
put  in  that  form,  they  seem  to  lose  the  direct  reference  to  action 
which,  Dewey  says,  differentiates  them  from  the  'descriptive* 
judgment  of  the  form  51  is  P.2  This  apparently  trivial  matter  is 
really  important.  Although  every  statement  embodies  judgment, 
some  statements  do  not  reflect  the  ground  upon  which  they  are 
asserted.  In  this  condition  they  may  be  viewed  as  opinions, 
suggestions,  or  guesses,  looking  towards  judgment  rather  than 
reflecting  its  results.  True  judgment  is  occupied  with  reasons, 
proofs,  and  grounds,  and  does  not  concern  itself  with  action  as 
action.  Only  when  taken  as  the  expression  of  an  individual's 
attitude,  do  Dewey 's  practical  judgments  (or  assertions)  possess 
the  direct  reference  to  action  which  he  selects  as  their  chief  char- 
acteristic. The  statement,  "You  ought  to  invest  in  these  bonds," 
does,  indeed,  suggest  a  specific  action,  but  in  so  doing  it  loses  its 
character  as  a  judgment.  Put  in  more  logical  form,  "You  are 
one  of  those  who  should  invest  in  these  bonds,"  the  proposition 
is  more  clearly  the  expression  of  a  judgment,  and  leads  back  to 
its  premises.  Attention  turns  from  specific  action  as  such  to 
action  as  a  typical  or  universal  fact.  In  short,  Dewey 's  practical 
judgment  is  not  a  true  judgment;  it  will  be  seen  that  it  is  studied, 
not  as  a  logical,  but  as  a  psychological  phenomenon. 

In  pursuance  of  his  psychological  method,  Dewey  discovers 
several  interesting  facts  about  judgments  of  practice,  (i) 
These  judgments  imply  an  incomplete  situation, — concretely 
and  specifically  incomplete;  they  express  a  need.  (2)  The  judg- 

1  Journal  of  Philosophy,   Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.   XII,    1915. 
Parts  I  and  II,  pp.  505-523;  Part  III,  pp.  533-543. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  506. 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  Ill 

ment  is  itself  a  factor  in  assisting  toward  the  completion  of  the 
situation,  since  it  directs  an  action  necessary  to  the  fulfilment 
of  the  need.  (3)  The  subject-matter  of  the  judgment  expresses 
the  fact  that  one  outcome  is  to  be  preferred  to  another.  The 
element  of  preference  is  peculiar  to  the  practical  judgment,  for 
it  is  not  found  in  merely  descriptive  judgments,  or  those  'con- 
fined to  the  given.'  (4)  A  practical  judgment  implies  both  means 
and  end,  the  act  that  completes,  and  the  completeness.  It  is  in 
this  respect  'binary.'  (5)  The  judgment  of  what  is  to  be  done 
demands  an  accurate  statement  of  the  course  of  action  to  be 
pursued  and  the  means  to  be  employed,  and  these  are  to  be  de- 
termined relatively  to  the  end  in  view.  (6)  It  finally  appears 
that  what  is  true  of  the  practical  judgment  may  be  true  of  all 
judgments  of  fact;  it  may  be  held  that  "all  judgments  of  fact 
have  reference  to  a  determination  of  courses  of  action  to  be  tried 
and  the  discovery  of  means  for  their  attempted  realization."1 

This  ingenious  reading  of  functionalism  out  of  the  practical 
judgment  is,  after  all,  merely  a  drawing  forth  of  the  psychological 
implications  previously  placed  in  it.  That  judgment  is  an  in- 
strument for  completing  a  situation;  that  it  is  linked  up  with 
action  through  desire  and  preference;  that  it  seeks  to  determine 
the  means  for  effecting  a  practical  outcome, — these  typically 
instrumental  notions  are  of  one  piece  with  the  system  of  belief 
that  led  Dewey  to  hit  upon  the  practical  judgment  as  the  em- 
bodiment of  a  direction  to  action.  It  is  important  to  distinguish 
between  the  logical  and  the  psychological  aspects  of  these 
propositions.  Action  as  psychological  is  one  thing;  as  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  judgment,  it  is  another.  In  coming  to  a  decision 
as  to  how  to  act,  the  agent  sets  his  proposed  action  over  against 
himself,  and  considers  it  in  its  universal  and  typical  character. 
His  motor  tendencies,  his  feelings,  his  desires  factor  in  the  situa- 
tion psychologically  considered;  but  they  do  not  enter  judgment 
as  psychological  facts,  but  rather,  if  at  all,  as  data  which  have 
a  significance  beyond  their  mere  particularity.  Dewey  remains 
at  the  psychological  standpoint,  giving  no  attention  to  the  genu- 
inely logical  aspects  of  his  'judgments  of  practice.' 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  511. 


112  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

From  the  study  of  the  practical  judgment,  Dewey  passes  on 
to  a  consideration  of  judgments  of  value,  proposing  to  maintain 
that  "value  judgments  are  a  species  of  practical  judgments."1 
There  will  be  a  distinct  gain  for  moral  and  economic  theory,  he 
believes,  in  treating  value  as  concerned  with  acts  necessary  to 
complete  a  given  need-situation.  There  is  no  obvious  reason 
why  Dewey  should  pass  to  the  pragmatic  theory  of  value  through 
the  medium  of  the  practical  judgment,  since  it  could  be  directly 
considered  on  its  own  account.  At  any  rate,  the  discussion  of 
value  judgments  which  follows  must  stand  on  its  own  merits;  it 
has  no  vital  relation  to  what  precedes. 

It  is,  as  usual,  the  psychological  characteristics  of  the  value 
judgment  that  attract  Dewey 's  attention.  Any  process  of 
judgment,  according  to  his  analysis,  deals  with  a  specific  subject- 
matter,  not  from  the  standpoint  of  any  objective  quality  it  may 
possess,  but  with  reference  to  its  functional  capacity.  "  Relative, 
or  comparative,  durability,  cheapness,  suitability,  style,  esthetic 
attractiveness  [e.  g.,  in  a  suit  of  clothes]  constitute  value  traits. 
They  are  traits  of  objects  not  per  se,  but  as  entering  into  a  possible 
and  foreseen  completing  of  the  situation.  Their  value  is  their 
force  in  precisely  this  function."2 

Attention  should  not  be  distracted  from  this  interpretation  of 
value,  Dewey  warns,  through  confusing  the  value  sought  with 
the  price  or  market  value  of  the  goods.  Price  values,  like  the 
qualities  and  patterns  of  the  goods,  are  data  which  must  be  con- 
sidered in  making  the  judgment,  but  they  are  not  the  values  which 
the  judgment  seeks.  The  value  to  be  determined  is  here,  is 
specific,  and  must  be  established  by  reference  to  the  specific  or 
psychological  situation  as  it  presents  itself. 

It  is  true,  as  Dewey  says,  that  in  judgment  a  value  is  being 
established  which  has  not  been  determined  previously.  But  it 
must  be  insisted  that  this  value  is  not  estimated  by  reference  to 
the  specific  situation  in  its  limited  aspects.  The  weight  of  the 
past  bears  against  the  moment;  the  act  of  judgment  bases  itself 
upon  knowledge  objective  and  substantial;  the  test  of  the  value 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  514. 

*lbid.,  p.  515. 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  113 

of  the  thing  is  its  place  and  function,  not  in  the  here  and  now,  but 
in  the  whole  system  of  experience.  Dewey  has  excluded  the 
reference  of  the  thing  to  objective,  organized  reality,  by  specify- 
ing that  its  value  shall  be  decided  upon  with  reference  to  a 
specific  situation.  This  limitation  of  the  judgment  situation  is 
imposed  upon  it  from  without,  and  from  a  special  point  of  view, — 
that  of  functional  psychology.  Every  object  and  every  situation 
has  its  quality  of  uniqueness  and  particularity;  but  the  judgment, 
as  judgment,  is  not  concerned  with  this  aspect  of  things.  Judg- 
ment seizes  upon  the  generic  aspect  of  objects;  this  kind  of  a 
suit  of  clothes  is  the  kind  that  is  appropriate  to  this  type  of 
situation.  The  movement  of  judgment  is  objective  and  uni- 
versal, not  subjective  and  psychological. 

Dewey  finds  one  alternative  especially  opposed  to  his  '  specific ' 
judgment  of  value;  that  is,  the  proposition  that  evaluation  in- 
volves a  comparison  of  the  present  object  with  some  fixed 
standard.  When  the  fixed  standard  is  investigated,  it  is  found 
to  depend  on  something  else,  and  this  on  something  else  again 
in  an  infinite  regress.  Finally,  the  Summum  Bonum,  as  the 
absolute  end  term  of  such  a  regressus,  turns  out  to  be  a  fiction. 
Dewey  is  quite  right  in  maintaining  that  value  is  not  something 
eternally  fixed.  This  does  not,  however,  remove  the  possibility 
of  '  real '  value,  as  opposed  to  mere  expediency. 

Value  as  established,  Dewey  continues,  must  be  taken  into 
consideration  in  making  a  value  judgment.  At  the  same  time, 
it  will  not  do  to  accept  the  established  value  from  mere  force 
of  habit.  Ultimately,  he  finds,  all  genuine  valuation  implies 
a  degree  of  revaluation.  "To  many,"  he  observes,  "it  will 
appear  to  be  a  survival  of  an  idealistic  epistemology,"1  pre- 
sumably because  it  implies  a  real  change  in  reality,  as  opposed  to 
a  fixed  and  rigid  order  of  external  reality.  But  practical  judg- 
ments, Dewey  says,  as  having  reference  to  proposed  acts,  neces- 
sarily look  toward  some  proposed  change  which  the  act  is  to 
effect.  It  is  not  in  an  epistemological,  but  in  a  practical  sense, 
that  judgment  involves  a  change  in  values. 

The  outcome  of  the  discussion  so  far,  Dewey  believes,  is  to 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  521. 


114  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

show,  first  of  all,  that  "the  passage  of  a  proposition  into  action 
is  not  a  miracle,  but  the  realization  of  its  own  character — its  own 
meaning  as  logical,"1  and,  in  the  second  place,  to  suggest  that  all 
judgments,  not  merely  practical  ones,  may  have  their  import  in 
reference  to  some  difference  to  be  brought  about  through  action. 

In  the  third  part  of  the  essay,  Dewey's  discussion  leads  him 
back  to  sense  perceptions  as  forms  of  practical  judgment.  There 
is  no  doubt,  in  his  mind,  that  many  perceptions  do  have  an  im- 
port for  action.  Not  merely  sign-posts,  and  familiar  symbols  of 
the  kind,  but  many  perceptions  lacking  this  obvious  reference, 
have  a  significance  for  conduct.  It  must  not,  of  course,  be  sup- 
posed that  all  perception,  at  any  one  time,  has  cognitive  proper- 
ties; for  some  of  the  perceptions  have  esthetic,  and  other  non- 
cognitive  properties.  Only  certain  elements  of  a  situation  have 
the  function  of  cognition. 

Dewey  goes  on  to  say  that  care  must  be  taken  in  the  use  made 
of  these  sign-functions  in  connection  with  inference.  "There 
is  a  great  difference  between  saying  that  the  perception  of  a  shape 
affords  an  indication  of  how  to  act  and  saying  that  the  perception 
of  shape  is  itself  an  inference."2  No  judgment,  Dewey  seems  to 
imply,  is  involved  in  responding  to  the  motor  cue  furnished  by  a 
familiar  object.  Again,  the  common  idea  that  present  percep- 
tion consists  of  sensations  as  immediate,  plus  inferred  images, 
implies  that  every  perception  involves  inference.  But  the 
'  merging  of  sensations  and  images  in  perception  can  be  explained 
naturally,  by  the  fusion  of  nervous  processes,  and  no  supple- 
mentary (transcendental)  act  of  mind  is  needed  to  explain  the 
integrity  of  experience. 

The  tendency  to  take  perception  as  the  object  of  knowledge, 
Dewey  continues,  instead  of  as  simply  cognitive,  a  term  in 
knowledge,  is  due  to  two  chief  causes.  The  first  is  that  in  prac- 
tical judgments  the  pointing  of  the  thing  towards  action  is  so 
universal  a  trait  as  to  be  overlooked,  and  the  second  is  that 
signs,  because  of  their  importance,  become  objects  of  study  on 
their  own  account,  and  in  this  condition  cease  to  function  directly 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  522  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  536. 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  115 

as  cognitive.  Dewey  means,  apparently,  that  because  the  cog- 
nitive aspect  of  things  is  never  attended  to  except  when  they  are 
'known,'  or  treated  as  objects  of  judgment,  there  is  a  tendency 
to  suppose  that  they  always  have  the  character  that  pertains  to 
them  as  'known'  things. 

Again,  Dewey  says,  perception  may  be  translated  as  the  effect 
of  a  cause  that  produced  it.  But  the  cause  does  not  ordinarily 
appear  in  experience,  and  the  perceptions,  as  effects,  remain 
isolated  from  the  system  of  things.  Truth  and  error  then  be- 
come matters  of  the  relation  of  the  perception  to  its  cause.  The 
difficulties  attendant  upon  this  view  can  be  avoided  by  taking 
sense  perceptions  as  terms  in  practical  judgments.  Here  the 
'other  term'  which  is  sought  is  the  action  proposed  by  the  per- 
ception. "To  borrow  an  illustration  of  Professor  Woodbridge's: 
A  certain  sound  indicates  to  the  mother  that  her  baby  needs 
attention.  If  there  is  error  it  is  not  because  the  sound  ought 
to  mean  so  many  vibrations  of  the  air,  while  as  matter  of  fact 
it  doesn't  even  suggest  air£  vibrations,  but  because  there  is  wrong 
inference  as  to  the  act  to  be  performed."1  The  idea  is  tested, 
not  by  its  correspondence  with  some  formal  reality,  but  by  its 
ability  to  lead  up  to  the  experience  to  which  it  points. 

From  the  consideration  of  error  as  cognitive,  Dewey  passes  on 
to  consider  its  status  as  primitive  sense  data.  He  draws  a  dis- 
tinction between  sensation  as  psychological  and  as  logical. 
Ordinary  sensation,  just  as  it  comes,  is  often  too  confused  to 
serve  as  a  basis  for  inference.  "It  has  often  been  pointed  out 
that  sense  qualities  being  just  what  they  are,  it  is  illegitimate  to 
introduce  such  notions  as  obscurity  or  confusion  into  them:  a 
slightly  illuminated  color  is  just  as  irretrievably  what  it  is,  as 
clearly  itself,  as  an  object  in  the  broad  glare  of  noon-day."2 
But  when  a  confused  object  is  made  a  datum  for  inference,  its 
confusion  is  just  the  thing  to  be  got  rid  of.  It  is  broken  up  by 
analysis  into  simple  elements,  and  the  psychologist's  sensations 
are  logical  products,  not  psychological  facts.  "Locke  writes  a 
mythology  of  the  history  of  knowledge,  starting  from  clear  and 

1Op.  cit.,  p.  538. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  540. 


116  JOHN  DEWEY1  S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

distinct  meanings,  each  simple,  well-defined,  sharply  and  un- 
ambiguously just  what  it  is  on  its  face,  without  concealments 
and  complications,  and  proceeds  by  '  natural '  compoundings  up 
to  the  store  of  complex  ideas,  and  the  perception  of  simple  re- 
lations of  agreement  among  ideas:  a  perception  always  certain 
if  the  ideas  are  simple,  and  always  controllable  in  the  case  of  the 
complex  ideas  if  we  consider  the  simple  ideas  and  connections  by 
which  they  are  reached.  Thus  he  established  the  habit  of  taking 
logical  discriminations  as  historical  or  psychological  primitives — 
as  '  sources '  of  beliefs  and  knowledge  instead  of  as  checks  upon 
inference."1  This  way  of  treating  perception  found  its  way  into 
psychology  and  into  empirical  logic.  The  acceptance  of  the 
doctrine  that  all  sense  involves  knowledge,  Dewey  believes, 
leads  to  an  epistemological  logic ;  but  all  perception  must  involve 
thought  if  the  'given'  is  the  simple  sensation. 

There  is  nothing  especially  new  in  this  critique  of  sensational- 
ism. Historically,  sensationalism  had  been  displaced  by  idealism, 
and  the  idea  that  reality  is  a  construct  of  ideas  held  together 
by  logical  relations  was  given  up  long  before  functionalism  ar- 
rived on  the  scene.  But  if  inference,  or  rationality,  is  not 
present  in  all  experience  as  the  combiner  of  simple  into  complex 
ideas,  it  may  be  present  in  some  other  form,  even  more  vital. 
Dewey,  however,  does  not  consider  such  possibilities. 

Finally,  in  an  article  of  slightly  earlier  date  than  the  studies 
which  have  just  been  considered,  Dewey  returns  to  a  considera- 
tion of  metaphysics,  and  the  possibility  of  a  metaphysical  stand- 
point in  philosophy.  This  article,  entitled  "The  Subject- 
Matter  of  Metaphysical  Inquiry,"2  deserves  careful  notice. 

The  comments  of  a  number  of  mechanistic  biologists  on 
vitalism  furnish  the  point  of  departure  for  Dewey 's  discussion. 
These  scientists  hold  that,  if  the  organism  is  considered  simply 
as  a  part  of  external  nature,  as  an  existing  system,  it  can 
be  satisfactorily  analyzed  by  the  methods  of  physico-chemical 
science.  But  if  the  question  of  ultimate  origins  is  raised,  if  it  be 
asked  why  nature  exhibits  certain  innate  potentialities  for  pro- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  541. 

2  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XII,  1915,  pp. 
337-345- 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  117 

ducing  life,  science  can  give  no  answer.  These  questions  belong 
to  metaphysics,  and  vitalistic  or  biocentric  conceptions  may  be 
valid  in  the  metaphysical  sphere. 

This  raises  the  question  of  the  nature  of  metaphysical  inquiry. 
Dewey  says  that  the  ultimate  traits  or  tendencies  which  give  rise 
to  life  need  not  necessarily  be  considered  ultimate  in  a  temporal 
sense.  On  the  contrary,  they  may  be  viewed  as  permanent, 
'irreducible  traits,'  which  are  ultimate  in  the  sense  of  being 
always  present  in  reality.  The  inquiry  and  search  for  these 
ultimate  traits  is  what  constitutes  valid  metaphysics.  "They 
are  found  equally  and  indifferently  whether  a  subject-matter  in 
question  be  dated  1915  or  ten  million  years  B.  C.  Accordingly, 
they  would  seem  to  deserve  the  name  of  ultimate,  or  irreducible, 
traits.  As  such  they  may  be  made  the  object  of  a  kind  of  inquiry 
differing  from  that  which  deals  with  the  genesis  of  a  particular 
group  of  existences,  a  kind  of  inquiry  to  which  the  name  meta- 
physical may  be  given."1 

The  irreducible  traits  which  Dewey  finds  are,  in  the  physical 
sciences,  plurality,  interaction,  and  change.  "These  traits  have 
to  be  begged  or  taken  in  any  case,"  for  wherever  and  whenever  we 
take  the  world,  we  must  explain  it  as  "a  plurality  of  diverse 
interacting  and  changing  existences. ' '2  The  evolutionary  sciences 
add  another  trait;  that  is,  evolution,  or  development  in  a  direc- 
tion. "For  evolution  appears  to  be  just  one  of  the  irreducible 
traits.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  fact  to  be  reckoned  with  in  con- 
sidering the  traits  of  diversity,  interaction,  and  change  which 
have  been  enumerated  as  among  the  traits  taken  for  granted  in 
all  scientific  subject-matter."3 

The  doctrine  that  plurality,  interaction,  change,  and  evolution 
are  permanent  traits  of  reality  gains  in  clearness  when  contrasted 
with  the  opposed  theories  which  involve  creation,  absolute 
origins,  or  temporal  ultimates.  The  term  'ultimate  origins' 
may  be  taken  in  a  merely  relative  sense  which  is  valid.  The 
French  language  has  an  origin  in  the  Latin  tongues,  which  is  an 
ultimate  origin  for  French,  but  this  is  not  an  absolutely  ultimate 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  340, 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  345. 


Il8  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

origin,  since  the  Latin  tongues,  in  their  turn,  have  origins.  It  is, 
for  instance,  meaningless  to  inquire  into  the  ultimate  origin  of 
the  world  as  a  whole ;  and  it  is  equally  futile  to  trace  any  part  of 
the  world  back  to  an  absolute  origin.  "That  scientific  inquiry 
does  not  itself  deal  with  any  question  of  ultimate  origins,  except 
in  the  purely  relative  sense  already  indicated,  is,  of  course,  recog- 
nized. But  it  also  seems  to  follow  from  what  has  been  said  that 
scientific  inquiry  does  not  generate,  or  leave  over,  such  a 
question  for  some  other  discipline,  such  as  metaphysics,  to  deal 
with."1 

Theories  like  that  of  Laplace,  for  instance,  trace  the  world 
back  to  an  origin  in  some  undifferentiated  universe;  or,  in  Spen- 
cer's terms,  some  state  of  homogeneity.  From  this  original 
state  the  world  is  said  to  evolve.  But  the  undifferentiated  mass 
lacks  the  plurality,  interaction,  and  change  which  are  presup- 
posed in  all  scientific  explanation.  These  traits  must  be  present 
before  development  can  occur.  "To  get  change  we  have  to 
assume  other  structures  which  interact  with  it,  existences  not 
covered  by  the  formula."2  In  short,  although  Dewey  only  im- 
plies this,  all  scientific  explanation  presupposes  a  system  of  inter- 
acting parts;  nothing  can  be  explained  by  reference  to  an  undif- 
ferentiated world  which  lacks  such  traits. 

Dewey  is  particularly  interested  in  the  origin  of  mind  or  intel- 
ligence. In  dealing  with  mind,  he  says,  we  must  begin  with  the 
present,  and  in  the  present  we  find  that  the  world  has  an  organi- 
zation, "in  spots,"  of  the  kind  we  call  intelligence.  This  existing 
intelligence  cannot  be  explained  by  any  theory  which  reduces  it 
to  something  inferior.  The  "attempt  to  give  an  account  of  any 
occurrence  involves  the  genuine  and  irreducible  existence  of  the 
thing  dealt  with."3  Mind  cannot  be  explained  by  being  explained 
away,  nor  can  it  be  explained  as  a  development  out  of  an  original 
source  in  which  the  potentiality,  or  direction  of  change  towards 
mind,  was  lacking. 

The  evolution  of  things,  Dewey  says,  is  a  real  fact,  and  is  to 
be  reckoned  with.  Moreover,  if  everything  that  exists  changes, 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  339. 

»I«d..p.343. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  344. 


LATER  DEVELOPMENTS.  119 

then  the  evolution  of  life  and  mind  surely  have  a  bearing  on  the 
nature  of  physico-chemical  things.  They  must  have  in  them  the 
trait  of  direction  of  change  towards  life  and  mind.  "To  say, 
accordingly,  that  the  existence  of  vital,  intellectual,  and  social 
organization  makes  impossible  a  purely  mechanistic  metaphysics 
is  to  say  something  which  the  situation  calls  for."1  In  other 
words,  the  world,  metaphysically  considered,  must  have  evolu- 
tion, as  well  as  the  physico-chemical  traits.  "Without  a  doctrine 
of  evolution  we  might  be  able  to  say,  not  that  matter  caused  life, 
but  that  matter  under  certain  conditions  of  highly  complicated 
and  intensified  interaction  is  living.  With  the  doctrine  of  evo- 
lution, we  can  add  to  this  statement  that  the  interactions  and 
changes  of  matter  are  themselves  of  a  kind  to  bring  about  that 
complex  and  intensified  interaction  which  is  life."2  Dewey 
holds  that  evolution  rests  upon  the  reality  of  time:  "time  itself, 
or  genuine  change  in  a  specific  direction,  is  itself  one  of  the  ulti- 
mate traits  of  the  world  irrespective  of  date."3 

This  article  presents  on  the  whole  a  distinct  advance  over  the 
position  taken  in  the  earlier  essay,  "Some  Implications  of  Anti- 
Intellectualism,"  which  was  reviewed  in  the  last  chapter.  Dewey 
is  not  now,  to  be  sure,  instituting  a  wholesale  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  being,  but  he  betrays  an  interest  in  the  general,  as 
opposed  to  the  specific  traits  of  reality.  He  inquires  into  the  real 
nature  of  the  world,  and  believes  that  he  discovers  its  ultimate 
traits.  This  essay,  of  course,  is  incomplete,  and  consequently 
indefinite  in  certain  important  respects.  It  may  be  said,  never- 
theless, to  give  an  accurate  view  of  the  metaphysical  back-ground 
against  which  all  of  Dewey's  theories  are  projected.  His  meta- 
physics, as  would  be  expected,  are  evolutionary  throughout,  and 
evolution  is  conceived,  where  he  is  at  all  definite,  in  biological 
terms. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  345. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid. 


CHAPTER   IX 

CONCLUSIONS 

DEWEY'S  interest  as  a  philosopher  centres,  from  first  to  last, 
upon  knowledge  and  the  knowing  process.  All  that  is  vital  in 
his  ethical,  social,  and  educational  theories  depends  ultimately 
upon  the  special  interpretation  of  the  function  of  knowledge  which 
constitutes  his  chief  claim  to  philosophical  distinction.  Dewey's 
logical  theory,  as  has  been  seen,  was  the  natural  and  inevitable 
outcome  of  his  demand  for  an  empirical  and  'psychological' 
description  of  thought  as  a  '  transformatory  '  process  working 
actual  changes  in  reality.  If  in  the  beginning  of  his  career  he 
found  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  all-important  for 
his  own  interests,  he  came  in  the  end  to  regard  it  as  the  problem 
of  problems  for  all  philosophers.  There  is  no  mistaking  Dewey's 
conviction  that  the  special  interpretation  of  knowledge  which  he 
advocates  opens  the  door  to  important  advances  in  philosophical 
,  speculation,  while  it  ends  all  discussion  of  those  pseudo-problems 
which  result  from  a  false,  epistemological  formulation  of  the 
function  of  knowledge. 

The  history  of  the  development  of  Dewey's  thought,  set  forth 
in  the  preceding  chapters,  does  not  pretend  to  furnish  an  adequate 
estimate  of  his  philosophical  system.  The  two  questions,  of 
origin  and  wWth,  are,  after  all,  distinct.  \The  genetic  account  of 
Dewey's  theory  of  knowledge  may  serve  to  make  its  bearings  and 
implications  better  understood,  may  reveal  its  deeper  meaning 
and  import,  but  the  final  estimate  of  its  value  as  a  philosophical 
hypothesis  depends  on  other  considerations.  In  this  final  chap- 
ter, it  is  proposed  to  deal  with  the  question  of  the 


of  functionalism  as  a  working  hypothesis.  This  criticism  may 
also  serve  to  gathertogether^tHe  threads  of  criticism  and  com- 
ment which  run  through  the  previous  chapters,  and  reveal  the 
general  ground  upon  which  the  writer's  opposition  to  Dewey's 
theory  is  based. 

120 


CONCLUSIONS.  121 

There  can  be  no  question  that  Dewey's  theory  of  knowledge 
rests,  finally,  upon  the  doctrine  of  '  immediate^-^^Bpiricism ;  * 
upon  his  belief  in  "the  necessity  of  employing  in  philosophy  the 
direct  descriptive  method  that  has  now  made  its  way  in  all  the 
natural  sciences.  .  .  .  "l  This  doctrine  is  clearly  stated  in  the 
first  essay  reviewed  in  this  study,  "The  Psychological  Stand- 
point" (1886).  To  quote  again  from  that  essay:  "The  psycho- 
logical standpoint  as  it  has  developed  itself  is  this:  all  that  is,  is 
for  consciousness  or  knowledge.  The  business  of  the  psychologist  | 
is  to  give  a  genetic  account  of  the  various  elements  within  this 
consciousness,  and  thereby  fix  their  place,  determine  their 
validity,  and  at  the  same  time  show  definitely  what  the  real  and 
eternal  nature  of  this  consciousness  is."2  The  descriptive  method 
here  advocated  does  not  differ,  as  an  actual  mode  of  procedure, 
from  that  of  Dewey's  later  empiricism.  It  lies  at  the  basis  of 
all  his  speculation,  earlier  as  well  as  later,  and  is  undoubtedly  the 
most  important  single  element  in  his  philosophical  system. 

In  "The  Psychological  Standpoint"  Dewey  ascribes  the 
failure  of  the  earlier  empiricists  to  their  desertion  of  the  direct 
descriptive  method  (a  criticism  repeated  frequently  in  later 
essays).  Locke,  for  instance,  instead  of  describing  experience 
as  it  actually  occurs,  interprets  it  in  terms  of  certain  assumed 
simple  sensations,  the  products  of  reflection.  These  non-ex- 
perienced elements,  Dewey  believes,  have  no  place  in  a  purely 
empirical  philosophy. 

But  the  empiricist  must  deal  in  some  manner  with  the  pro- 
ducts of  reflection.  The  atoms  of  chemistry  and  the  elements^  / 
of  the  psychologist  are  not  experienced  facts,  but  still  they  play 
a  valuable,  indispensable  role  in  the  technique  of  the  sciences. 
What  is  to  be  done  with  them?  It  must  be  made  to  appear  that 
they  are  valid  within  knowledge,  but  invalid  elsewhere.  This 
leads  to  a  separation  of  knowing  from  other  modes  of  experienc- 
ing, and  the  descriptive  method  is  depended  upon  to  maintain 
the  empirical  validity  of  the  separation.  It  has  been  seen  how 
Dewey's  attempt  to  interpret  knowledge  led  gradually  to  a  dis- 

1  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  240. 

2  Op.  cit.,  Mind,  Vol.  XI,  p.  8  f. 


122  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

tinction  between   the   'cognitional'   and   the   ' non-cognitional' 
processes  of  experience. 

The  completed  theory  of  knowledge  depends  for  its  validity 
upon  the  distinction  thus  established  between  knowing  (as 
reflective  thought)  and  the  practical  attitudes  of  life.  The 
concepts,  elements,  and  other  apparatus  of  reflection  are  em- 
ployed, it  is  said,  only  when  there  is  thinking, — and  this  is  only 
occasionally.  Theory  is  an  instrument  to  be  used  in  connection 
with  that  special  activity,  reflective  thought,  the  general  aim  of 
which  is  the  furtherance  of  the  practical  ends  of  life. 

One  fairly  obvious  difficulty  with  this  separation  of  reflection 
from  the  other  life  activities  is  that  the  'direct  descriptive 
method,'  as  here  employed,  is  itself  reflective.  How  does  it  come, 
then,  that  this  particular  method  achieves  such  an  effective 
hegemony  over  the  other  modes  of  reflection?  The  'descriptive 
method,'  as  the  method  of  pure  experience,  is  made  to  determine 
or  supplant  all  other  methods.  It  defines  the  limits  and  aims  of 
conceptual  systems;  it  marks  out  the  limits,  aims,  and  tests  of 
reflective  thought  in  general.  How,  it  may  be  asked,  does  the 
'direct  descriptive  method'  escape  the  limitations  which  it  im- 
poses upon  the  other  forms  of  reflective  thought? 

/It  has  been  seen  that  in  Dewey's  view  logic  is  subsidiary  to 
psychology.  But  psychology  (his  psychology)  results  from  the 
application  of  the  'descriptive  method'  to  experience.  The 
'descriptive  method,'  it  may  be  inferred  from  this,  is  not  subject 
to  logical  criticism.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  basis  of  all  logic. 
Logic,  as  the  criticism  of  categories,  is  confined  to  the  study  of 
the  instrumental  concepts  as  functioning  within  the  knowledge 
experience,  and  its  limits  are  set  by  descriptive  psychology. 
There  is,  apparently,  no  means  by  which  the  '  direct  descriptive 
method '  can  itself  be  brought  under  criticism. 

Dewey  says:  "By  our  postulate,  things  are  what  they  are 
experienced  to  be;  and,  unless  knowing  is  the  sole  and  only 
genuine  mode  of  experiencing,  it  is  fallacious  to  say  that  Reality 
is  just  and  exclusively  what  it  is  or  would  be  to  an  all-competent 
all-knower;  or  even  that  it  ist  relatively  and  piece-meal,  what  it 
is  to  a  finite  and  partial  knower."1  Reality  is  not  simply  what 

1  "The  Experimental  Method,"  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  228. 


CONCLUSIONS.  123 

it  is  known  as,  for  it  is  experienced  in  other  ways  than  by  being 
known.  "But  I  venture  to  repeat  that  .  .  .  the  inferential 
factor  must  exist,  or  must  occur,  and  that  all  existence  is  direct 
and  vital,  so  that  philosophy  can  pass  upon  its  nature — as  upon 
the  nature  of  all  of  the  rest  of  its  subject-matter — only  by  first 
ascertaining  what  it  exists  or  occurs  as.1'1 

Reflection,  then,  is  not  designed  to  furnish  an  insight  into  the 
nature  of  things.  Acquaintance  with  reality  must  be  obtained, 
not  by  reflecting  upon  it,  but  by  describing  it  as  it  occurs.  What- 
ever else  this  may  mean,  it  certainly  aims  at  demonstrating  the 
superiority  of  description  to  the  supposedly  less  effective  modes 
of  thought.  It  cannot  be  conceded,  however,  that  'description,' 
as  employed  by  Dewey,  is  non-reflective,  or  super-reflective. 
If  things  are  not  what  they  are  known  as,  then  they  are  not  what 
they  are  known  as  to  a  describer.  The  point  of  this  objection 
will  be  obvious  if  it  is  remembered  that  it  is  the  method  of  '  direct 
description'  which  enables  Dewey  to  distinguish  between  the 
'cognitional '  and  the  '  non-cognitional '  activities  of  life,  and  make 
thought  the  servant  of  action.  If  Dewey's  descriptive  method 
is  not  reflective,  then  there  is  no  such  thing  as  reflection. 

Passing  for  the  moment  from  this  criticism,  which  is  not  apt 
to  be  convincing  in  such  abstract  form,  it  may  be  well  to  consider 
for  a  time  the  psychology  upon  which  Dewey's  logical  theory  is 
grounded:  the  psychology  which  is  established  by  the  'direct 
descriptive  method.' 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  nervous  correlates  of  experience, 
Dewey's  theory  involves  two  postulates:  first,  that  customary 
conduct  is  carried  on  by  an  habitual  set  of  nervous  adjustments, 
and,  second,  that  reflection  is  a  process  whereby  new  reactions 
are  established  when  habitual  modes  of  response  fail  to  meet  a 
critical  situation. 

It  must  be  clearly  recognized  that,  so  far  as  the  nervous 
system  is  concerned,  the  scheme  is  highly  speculative.  The 
advance  made  by  physiology  towards  an  analysis  and  under- 
standing of  the  minute  and  specialized  parts  of  the  nervous 
organism  has  necessarily  been  slow  and  uncertain.  Whatever 

i  "The  Experimental  Method,"  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  240. 


124  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

plausibility  Dewey's  theory  possesses  must  depend,  not  upon 
the  technical  results  of  neurology,  but  upon  the  external  evidence 
which  seems  to  justify  some  such  scheme  of  nervous  organization. 

An  examination  of  this  evidence  shows  that  it  falls  under  two 
main  heads:  (i)  facts  drawn  from  the  observation  of  the  outward 
behavior  of  the  organism,  and  (2)  facts  derived  from  an  intros- 
pective analysis  of  the  thought-process. 

The  study  of  behavior  shows  that  man  thinks  only  now  and 
then.  Most  of  his  conduct  is,  literally,  thoughtless.  It  is  said 
that  thought  is  outwardly  manifested  by  a  characteristic  attitude, 
marked  by  hesitation  and  an  obvious  effort  at  adjustment.  The 
introspective  analysis  of  the  thought-process  shows  that  it  alone, 
among  experiences,  is  accompanied  by  analysis,  abstraction, 
and  mediation.  Again,  both  the  internal  and  external  evidence 
show  that  a  puzzling  situation  (whose  nervous  correlate  is  a 
conflict  of  impulses)  is  the  stimulus  which  awakens  thought. 
These  are  important  items  in  the  list  of  evidence  which  supports 
the  functional  theory. 

It  would  be  a  tedious  and  unnecessary  task  to  subject  each 
[of  these  bits  of  evidence  to  empirical  criticism.  It  will  be  better 
to  deal  with  them  by  showing  that  they  do  not  necessarily  imply 
functionalism,  since  they  are  compatible  with  a  psychology 
directly  opposed  to  the  fundamental  assumptions  of  Dewey 
theory. 

'  It  is  doubtless  true  that  men  think  only  occasionally  and  with 
some  reluctance.  This  is  a  common  observation.  What  is  to 
be  made  of  this  intermittance  of  thought?  The  evidence  merely 
shows  that  man  is  more  wide  awake,  energetic,  and  alert  at  some 
times  than  at  others.  On  these  occasions  every  faculty  of  the 
organism  is  in  operation,  higher  as  well  as  lower  centres  are 
pitched  to  a  high  degree  of  responsiveness,  not  at  hap-hazard, 
to  be  sure,  but  apropos — tuned  to  the  situation.  In  saying  that 
men  think  only  now  and  then  nothing  more  is  necessarily  implied 
than  that  men  are  for  the  most  part  sluggish  and  indifferent,  and 
the  periods  of  high  intensification  of  the  normal  processes  contrast 
sharply  with  the  habitual  lethargy  of  conduct. 

Against  Dewey,  it  will  be  maintained  here  that  thought  cannot 


CONCLUSIONS.  125 

be  defined  as  a  special  kind  of  activity  considered  from  the  side 
of  the  organism.  The  life  processes  are  constantly  welded  into  a 
single  unified  activity,  which  may,  as  a  whole,  be  directed  upon 
different  objects.  Thus,  from  the  side  of  its  objects,  this  life 
activity  may  be  called  eating,  running,  reading,  and  whatever 
else  one  chooses.  Thinking,  from  this  standpoint,  may  be  defined 
as  the  direction  of  effort  upon  symbols  and  abstract  terms.  But 
thinking  in  this  case  would  be  identified  on  the  basis  of  its  con- 
tent, not  in  terms  of  special  nervous  activities  in  the  organism. 
Whether,  therefore,  thinking  signifies  that  intense  periodical 
activity  which  has  been  noted,  or  preoccupation  with  a  certain 
kind  of  subject-matter,  it  in  no  case  implies  the  operation  of  a 
special  organic  faculty  of  the  type  described  by  Dewey. 

But,  again,  it  is  said  that  true  reflection  is  marked  by  a  certain 
characteristic  bodily  attitude,  which  bespeaks  inner  conflict  and  a 
search  for  adjustment.  This  contention  seems  to  have  little 
ground  in  fact.  The  puzzled,  hesitating,  undecided  expression 
that  is  usually  supposed  to  betray  deep  cogitation  may  in  fact 
mean  simply  hesitation  and  bewilderment, — the  need  for  thought, 
rather  than  its  presence.  The  expression  reveals  a  certain 
degree  of  incompetence  and  sluggishness  in  the  individual  con- 
cerned, and  signifies  a  lack  of  wide-awakeness  and  responsiveness. 
A  student  puzzling  over  his  algebra,  a  speaker  extemporizing  an 
argument,  a  ball-player  using  all  his  resources  to  defeat  the 
enemy,  have  attitudes  so  unlike  that  no  analysis  could  discover 
in  them  a  common  form  of  expression.  And  yet  it  would  be 
madness  to  deny  that  thinking  attends  their  various  performances. 
There  is,  in  short,  no  evidence  from  the  side  of  bodily  expression 
to  indicate  the  presence  in  man  of  a  special  nervous  faculty  called 
reflection. 

Consider  next  the  contention  that  the  cue  to  thought  is  a 
puzzling  situation,  involving  a  problem.  No  problem,  no 
thought;  no  thought,  no  problem. X  This  may  mean  either  that  a 
man  finding  himself  in  a  difficult  situation  uses  all  his  energy 
and  resource  to  escape  from  it,  or,  that  he  never  concerns  himself 
with  abstract  symbols  except  under  the  spur  of  necessity.  The 
former  meaning  contains  some  truth,  but  the  latter  is  what 


126  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

Dewey  would  call  a  'dark  saying.'  If  by  'thought'  be  meant 
that  period  of  high  activity  of  all  the  faculties  which  is  only 
occasional,  it  is  doubtless  true  enough  that  a  problem  is  fre- 
quently needed  to  awaken  it.  Man  is  content  to  let  life  glide 
along  with  a  minimum  of  effort;  he  cannot,  if  he  would,  long 
maintain  the  state  of  high  activity  here  called  'thinking.'  As  a 
consequence  of  not  thinking  when  he  should,  man  frequently 
finds  himself  involved  in  situations  requiring  the  exercise  of  all 
the  energy  and  resource  he  possesses.  But  the  really  efficient 
'thinker'  is  the  man  who  keeps  his  eyes  open,  who  sees  ahead. 
He  is  not  efficient  merely  because  of  the  excellence  of  his  estab- 
lished modes  of  response,  but,  more  particularly,  because  he  is 
alive  and  alert.  His  thinking  is  effective  in  preventing  difficult 
situations,  as  well  as  in  getting  out  of  them. 

Defining  'thought,'  however,  as  the  direction  of  activity  upon 
symbols  and  conceptions,  there  seems  to  be  little  warrant  for 
asserting  that  it  functions  only  on  the  occasion  of  a  concrete, 
specific  problem.  One  would  say,  on  the  contrary,  that  this 
would  be  an  unfavorable  occasion  for  the  study  of  fundamental 
principles,  whether  scientific  or  practical.  Summing  up  the 
external  evidence,  then,  one  would  say  that  it  accords  as  well 
with  the  hypothesis  that  the  life  processes  constitute  a  single 
activity  directed  upon  various  objects,  as  with  the  hypothesis 
that  thought  is  a  very  special  organic  activity,  having  a  special 
biological  function.  At  least,  the  evidence  for  the  existence  of 
such  a  special  faculty  is  dubious  and  uncertain. 

What  does  the  internal  evidence  prove?  The  analysis  of 
thought  contained  in  James's  chapter  on  "Reasoning"  in  the 
Principles  of  Psychology  has  been  the  guide  for  Dewey  and  other 
pragmatists  in  this  connection.1  James  undertakes  to  show  that 
reasoning  is  marked  off  from  other  processes  by  the  employ- 
ment of  analysis,  abstraction,  and  the  use  of  mediating  terms. 
It  must  be  urged  here,  not  only  against  James,  but  against  a 
considerable  modern  tradition,  that  this  account  of  thinking  is 
misleading  and  inaccurate.  The  question  to  be  faced,  of  course, 
is  whether  the  processes  of  thought  differ  radically  from  the  non- 

1  See  the  review  of  Dewey's  essay,  "The  Experimental  Method,"  in  Chapter 
VII  of  this  study,  p.  91  ff. 


CONCLUSIONS.  127 

reflective  processes  in  kind,  or  whether  they  are  simply  the  inten- 
sification of  processes  which  attend  all  conscious  life.  It  should 
be  noted  that  no  concession  is  made  to  the  notion  that  thinking 
is  a  special  kind  of  process;  only  its  subject-matter  is  special,  or 
else  thought  is  simply  a  period  of  wide-awakeness  and  alertness. 
In  the  latter  sense,  thought  involves  an  intensification  of  the 
powers  of  observation,  an  awakening  of  memory,  a  general 
stimulation  of  all  the  faculties.  It  calls  for  the  fullest  possible 
apprehension,  demands  the  most  complete  insight  into  the  nature 
of  the  situation  that  the  capacities  can  provide.  The  contrast 
between  the  adequate  view  of  reality  achieved  in  this  manner 
and  the  common  and  inadequate  apprehension  of  ordinary  life 
is  very  great,  and  might  easily  lead  to  the  supposition  that  think- 
ing (so  understood)  contains  elements  which  are  added  through 
the  activities  of  a  special  nerve  process. 

But  is  it  only  in  such  moments  that  we  deliberately  resolve  a 
situation  into  its  elements,  and  abstract  an  '  essence '  to  serve  as  a 
middle  term  in  inference?  It  is  certain  that  at  such  moments 
these  processes  are  more  distinct  than  at  other  times;  but  the 
whole  situation,  for  that  matter,  stands  out  more  clearly  and 
distinctly.  Perception  is  keener,  memory  more  definite,  feeling 
more  intense.  In  less  degree,  however,  all  attention  involves 
analysis  and  abstraction.  Experience  has  always  a  focus  and  a 
margin;  there  is  a  constant  selecting  and  analyzing  out  of  im- 
portant elements,  which  in  turn  lead  to  further  conclusions  and 
acts,  through  associations  by  contiguity  and  similarity.  This 
process  appears  in  an  intensified  form  in  the  high  moments  of 
life.  In  short,  thought  and  passive  perception  are  differentiated, 
not  by  the  elements  which  compose  them,  but  by  the  degree  of 
energy  that  goes  into  perception,  memory,  feeling,  and  discrimi- 
nation. There  is  nothing  in  the  evidence  to  show  that  thinking 
is  a  special  kind  of  activity,  which  operates  now  and  then.  On 
the  contrary,  there  is  every  reason  to  hold  to  the  position  that 
the  life  processes  are  one  and  inseparable,  operating  continually 
in  conjunction. 

What  shall  be  said,  then,  with  reference  to  the  assertion  that 
thought  operates  in  the  interests  of  the  non-cognitive  life  pro- 


128  JOHN  DEWEY' S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

cesses?  That  it  comes  'after  something  and  for  the  sake  of 
something,'  namely,  'direct'  experience?  Since  the  separation 
of  the  activities  into  various  'functions'  cannot  be  allowed,  by 
occasional  thought  must  then  be  meant  those  moments  of  ener- 
getic aliveness  described  above.  Translating,  Dewey's  theory 
would  read  something  like  this:  Man  employs  his  faculties  to 
the  fullest  extent  only  when  he  is  compelled  to  do  so.  He  gets 
along  habitually,  that  is,  with  a  minimum  of  effort,  as  long  as  he 
can,  but  rouses  himself  and  makes  an  earnest  effort  to  com- 
prehend the  world  only  when  his  environment  presents  him 
with  difficulties  which  demand  solution.  The  test  of  man's 
thinking  consists  in  its  efficiency  in  getting  him  out  of  trouble, 
and  enabling  him  to  return  to  his  habitual  modes  of  sub-conscious 
conduct  with  a  minimum  of  annoyance.  In  short,  thinking  is  an 
instrument  which  subserves  man's  natural  laziness,  and  its  test 
is  the  efficiency  with  which  it  promotes  an  easy,  or,  at  any  rate,  a 
satisfactory  mode  of  existence. 

No  doubt  some  men,  perhaps  many  men,  do  follow  such  a 
programme ;  but  it  would  not  be  kind  to  Nature  to  assert  that  she 
planned  it  so. 

This  separation  of  the  activities  of  life  into  several  distinct 
processes  having  each  a  special  function  looks  like  a  survival  of  the 
old  faculty  psychology,  against  which  modern  thought  has  pro- 
tested as  much  as  against  anything  whatever.  The  conception 
of  the  organic  processes  as  separate  in  action  has  all  the  faults  of  a 
merely  mechanical  representation  of  consciousness.  Doubtless 
some  advantage  is  to  be  obtained,  for  purposes  of  investigation, 
by  treating  thought,  appreciation,  and  affection  separately; 
but  it  is  a  serious  error  to  take  this  provisional  distinction  as  real. 
It  is  a  curious  fact  that  Dewey,  with  all  his  opposition  to  such 
modes  of  procedure,  himself  falls  into  this  abstract  way  of  treat- 
ing the  'functions'  of  experience,  seeing  not  the  beam  that  is  in 
his  own  eye. 

It  is  this  very  form  of  treatment,  strangely  enough,  which 

j .  enables  Dewey  to  call  biology  to  the  support  of  his  interpretation 

(/  of  the  function  of  knowledge.     According   to   the   Darwinian 

theory,  survival  of  the  species  is  dependent  upon  the  development 


CONCLUSIONS.  129 

of  special  structures  and  capacities  which  enable  the  organism  to 
adjust  itself  to  its  environment.  Dewey  finds,  following  a 
familiar  argument,  that  the  lower  animals  are  adapted  to  their 
environment  by  special  habits  of  reaction  which  are  relatively 
fixed  and  inelastic.  Man,  on  the  contrary,  has  an  exceedingly 
plastic  nervous  system,  which  enables  him  to  meet  changing 
conditions.  Man  is  not  only  highly  adapted,  but  highly  adapt- 
able. This  trait  of  plasticity,  or  adaptability,  Dewey  believes, 
is  a  product  of  natural  selection,  and,  of  course,  in  the  final 
analysis,  this  high  degree  of  plasticity  is  the  thought  function. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  this  treatment  of  thought 
is  highly  speculative.  Dewey  offers  little  concrete  evidence  to 
support  his  position;  indeed,  it  would  require  the  labor  of  a 
Darwin  to  supply  the  needed  evidence.  Instead  of  grounding 
his  theories  upon  the  results  of  science,  Dewey  adapts  the  ever 
elastic  '  evolutionary  method '  (not  really  that  of  biological  evolu- 
tion, however  indeterminate)  to  his  own  scheme  of  things.  It 
would  be  hard  to  discover  in  philosophical  literature  a  method 
more  purely  theoretical  and  even  dialectical  than  that  whereby 
Dewey  gives  his  logical  theory  the  support  of  evolutionary  theory. 

The  ultimately  mechanical  tendencies  of  his  argument  are 
conspicuous,  in  spite  of  all  disclaimers.  The  effect  of  his  analysis 
is  to  set  plasticity  or  adaptability  off  by  itself,  as  a  special  trait 
or  feature  of  the  nervous  system.  The  lower  forms  of  life 
are  governed,  we  are  told,  by  fixed  reflexes,  and  the  trait  of 
adaptability  appears  at  some  higher  stage  in  the  process  as  a 
superadded  capacity  of  the  nervous  system,  correlated,  no  doubt, 
with  special  nervous  structures.  Evolutionism  would  not  serve 
Dewey  so  well,  had  he  not  previously  made  this  separation 
between  the  organic  functions  and  their  correlated  structures; 
but,  given  this  abstract  treatment  of  the  life  processes,  he  is  able 
to  make  the  doctrine  of  selection  contribute  to  its  support.  In 
opposition  to  Dewey's  argument,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  con- 
tend that  plasticity  is  inherent  in  all  nervous  substance.  The 
higher  organisms  are  more  adaptable,  because  there  is  more  to  be 
modified  in  them, — more  nerves  and  synapses,  more  pliability. 
There  is  no  sound  empirical  reason  for  accepting  Dewey's  bio- 
logical conclusions. 


130  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

Taking  Dewey's  theory  at  its  face  value, — and  it  would  be 
presumptuous  to  search  for  hidden  meanings, — its  net  result 
is  to  place  the  function  of  knowing  in  an  embarrassing  situation 
with  respect  to  its  capacity  for  giving  a  correct  report  of  reality. 
Dewey  expressly  denies,  indeed,  that  the  purpose  of  knowing  is 
to  give  an  account  of  the  nature  of  things.  Reality,  he  asserts, 
is  whatever  it  is  'experienced  as  being,'  and  it  is  normally  ex- 
perienced in  other  ways  than  by  being  known.  The  nature  of 
reality  is  not  hidden  behind  a  veil,  to  be  searched  out;  but  is 
here  and  now,  as  it  comes  and  goes  in  the  form  of  passing  expe- 
rience. Knowing  is  designed  to  transform  experience,  not  to 
bring  it  within  the  survey  of  consciousness. 

How  does  it  stand,  then,  with  Dewey's  own  account  of  the 
knowledge  process?  He  has  reflected  upon  experience,  and 
claims  to  have  given  a  correct  account  of  its  nature.  Dewey's 
conception  of  the  processes  of  experience  is  genuinely  conceptual, 
a  thought  product,  designed  to  furnish  a  solid  basis  for  belief 
and  calculation.  But  reflection,  by  his  own  account,  is  shut  in 
to  its  own  moment,  cannot  apprehend  the  true  nature  of  'non- 
cognitional'  experiences,  and  cannot,  therefore,  deal  adequately 
with  any  problems  except  such  as  are  furnished  it  by  other 
'functions.'  No  wonder  that ' anti-intellectualism '  should  result 
from  such  a  conception  of  knowledge. 

Philosophers  have  always  held  that  the  purpose  of  reflection 
(whatever  reflection  may  be,  psychologically)  is  the  attainment 
of  a  reliable  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  world.  Practical 
considerations  compel  this  view.  Ordinary,  casual  observation 
is  superficial  and  unsystematic;  it  never  penetrates  beneath  the 
surface.  Doubtless  reality  is,  in  some  degree,  what  it  is  in  unre- 
flective  moments;  but  it  is  frequently  something  more,  as  man 
learns  to  his  sorrow.  Reflection  displaces  the  casual,  haphazard 
attitude,  in  the  attempt  to  get  at  the  real  nature  of  the  world. 

The  results  of  reflection,  moreover,  are  cumulative.  It  tends  to 
build  up,  by  gradual  accretions,  a  conceptual  view  of  reality 
which  may  serve  as  a  relatively  stable  basis  for  conduct  and  cal- 
culation. Thought  does,  indeed,  possess  a  transforming  function. 
The  reasoned  knowledge  of  things  is  gradually  extended  beyond 


CONCLUSIONS.  131 

the  occasional  moments  of  inquiring  thought,  supplanting  the 
casual  view  with  a  more  penetrating  insight;  reality  becomes  more 
and  better  known,  and  less  merely  experienced. 

Dewey  reverses  this  view  in  a  curious  manner.  It  is  'experi- 
ence' that  is  built  up  by  the  action  of  thought,  not  knowledge 
itself.  This  play  on  terms  might  be  innocuous,  if  it  were  not 
accompanied  by  his  separation  of  the  knowing  function  from  ' 
others.  Dewey  makes  'knowing'  the  servant  of  'direct  expe- 
rience '  by  giving  it  the  function  of  reconstructing  the  habits  of 
the  organism,  in  order  that  unreflective  experience  may  be 
maintained  with  a  minimum  of  effort.  The  non-reflective  expe- 
rience becomes  the  valuable  experience,  and  knowledge  is  made 
to  minister  unto  it.  This  is  truly  a  '  transvaluation  of  values.' 

Dewey  asks:  "What  is  it  that  makes  us  live  alternately  in  a 
concrete  world  of  experience  in  which  thought  as  such  finds  not 
satisfaction,  and  in  a  world  of  ordered  thought  which  is  yet  only 
abstract  and  ideal?"1  This  sharp  separation  of  thought  from 
action  is  vigorously  maintained.  Following  are  some  of  the 
terms  by  means  of  which  the  difference  between  direct  and 
reflective  experience  is  expressed:  'direct  practice,'  'derived 
theory;'  'primary  construction,'  'secondary  criticism;'  'living 
appreciation,'  'abstract  description;'  'active  endeavor,'  'pale 
reflection.'2  This  casual,  easy  distinction  escapes  criticism  be- 
cause it  seems  harmless  and  unimportant.  The  distinction, 
however,  is  not  real.  It  does  not  correspond  to  the  simple  facts  , 
of  life.  Thinking,  far  from  being  'pale  reflection,'  is  often  a 
strenuous  and  energetic  'activity.'  Reflection,  not  'direct  expe- 
rience,' is  often,  at  least,  at  the  high  moment  of  life.  Experience 
becomes  unmeaning  on  any  other  basis.  'Living  appreciation' 
and  'primary  construction'  involve  thought  in  a  high  degree; 
'pale  reflection'  is  lazy  contemplation,  lacking  the  spark  of  life 
that  characterizes  true  thought. 

There  is  no  escape  from  Dewey's  needlessly  alarming  conclu- 
sions, except  by  maintaining  that  thought  accompanies  all 
conscious  life,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  and  that  the  moment  of 
real,  earnest  thinking  is  at  the  high  tide  of  life,  when  all  the 

1  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  4. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  2. 


I32  JOHN  DEWETS  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

powers  are  awake  and  operating.  Thought  must  be  made 
integral  with  all  other  activities,  a  feature  of  the  total  life  or- 
ganization, rather  than  an  isolated  phenomenon.  Man  is  a 
thinking  organism,  not  an  organism  with  a  thinker. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  for  a  moment  that  by  'thought'  is 
here  meant  the  activity  of  a  merely  subjective  knower.  Dewey 
does,  indeed,  deal  effectively  with  the  subjective  ego,  and  with 
representative  perceptionism.  But  by  'thought'  is  here  meant 
reflection,  judgment,  inference;  and  in  this  sense  thought  is  said 
to  be  present  in  all  experience.  There  can  be  no  question  of  the 
relation  of  thought,  so  understood,  to  reality;  for  the  reason 
that  it  has  been  so  integrated  with  experience  as  to  be  inseparable 
from  it.  Setting  aside  knowing  as  the  awareness  of  a  conscious 
subject,  there  remains  an  issue  with  Dewey  concerning  the  actual 
place  of  thought,  as  an  empirical  process,  in  experience,  and  the 
issue  must  be  settled  on  definite  and  really  empirical  grounds. 
So  much,  then,  for  '  f unctionalism '  and  its  psychology. 

Something  should  be  said,  before  closing  this  discussion, 
concerning  philosophical  methods  in  general,  since  Dewey's 
psychological  approach  to  the  problems  of  philosophy  must  be 
held  responsible  for  his  anti-intellectualistic  results,  with  their 
sceptical  implications.  In  the  beginning  of  his  career,  as  has 
been  seen,  Dewey  adopted  the  'psychological  method,'  and  he 
has  adhered  to  it  consistently  ever  since.  This  initial  attitude, 
although  he  was  not  aware  of  it  for  many  years,  cut  him  off  from 
the  community  of  understanding  that  exists  among  modern 
idealists  concerning  the  proper  aims  and  purposes  of  philosophical 
inquiry.  Although  at  first  a  professed  follower  of  Green  and 
Caird,  Dewey's  method  was  not  reconcilable  with  idealistic 
procedure,  and  in  a  very  real  sense  he  never  was  an  idealist. 
The  virulence  of  his  later  attacks  on  '  intellectualism '  may  be 
explained  in  terms  of  his  reaction  against  a  philosophical  method 
which  interfered  with  the  development  of  his  own  'naturalistic* 
tendencies. 

The  method  of  idealism,  or  speculative  philosophy,  is  logical; 
,  but  it  may  perfectly  well  be  empirical  at  the  same  time.  To  the 


CONCLUSIONS.  133 

anti-intellectualist  empirical  logic  is  an  anomaly,  a  red  blue-bird, 
so  to  speak.  The  philosophical  logician  is  represented  as  one 
who  evolves  reality  out  of  his  own  consciousness;  who  labors 
with  the  concepts  which  have  their  abode  in  the  mental  sphere, 
and,  by  means  of  the  principle  of  contradiction,  forces  them 
into  harmony  until  they  provide  a  perfectly  consistent  represen- 
tation of  the  external  world  which,  because  of  its  perfect  ration- 
ality, must  somehow  correspond  with  the  cosmic  reality.  In 
spite  of  the  fact  that  no  man  possesses,  at  least  in  a  sane  condi- 
tion, the  mental  equipment  requisite  for  such  a  performance, 
certain  critics  have  not  hesitated  to  impute  this  kind  of  logical 
procedure  to  the  idealists.  To  quote  from  Dewey  himself: 
"For  modern  philosophy  is,  as  every  college  senior  recites, 
epistemology ;  and  epistemology,  as  perhaps  our  books  and  lec- 
tures sometimes  forget  to  tell  the  senior,  has  absorbed  Stoic 
dogma.  Passionless  imperturbability,  absolute  detachment, 
complete  subjection  to  a  ready-made  and  finished  reality  ...  is 
its  professed  ideal.  .  .  .  Philosophy  has  dreamed  the  dream  of  a 
knowledge  which  is  other  than  the  propitious  outgrowth  of 
beliefs  that  shall  develop  aforetime  their  ulterior  implications 
in  order  to  recast  them  .  .  .  ,  the  dream  of  a  knowledge  that 
has  to  do  with  objects  having  no  nature  save  to  be  known."1 

This  charge  against  modern  idealism  has  little  foundation. 
Speculative  philosophy  repudiated,  long  ago,  the  '  epistemological 
standpoint'  as  defined  by  Dewey.  Idealists  have  not  fostered 
the  conception  of  a  knowing  subject  shut  in  to  its  own  states, 
seeking  information  about  an  impersonal  reality  over  against 
itself.  Note,  for  example,  this  comment  of  Pringle-Pattison  on 
Kant,  made  over  thirty-five  years  ago:  "The  distinction  between 
mind  and  the  world,  which  is  valid  only  from  a  certain  point  of 
view,  he  took  as  an  absolute  separation.  He  took  it,  to  use  a 
current  phrase,  abstractly — that  is  to  say,  as  a  mere  fact,  a  fact 
standing  by  itself  and  true  in  any  reference.  And  of  course 
when  two  things  are  completely  separate,  they  can  only  be 
brought  together  by  a  bond  which  is  mechanical,  external,  and 

1  "Beliefs  and  Existences,"  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  172  f. 


134  JOHN  DEWEY'S  LOGICAL   THEORY. 

accidental  to  the  real  nature  of  both."1  Dewey  himself  never 
condemned  '  epistemology '  more  effectively.  But  it  is  useless 
to  cite  instances,  for  any  serious  student  familiar  with  the  litera- 
ture of  modern  philosophy  ought  to  know  that  'idealism'  has 
never  really  been  '  epistemological'  in  the  sense  meant  by  Dewey 
and  his  disciples.  Subjectivism  is  not  idealism, — the  stolid 
dogmatism  of  neo-realism  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

Idealism  holds,  speaking  more  positively,  that  philosophers 
must  submit  the  conceptions  and  methods  which  they  employ 
to  a  preliminary  immanent  criticism,  in  order  to  determine  the 
limits  within  which  they  may  be  validly  applied.  Every  genuine 
category  or  method  is  valid  within  a  certain  sphere  of  relevance, 
and  the  business  of  criticism  is  to  determine  by  empirical  in- 
vestigation or  by  'ideal  experiment'  (which  means  much  the 
same  thing)  what  concrete  significance  the  conception  is  capable 
of  bearing.  Dewey,  from  the  standpoint  of  idealism,  is  guilty  of 
a  somewhat  uncritical  use  of  the  categories  of  '  description  *  -and 
'evolution.'  Are  the  categories  of  biology  fitted  to  explain  mind 
and  spirit?  Instead  of  instituting  an  inquiry  designed  to  answer 
that  question,  Dewey  accepts  'evolutionism'  as  final,  and  at- 
tempts to  force  all  phenomena  into  conformity  with  his  resulting 
logical  scheme.  He  misses  the  valuable  checks  upon  thought 
which  are  furnished  by  the  'critical  method,'  and  is  none  too 
sensitive  to  the  technical  results  of  the  special  sciences. 

The  logical  approach  to  philosophy  strictly  involves  certain 
implications  which  have  been  overlooked  by  many  of  its  critics. 
/  It  may  well  be  admitted  that  our  real  categories  are  not  fixed  and 
final,  but  are  perpetually  in  process  of  reconstruction.  The 
process  of  criticism  inevitably  makes  manifest  the  human  and 
empirical  character  of  the  particular  forms  of  reflective  thought. 
It  recognizes  the  fact  of  development,  both  in  knowledge  and  in 
reality,  and  by  this  very  recognition  the  value  of  knowledge  is  en- 
hanced. It  is  forced,  by  the  very  nature  of  its  method,  to  recog- 
nize the  concrete  and  practical  bearings  of  thought.  Indeed, 
there  is  a  sense  in  which  idealism  would  declare  that  therejgjlQ-* 

1  The  Philosophical  Radicals,  p.  297.  The  essay  in  which  it  occurs,  "  Philosophy 
as  a  Criticism  of  Categories,"  was  first  published  in  1883,  in  the  volume  Essays  on 
Philosophical  Criticism. 


CONCLUSIONS.  135 

thought — when  thought,  that  is,  is  taken  to  mean  an  isolated 
fact  out  of  relation  to  the  world.  It  is  not  possible  to  make  this 
retort  upon  the  critics  of  idealism  without  recognizing  that  there 
has  been  a  vast  misjudgment,  amounting  almost  to  misrepresen- 
tation, of  the  intellectual  ideals  of  modern  speculative  philosophy. 

To  conclude,  it  is  neither  by  abstract  logical  processes,  nor 
yet  by  the  dogmatic  employment  of  scientific  categories,  that 
philosophy  makes  progress,  but  by  an  empirical  process  which 
unites  criticism  and  experiment.  In  speaking  of  the  develop- 
ment of  modern  idealism,  Bosanquet  says:  "All  difficulties  about 
the  general  possibility — the  possibility  in  principle — of  appre- 
hending reality  in  knowledge  and  preception  were  flung  aside  as 
antiquated  lumber.  What  was  undertaken  was  the  direct 
adventure  of  knowing;  of  shaping  a  view  of  the  universe  which 
should  include  and  express  reality  in  its  completeness.  The  test 
and  criterion  were  not  any  speculative  assumption  of  any  kind 
whatever^  They  were  the  direct  work  of  the  function  of  know- 
ledge in  exhibiting  what  could  and  what  could  not  maintain 
itself  when  all  the  facts  were  confronted  and  set  in  the  order  they 
themselves  demanded.  The  method  of  inquiry  was  ideal  experi- 
ment."1 

When  all  has  been  said,  this  method  remains  the  natural  and 
normal  one.  Dewey's  'psychological  method,'  by  contrast, 
seems  strained  and  far-fetched,  an  artificial  and  externally 
motived  attempt  to  guide  the  intellect,  which  only  by  depending 
upon  its  own  resources  and  its  own  increasing  insight  can  hope 
to  attain  the  distant  and  difficult,  but  never  really  foreign  goal. 

1  "Realism  and  Metaphysics,"  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXVI,  1917,  p.  8. 


UNIT'- 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or  J 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 

i  RECTD  LD 


REC'D  _ 


re*-^  D  L.D 

,    NOV   11961 

'V63WH 

REC'D  LI 

) 

JUS  18196 

3 

iw$^ 

p 

S3* 


LD  21A-50m-4,'60 
2slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


$ 

*v 

D-^'i 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


